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The Xnaian ocean has b^ CKne geographically Inportant due 
to the strategic location of iiaportant straits» gulfs and oi l 
resources, ^ e strait of Bahel mndeb occupies e gate way 
position to the Red Sea* on tl» other hri»3 the Red Sea and the 
l^aiterranean arc connected Iqr the Suez Canal* providing 
shortest route bett^een Europe and the AustralAaS/^ ^ The 
coionercial relations bctii^en l ittoral and non-littoral states 
are detercnii^d by this canal <i.*^he Aden Gulf is a sort of a 
bottleneck.. Ttie straits of Horiouz have becoioe one of the most 
vital strait of the «.orld on accx>und('of the peninsular projection 
into the pcirsian Gui>i|^ .'-^ ., 
The islands and archipelagoes of the South western part 
of the XndJ^ n ocean are strategically iiaportant for sone 
countries. The British Indian ocean Territory (BXor)« the 
construction of the military base at Diego Garcia and tiie French 
use of the Malaysia highlight the geo-strategic significance of 
this region* 
The iiBportance of the Indian Ocean is also due to i t s 
connection with the Atlantic ocean tlarough the Cape of Good 
Hope* The Super oil tankers supply i s possible only through the 
route of ths Cape of Good Hcspe* on account of their large s iee . 
In this wa;/ the security of the Cape of Good Hope is conditional 
for o i l supply to the western t^arld. The geo-strategic ioportance 
of the area determines ttm close relations bet%«en United States 
and South Mr lea . 
The presence of vast natural resources ana tbe global 
acraiBble for the same has iiKxease<3 the s t r a t e ^ c ispportance of 
the Xnaian 0<5ean eoore* 
Tkm a^}eQ€tency c^ the ecoricMies of the v<estern i n ^ ^ t r i e l 
countries amS of Japan on the continuation of secure o i l s u l l i e s 
from the f>eri9ian Gulf had proved after the ootusber 1973 war. For 
this* the area h i^s becoBie a factor in global s trategic consideration* 
T\m economies of the OECD and the Persian Gulf have been linked 
and the occuinilated petro'-dollars tiere used and invested in OEC& 
countries only for the purpose to raake the western oarksts 
dependent vqpim the purchase poii^r of the petrodollars* ^ l^e 
united States trade interest In the Indian ocean metm t^arth 
$ 40 as agaii30t $90 million with iiestern Europe and Japan after 
the o i l s<3iieeae* The freequent cruds o i l price of tiie QPBC 
countries has led to similar trends in ^nat ional economies of 
a l l aavelope osuntries of the «iorld* 
Besiais i t s s trategic iB|>ortai»:e on account of large 
deposits of natural resources# and vi ta l conraaarcial routes each 
sub region oi' Indian ocean i s s trategical ly ii^portant in global 
pol i t ics* L<ich sub region of the Indian ocean te required a 
p a r t i cular s t u ^ due to i t s s t rategic iiqportance* 
lbs fltrategy of tim Suiter poireini qperate both a t ttie i s t e r -
Super power level ©na a t tl5© Si^psr power - Third woria level* fimre 
is e parallelietn between the strategies o£ both the Sia^r Po%»er8 • 
the Soviet strategy beii^ Q»etly a reactive one as a response to 
United States* in i t i a t ives . There£c»re« a study of the united 
states* strategy in the Indian cnsean i s a primary conditiem to 
understand the anaton^ of Stapsr pom '^srs strategies* 
The !j«iited States has clear s t rategic intez^sts and 
objectives in the Xndian Oceani 
'^ The \M has both a>nventiaaal and perhaps a s t ra tegic ni<iclear 
military interest in the %Jlian ocean* Milit^ury objectives for 
us conventional forces i^cluds the capability to (i> protect 
us economic interests in the Persian 6ulf« ( i i ) eniploy or threaten 
to use force in si;^port of IS <^losBtic objectives 1|| the Middle 
Bast« ( i i i ) seciare the Indian Ocean a i r and sea routes against 
harasensent or interdiction* (iv) intervene in support of other 
objectives in the l i t t o r a l and* related to a l l of these* 
(v) balance Soviet fotasn in the region and a t ta in superi<%rity in 
a cr i s i s* The US also possesses a potential s t ra tegic nuclear 
military objective of deploying* ^h&n necessary or eoavenient# 
b a l l i s t i c missiles subsoarines targeted <m the USSR. The 
preservation of {western access to Persian Gulf o i l resources and 
the caaintenance of a local geopelitical balance are the v i ta l 
in te res t of the United states* Tbe us believes tha t only the 
Soirlet actiom can orlgifoate any aeciain^ tlareat to the interests 
o£ the unitaa States. Soviet ectioo in Afghanistan and the Horn 
of Africa eviaencea the rea l i ty of this envisaged threat to the 
united Statets. soviet bases are si tuated on laaritit^ s trategic 
choke--|K3inter* due U> viihich i t s military poKer can he directly 
projected into the l i t t o r a l and i t is contiguous and overlooking 
the porsian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. The events of Afghanistan 
and Iran made t)% Soviet t t^ea t core nicnacing for the US as they 
had shifted the g e o - ^ l i t i c a l balance adverse to the us interests* 
Since a reduction of naval force in the area »ould only increase 
the prepond<£rance of land forces the Soviets have in the Soviet 
union and Aifghanistan they could \mll afford to clmfi|>ion the idea of 
an Indian ocean 2^ne of F^ace* 
Fi rs t of a l l a f e c i a l attention has to be given to the 
lor^ standing aiucieties of the l i t t o r a l states# which is the resul t 
of sul^narintss lai»iched Bal l is t ic Kissi le 's (SLBI^ deplo^ ^Eoeift in the 
Indian Oceai) by the united States before exai&iniixg the nature of 
the 3\3p6r p o ^ r presence* with the US introduction in 1964 of the 
long range. Polaris A-e ba l l i s t i c missiles and in 1971 o£ the 
Poseia^n C - 3 . . . . ix3th with a rai^e of 2&00 nautical miles «.*• th& 
Arabian Sea became a plausible deployiaant option for the US* the 
Trident C-3 esqpanded the SLBM range to 423o iBiles and the 
forthcoming developiaant of the Trident 11 Ci>S) missiles* with « 
range of 60{)0-pius nautical miles* both expanded the target area 
t^ithin the lj«r.! *:. and the accuracy of the missiles as unsli as 
the ocean area to be searched by the U«S«S.R* thm United states 
has o f f i c i a l l y denied such deploynent to the 2|)di«B Ocean but 
the Soviet SLBM Concern i s highly specolt^tive. fkm Soviet 
Union admitted non deplo^rment in the 1&77-78 Naval Atma Liraita-
t ion Talfcs vjhen i t agreed in principle to a free»i» The Soviets 
had entered the talks largely to foresta l l such a deployment* 
After all# the c loses t U*S* operating bases capable of 8i;qpporting 
a nuclear missile - carrying submarine are Guam in the K'estern 
Pacif ic and Rota in Spain, both such a great distance that 
transit times to and from the Indian ocean vouid s ignif icant ly 
reduce the on-station tint^ for each submarine. 
The range of Polaris and poseidon missi les is re la t ive ly 
l imited, and while the Trident s ign i f i es a marked iiqprovcment in 
that respects their presence in the Indian Ocean would greatly 
aggravate soviet Anti-submarine i^arfare (ASW) problcnass. StoJlta* 
neously U«S. targeti i^ f lex Uti l i ty vould be enhanced vis-«<«vi8 
some target4i in the sovtet union-because the Soviets woiitld find 
i t nK>8t d i f f icul t to deploy ASW forces there adequate to contain 
the threat of attack from the sea «••• The US sea based missile 
deployment i s influencive to detter any Soviet threat or 
deployment because of the best location provided by the Red 
Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. 
A tl-reat of Soviet i^ive to%;ards the Gulf Saudi Oil f ieldto 
has been portrayed as the need for the military measures by the 
United states. 
The followlf^ RtF coT±iget3Cime ere often uted ae ex&wpleat 
(e) protection of an ally (usually in the Middle Ea^t) 
against aggression by a foreign povett 
{to) protection of vital U.S. ecorK>isic interesta (also in 
the Middle Cast) « as in a tnissicm to defenctforeign oi l fields 
against either foreign invasion or dotoestic disturbancei 
(c) assistance to a friendly go^rroiient (perheqps in 
Let in Mnerilca) uhich is inca|>acltated by violent guerilla 
activity^ 
(d) intervention agaimst Soviet surrogate troops 
(perhaps Cubans) seeking territorial aggrandisBenient (perhaps in 
Africa) • 
Actiaally the RIF is going to be an intervention force 
tnrith the Gulf as i t s nsain area of c^erations* 
Die<3o Garcia viae o£ pivotal importance in the military 
and strategic measures • senne shortHterro and otiters nedium-terp 
decided \tpon at the beginning of 1980 (e.g. the security of 
rights to use military fac i l i t ies in the l i ttoral states^ the 
deployment of Marines* advance storage of arm om ships for use 
by the Rapid Deployment f^rce • (RDF) • 
ThB Svtpet poi^rs hmve cone to re ly heavily on sa te l l i tes# 
not only for conventional warfare* but also £or m nuclear 
conf l ic t . 
The US ASAT strategy will be global in i t s i^yproach to 
get the 0tK:cess and will need to be launctuadl in a multi* 
directionaSl^* multi-naode* oaordinated integrated opearation to 
sjLniultaneously intercept almost a l l Soviet s a t e l l i t e s only 
for the naiciinuiQ effect of ASAT systen. Soviet land mass and 
the regional south of i t including the Indian Ocean»^  Constitute 
nearly one th i rd of the ear th ' s surface. At any ODB tism, 
therefore* a large nuzober of Soviet s a t e l l i t e s may be expected 
to be over th is part of the globe* which tuay take as m\jch as 90 
minutes to get to areas under the direct Jurisdiction of the US 
at.d i t s a l l i e s ; and unacceptable level of time lag for successfxal 
ASAT strat(sgy. The ispCratives for the united States to be able 
to launch i^ ASAT v^apons in th is par t of tho globe* therefore* 
are obvious. And iK n^ce the l^^portance of the Xndian 0e6an and 
i t s l i t t o r a l especially when i t i s retnecdaered that the 
Southern hieiRisphere is niore c r i t i c a l . 
An iRportant eletnent of intrusion and ttm concomitant 
mili tary presence is formed by the Indian ocean rag ion in the 
po l i t i c s of united States as a par t of i t s global strategyt but 
i t is also l ikely to play a crucial role in space and s t ra tegic 
i).'arfare» 
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The Soviet union has become for a number of factors one 
of the roost poiv-erful Indian ocean hintarland s t a t e s . 
EnhaoceiS ac t iv i t ies and interests of the Soviet union 
in the Indian ocean are explained in terns of i t s growii^ 
de^nderare on the 8e& route tlsrough the Indian ocetm for laoveinent 
of goods bet^i^en the east and vest coasts of the country* The 
trana*Sibcrian r a i l route has reached i t s saturation point and the 
northern route through the Arctic ocean ge t s frozen In winter* 
The iinportsince o£ the Indian ocean for the Soviet union is due 
t o the seal^ xame si^port of the various space exploration. 
Since 1967 Sioviet Space Event supporting ships have been cont i -
nuously deployed in the Indian ocean which serves as an energeiKry 
sea recovery area for Soviet space ships* 
Beic )^ only a few hours ati^ ay by a i r from the Arabian Sce# 
the Persian Gulf« the Babel Handeb s t r a i t s and the Horn of 
Africa and also because of i t s arraed potential along the frontiers 
of the l i t t o r a l s ta tes of the north-^icstem Indian Ocean« the 
soviet union i s now in a position to become a cnost powerful 
hinterland s t a t e . The Soviet capability and aspiration of the 
{Dobil isation - potential have been demonstrcted in the mid^-seventies. 
The iu:w involveisent of the Soviet union with regional s ta tes was 
against thi» conparison of her ear l ier involvement* The 
prohibition of the western containmont of the Southern flank -
required csutual arrangetaents necessarily* Such arrai^einents 
involved bilateral agreeraents with Xndia# Egypt* Afghanistan* 
Burma and Xnaonesia. 
Soviet union*8 main purpose is to secure a *2one o£ 
Soviet penetration^, through the tvo measured %«apoiw namely 
the exploitzition of the regional instability and a general 
prqE>aganda eigainst the West* Soviet occupation in Afghanistan 
i s advantageous to the Soviet union vis-a-vis the Gulf region* 
A distance of only llOO kis* separates the Baku area of the USSR 
iTwa Abadan and Basra* and the Soviet union concentrates one of 
the strongest air<<»3ntingents in the area* Ihe Soviet union 
is trying to alter ttG military balance o£ forces step by step 
in this rcg:Lon to her own advantage* The &>viet union is trying 
i t s best thirough various atten^ts as* i t is tnaking increasing 
use of i t s strategic position and is leaving i t to the other 
side* only for the purpose to obtain large fac i l i t i e s in the 
Indian Ocean area* 
Soviist interests in the Indian (^ean are not only 
political* and economic Ixit strategic too* The development 
of ntacear ]30wered submarines capable of launching nuclear 
mediaais^ iran^ e bal l ist ic missiles increased the strategic 
significance of the Indian ocean for the Soviet union* The 
strategic t^sapon dsployraent can be dangerous against the Soviet 
union more than against the US (which i s altogether in a 
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different hcsodsptiere) on account o£ the physical conf iguraticm 
of the ZndJLan ocean. 7b nnntralise these weapon system and to 
present a s^ UaiXar threat to the mat, Soviet control in the 
Indian ocean is ncceseary. That is why# soviet sea denial 
s trategy sivlftcd to sea control strategy. The icqportaidte of the 
Indian ocean has ir^::rea8ed for the Soviet union* because i t 
provides a l l v;eather t rans i t routes for t ramfer o£ f leet units 
between the soviet Far Eastern and SLacH Sea fleets» Baltic and 
tiorthcrn fleets* These Soviet techniques become clear in the 
l i gh t of long-term planning. 
The objective of the Soviet policy in the 2hird world is 
not to prohibit tlie i^stern maritime trade and comioerce# but# to 
strengthen Soviet naval interventionist caqpacity ofily to 
neutral ise ivestem naval power* The subscription of Soviet policy 
i s neither to provoke a nuclear vex i tself nor hope of any 
nuclear atl;ack from the west# by hurting Soviet im^erests in 
those areasi* ^imte Soviet diplomacy has developed a stales* The 
main purpose of Soviet policy is to p<gpNaas1ri i t s moacm 
influenciv<» position in every possible area# through timely and 
decisive ii3ter vent ion« under a perception that western response 
would lo t lead to a head on clash* 
Soviet perception of the s t rategic iciportance of the 
Indian ocean for i tself is proved after i t s attSR^t of 
strengthening her pol i t ica l and military poi«er ia the region* 
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ft) ^im coRt]rol over t t» western v i ta l o i l l i£e l ine and to 
establ ish a t e r r i t o r i a l iiiteir£ereix:e in tim regiem* strategic 
geo]pK>litical gain is conditional. Terri torial encroaebment in 
the region »^i!Ould be definitely tccspting because t h i s liould mean 
a ganie in s trategic ternw 1^ having osntrol over the Gulf 
o i l lifelima of the west. Mith the help of the i^eakoess of 
buffer s ta tes and loss o£ nerve on the part of the i^ .est* the 
control over Gulf o i l l i f e lii% of the h'Bst tmy bo taken. 
'^e may reach a conclusion after examining the efoerging 
changes in military technology that a fai lure of global ara» 
control efforts* specially the coll i^se of tim * B n Treatyt 
could open the way for various £<xcwm of i^ e^ and destabilising 
mili tary act ivi ty in the Indian ocean by both super poimre, 
including possible nuclear deployioents* the aggravation of 
nuclear arjcities in the Indian ocean region e^B veil as in 
other parts of the viorld is the resul t of posed verification 
probleffis of Cruise missile deployments* The northi^n /Arabian 
sea <K>uld acquire special sensi t iv i ty in the context of U.S. 
an t i - s a t e l l i t e and other interception systems related to the 
s t ra tegic Defence Ini t ia t ive ana Soviet countermeasures on account 
of to give location* The present re la t ive s t ab i l i t y in su|»er 
power conventional naval deployments could abri;q;»tly change in 
a climate of increasing tension a t the global and regional level . 
The regional and eictra«cegional factors create continuing 
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liwt«biXity which could draw the Svqper powers into a direct 
con£rontatioii. The var Ut Afghanistan and the coecomitant 
conf l ic t (teveloping in the Afghanistan • paKifitaa borderlands# 
indO'Pak tenslonsi the Iran Iraq war and uncertainty surrounding 
the p o l i t i c a l future of Iran were the main points aniot^ the oKsre 
explosive focal points of instabil i ty* 
The main purpose of arms supplier countries was to 
secure an uninterrii^ted flow of o U by establishing a viable 
relatioifflhip at any cost . Probahly« the svq[>pller8* willingness 
of highly sophisticated e<^lpiaent*s supply to these countries 
was a low r isk. Ohere i s cot a s ingle recipient or o i l 
producing country in a posit ion to e»qploit and aalntaln the 
equipment adequately. This Inadequacy turns in the dependency 
of these recipients on suppliers even for the maintenance of 
the equipment. In th i s way the (^pendency of West Asian countries 
i s increasing day by day in respect of their natlo:3al security. 
The influx of petro«dollars did provlt^ the o i l r ich 
s t a t e s with tacans to enhance their military capabil i ty. 
Regional powers confrontation due to their arms prol i fe* 
rat ion poses a limited threat to world peace and security. When 
the reglona:L confront at ton i s linked up with Great Power rivalry 
and their Interests in a given area# then a serious threat 
i s posed not only to regional security and peace but also to the 
%^rld as a whole. 
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The anotlier notable reason of anm proliferat ion in the 
Indian Ocean is the direct military presence of Great Foners and 
the i r cc^abili t iea to project such presence at short notice in 
tha region* X£ arms proliferation is regarded as a quantmn 
^xxup in the c ^ a b i l i t y to use military coersion at mw tine, th i s 
variable a lon^ th the linkages o£ Greet powers vi th regional 
surrogates i^nd proxies* should be analysed very carefully. 
tsot a single country is there in the Indian ocean reland 
from the Co\pQ of Good Hope by t^ ay of the Horn of Africa* the 
Persian Gulf* the Arabian Sea* the Bay of Bes^al* the St ra i t of 
Malacca* to the Qrcat /«u8tralian Bi^ht* «hich ha& not signed a 
military pact or treaty with the united States or the soviet 
union in respect of security* ideology* pol i t i ca l convenience* 
economic pay otf* or expedience* in other woords for the sake of 
national interest* 
itliat is not clear is the party to be blamed for the 
mil i tar isat ion o£ the region - extra regional powers or the 
l i t t o r a l i t se l f . Actually* the extra regional potiers have only 
taken advantage of the local r iva l r ies and conflicts* 
The f i r s t formulation of the pre-eletiants of the peace 
zone in the Indian ocean icas cor>pleted in 1970 at the Iton-^ignsd 
Summit of Lusaka and subsequently ac t iv i t ies shifted to 
promoting the proposal within the united Nations* 
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The following vere the cnoat inportant elements i 
Ttm region should not of£er the pre-reqiuisites for 
izivolveroent in « military confrontation between the 
si|>eri>ower8. Xt shouia therefore be free from 
faj.litary bases # from the regular presence of navies and 
fi*oin nuclear wei^ >ons* 
• Tlie l ittoral states should not enter into tmy military 
consaitments %fith the super-powers (especially military 
pacts) which were obviously coiK:eived in the context 
of global Bxtp&c-poimr rivalry• 
Tltm l i ttoral states want to reserve for themselves# 
iy^ means of a special regime and in keepimj with 
tihe concept of collective 8elf-determiz»tioB# the 
decision to limit rights of free passage and of sojourn 
as well as rights to fly over the region and other 
military uses of the ocewi by external powers* 
The basket of the concept of pea^e Zone in the Indian 
ocean has varities of icteas* The acceptance c^  the solution for 
the establishment of Peace Zone in the Indian ocean witlK>ut 
conplote ki^wledge of the fact i s wrong # because t l^ acceptance 
of the withdrawal by the external powers means the continuation 
of regional problems and differen^s to pose unsursKmntabLe 
chaises to the peace in the region. The development and security 
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asubtful 
of regicmal smaller ana weak states is/from stronger and the 
bigger states of ttm area* Their milltarif attitude end 
Inability in the solution o£ their problems through negotiations 
conpel th^n to invite the presence of the Super powers in the 
region* ratlKsr than having an agreement with the bigger states 
on equal terms. The oocplexity of peace problem is expanded 
by the eagerness of nevly independent states to iivite the 
external powers* military intervention. The outcomes of this 
ironical situation are that the regional powers are supporting 
the concept of Peace Zone* on the one hand# and subseques^ly 
on the other also concentrate themselves on the military build 
\tp which encourages a scramble for dominance in the region. 
The n«in focus for cooperation «9ong the developing 
countries h as to be on measures for accelerating their develop-
ment, but« at the same tijae« as far as p<»isible« possibility for 
increasing the volume of intra-regional trade and diimrsifyitHj 
its composition have to be probed because they are necessary to 
rapid growt;h and development. Cooperation* growing out of 
larger tra<Se opportunities and derived from the needs of 
development: planning* are mutually conplementary* but the latter 
aspect is lively to take precedence in e^conomic relations among 
the less di»velopcd countries. 
There are certain factors t^ hich invite the regional 
cooperation in South Asia. Geographically speaking South Asia 
is almost a contig^us landbiass and there are similar processes 
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of his tor ical oi^lution expearieoccd 1^ the countries o£ thm region* 
Ti^se countries have also had vast socio-cultural and ethnic 
i ^ n t i t i e s and proximities o£ religion*race# language aiM3 costunioa 
. etc.*and for countries together they have preserved and prqpagated 
similar philosophical tradition* cultural values and nsrcis of 
l i f e . 
Despit€i some sisiilariti^^* there are some obstacles which 
hinder the regional cooperation aoaong the countries of South 
Asia. Among these olastacles* i«e {nay inclut^ the colonial legacies* 
problems of niitional integration and nation building* nasi developed 
economic structure* regin^ instability* p&ves dispari t ies in 
the region en<3* finally* the role of external powers. At leas t 
t i l l the Siotka Agreec^nt* these factors hindred the growth of 
healthy rcgioiEial co^erat ion in South Asia. 
Despite d i i^cr i t ics and differences in perception* a large 
number o£ cotncnon interests of the region se&a to enforce the 
move of regional cooperation in South Asia. The main purpose 
of this mo\fl^  ^j to create an atmosphere of peace and harmony* in 
which people may ixsprove their l i f e s ta tus . But i t can be 
posailde only the end of past inhibitions and prejudioi* and 
to strengthen the unanimity among the countries of South Asia t o 
create an atnosphere of t rus t and good wi l l , in faet* the c^t im 
to cooperate is as much an exercise in the practical economic 
plane as i t is an e f for t toward conf iaence building* 1!he most 
I t 
linportant notable point i s that , inspite of suceptibi l i ty and 
vulnerabili ty of these countries to external pressures* the 
iepetue for regional cooperation came from t^ithin the region, 
not withoitt. I t *7a8 not an inposition but a choice for associa-
t ion voluntarily arrived a t . 
There uere some factors that governed the evolution of 
south Asian regional cooperation during the las t half decade. 
These factors led t o a growing realization anong the under-
developed countries* that an emancipation i s possilde only through 
the economic cooperation among theieselves and collective self 
re l iance . The establishment of SAARC is the actualisation of such 
aspirations for emancipation. 
The focus v ^ n the establishment and support of joint 
projects to be undertaken in the fields of industry* agriculture 
and services using public* private (»- mixed funds t o achieve 
economic integration* the integration of production and joint 
development on economically sound bases* are the main fraine^'ork 
of coordinating operations for the GCC countries. 
The tnain factors that are responsible for t t e i r successful 
and aanirable much achievements in so short a {Hsrlod ia the 
feeling of mutual t r u s t between the members of mlnistcurial cosmiittee 
and the lack o>f resentment even yien one of the countries put 
forward a project which i s rejected for economic reason. Moreover* 
Id 
i t 1» the raand^esto policy orientation o£ member governments 
that tt^ee projects should have economic basis in order to 
enable them to survive and to form a buttress for gulf coopers* 
tion in generial rather than a burden which haiqpers the 
development oi cooperation bet%ieen tlw member countries. 
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Thi» i« to Cdttify tlt%mt th« work embadleel in 
fcnitt tii»9vstBtion, mntitlmd ^Mgion&l Conflict end 
CoojtraUan in tht Indien Uesisn sinca t966 i!* 1914"» 
ii> ti»« orlQinfti u o ^ ef ttii^  carsoiv/^ i^ Sf fiii,s, Y^sftstn 
Akhfctir diodic)!, ai^ d i t tuitabi* for «u0«ia*ion fof 
ttid aysrd of ^mii dt^rM in PsXitical t»ei«n6« of 
%h» i^iijftrin fisuftlia Uniy»r»ity. The candidate h«a 
fulfi l i«:i thtt tiiquirttsti(nw6 of st&^danos and ot«y« 
(Or) AkhUr R«i»«ii 
H*ad«r 
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Indian Ocatn ••• 30 
«• l^apt^ir i l l 
Ams Pfoiiferation* Ar»s Raca and 
Tha Q3neapt of Indian Oeaan aa a 
imm of Paaea • • • 6S 
S. Gttaptaf l» 
Ba9i<mai Co»op6ration in tha Indian 
Oeaan Ragiwis ^roHiaaa and ^toapacta * • • 107 
7* A^aandli^ t 
( i ) Tha Indian Oeaan Haaion 
Countriaa • • • 146 
( i i ) lltpid Oaplayaiant forcaas 
Huiaautanca or Thraat to 
Aiiarioan Saeurity Intaraata? • • • 149 
( i i i ) OaeaMbar 1971 UM »aaoXution on 
Indian yoaan ••• 159 
(i«) Qiaelaration on South Aaian 
(lagional Cooparation • • • 164 
(v) Taxt of Gulf Cooparation 
Counoii'a Ceononie Agraaaant «*• 171 
a« tililiography . ,« • • • 181 
Tliei ZxiClan oc®«& occi^ies « ai^ niClfi^ itnt ta^m i s the 
•tro.tegtc coissit^ratioitf of alcKMt cvar, ctut® to ths 
coiit«fl|rjrarf inte^natlooai polities* ttm aevelopnent of erv 
wecpoc 8^te!»i has increased the si^ail icam:« of th^ Xediftn 
ocean in ttm eiilitmry ttrategies o£ mtper i^ OMipt* Tliero is so 
a^ ulst tlxt tlwir strateieits are €irecte€l against tlie littoral 
ana tiintarlanf statcMi* An mumnle ot this stratstnv is the 
iiBiplc Deploynrnt Pares* nhich tm^ been conceive d as as 
intervention fc^cs Cor such TLird ioria countries* i^lch niyht 
try to assert tiieir soversign rights ov@r th«ir natural rasoio'css 
in a manr^ ir tlareatening the stmrall aonopoly o£ Supar potiars. 
v.1}atcvf>r tm the staKsSf both the S4>6r Ponrxs aien at maintainlny 
at least a balancs ot potter* iupl^ -ing tlK t^ no single eoantry 
sh^oia ije €ilIoii.ed to a i^einaie any ^« a am-: to l^ ecotr® so stront^  as 
to t^ pset tte equilihrium o& forces* Such strategf oi f^ ufNsr 
i»o«ers orierate hsth at tha intar-si^erpot^r level ana at the 
Super pomr • Thira wispld level* In this r«n^ &ra the @Jtra 
regional fon^ra Imve ta»%r. cavantaje of the local rivalri s ami 
conCliets a^ich has led to the tnassive arm huiia up ana osilita* 
rirati n ic Urn region* Ttte regional anf extra regional Tctf^ tors 
create instabi*»t/ i^ hich isi^ h ara^ the St^r powers into a 
c irect confrontations* Qm casualty o~ such strategies has been 
a concept of pe^:e i&r-.ne* lihile on the oim hand the re^ioiml 
i i 
pollers «up|?art the concept of peace ^iie« o» tt» other nana 
tlwy €lreet their pollclee to the military liuU4*^ t«bich 
ene;}uri^e8 en ecrei^e for a^minatibf) Ixi the region* 
Z»i|»ite of thie esstre^reyioi^l ecraaft»le for dorainatloo 
ana e louitesr o£ die|>erfttie3 in the pcr^ption o£ the regijotml 
po«ere» eosae co:.^on intereste o£ ttm region eee^ to comoliaate 
the tnove for tcgiatml eooperetion in tlK^rryion* The exercise 
in regions] cooperation in the Infien cu. en i s to be an eftort 
tc^ weurcs re:.ional c;^ni'iaence tMilCim^ ^t is eecoureying that 
the Iqpetuai for regional eooperetion in the ZnCian ocean ties oat 
been an imposition httt a choice for association voluntarily 
arrived at« 
The present stufy deals with Laci^ r^ouna pn.vi&is:^ 
reference points for the evaluation cM current ^velopflents* 
i^ceoreinnly the f irst chapter i» ^n 'Strategic Significance 
of the Zn<^ iaij ncean** Zn this tism heec aiscussea the ini^rtance 
of the reoion not only hecai»e i t aLoua^ In valuahla natural 
resources «;hich are eec^sssry for the ccor.«»sies c^ developed 
countries# and i^lso heeause of the ioisortant trade routes of 
the region but also frois the fsoint of vic« of strategic pcrcep-
tlon of eiffsrent ponrrrs* ftreteyie sii^ni^ic^ n e oi fifC. rent 
suh^HTcgions en^ «reas has heet. discussed. 
The second chapter deals with *Ttie f^ uper po^ e^rs conf ron* 
tetion an£ ithe Zn i^an ocean** itsti cliaracteristic Isehaviour-treits 
of hoeh ttm s,jpGt Powers are analysed as partly reZated to each 
iu 
other* io ttnLiix rivalry mid pftrtly as Colloitfing aif£«rtiit 
priorities*. 
The thira chttptar a^alo with 'Arim ProliCeratloB* Agtm 
mis& ima trc concept of lneia» ccaan AS a &nm of psace' end in 
this ttx;s real essence oi tins mac* k^ i^ e coDcapt has faaan analysed 
mhiich Is icisi^ araba® £ror:» a ^uciaar Fr«® ioc^ atuf! eorraapaiiaifH^ 
oblijati^O! o£ the r gional states* 
The £6'^th a?als with *fi@9iocal C^-optrati^n ZB Ths XcieiaB 
oceac Se^ioot rTwhleiBi Ana prospects* and ths v^risus 6it£ieuitias 
£ac^a ty regional pot^rs* iJiKsayMi o£ iimiHDLr«bla ^lisparities hava 
b&en CiscMBe^t along i»lth %im iaentity o£ isitanrsts ant ths lac i^va* 
tixiQ Cactors «:hich have l€<S tn the Cornati'^ o o£ ragional 
cooparatioo in this rwskm* 
zt «B3uia bs lii|»ossil9&€i to pmv truants bg nans to ali 
those iiho tHAve hc^ lpetf as to pr^^ara this thesis but t shc^ uia 
litm to mprmse mi siccare ^etituas to mf aii^arviscr rr Akhtar 
rAi©e<l «fho Irjspitc o£ his regtil&r ime enai^ss angi^ wmgnts 
sparoa anc^  (f^ evotea uis preei:^us tSiae an€ ^t^aam su^iarvision ana 
i&'hoio hearti^ a cooperation snsLiea tm to oorupiate mf thesis* i ais 
also inr'#l3tca to ail the teachers o£ the ^a^rtsmUL for thalr 
oneoaregasrnt anc1 halp* t urn also thankfiH to iwniaars of staff 
of the raaulfina Aaaa LiLrary for thair hrlr ana cooperation in 
my stuaies* 
f^ y 9p«Qi»l (Hanks ar* dun to ny u l i eoiJltt«g^»» and 
f r i snds f for l i i a i r affaoiXort, meoittaqmamntt coo^aration and 
guiCanea. 
It IB b»fottd my mbllltf &a axgmms mf faaiings of gratituda 
%o ey 9<'»rante* 
fiaaditsa to add, i an taanonaiDla for fctia oninion axprassad 
and ffiiiaiakaSf i f any* 
^oinM^au^^ J^Max 2uj/c 
Saptaiit3>ar 1987 
Ya«Ka«n Akhtar Slddi(}i 
The Zn€li«n ocean i s the third largest ocean of ttia vorldl* 
extendi!^ over mote than 75 mill ion km* tfguare* bet«^iii 20^o*£» 
147^0*E aiia 60 o'S* One characteristic feattre vihich se ts the 
inaian Oc^an cipart *^ rain others i s th&t« " i t s northern part i s 
surrounded hy Africa* A@ia and Australia to ttm extent that i t 
2 
tends to resemhle a ht^e Joey*. It means that t h i s o^an i s alioost 
landlocked in the Korth and does not extend into the cold regions 
totvards the South. 
KorthiK>8tem qiBdrant o£ the Indian Ocean cow^irm v i ta l 
sea lanes* landDQ s^s and islands. The vital landnass o^ roiddle«-east 
Persian Gul£ - Arabian peninsula and Horn of Africa i s geo-
s trateg ica l ly and p o l i t i c a l l y s ignif icant . 
The location of iftfxortant s trai ts* guli's* and o i l resources 
(tsake the landmass geographically iciportant. The s tra i t o*. Babel-
Ma ndeb i s the ^ateiivay to the Red Sea and the suex canal connects 
the Red Sea to ttK' mediterranean*providing shcortest route between 
Europe end the Australasia. This canal i s the route oL coisffisrcial 
relat ions between l i t t o r a l and notv-littceral s ta t e s . The Aden 
Gulf i s a sort of a bottleneck created by the projection of Africa 
1 . l^rry. fe-. Bowaan t^ nd Jan Clark, YfTfi iPtM^ QffgfB IB gift^Jl 
P9]L4<^ <^r? (Boulder 1981), p. i v . 
2, rioter eraun* The Indian Oceani Region ^f qonl l ict or Peace 
.^22J£-(Oxford 1983, p. I ) , 
ftcid the So«t1ie«st«r» t i p of i^r&bi&t the iiast oAae providin:^ entry 
t o the Galf which i s ooatrolled isy the island o£ Socotra. The 
p»iJii3sular pro-|©ction into the persieo Gulf »afee« the Strai t of 
HOriBas on© of the mm% v i ta l s t r a i t of the %#orld. I t i s used by 
o i l tankers* 
The Kcyrth t^atcm quadrant c^ the Indian ocaan has al««y« 
heen s trategical ly vital* Tl^ seventeenth eenttary Portugese 
s t ra tegis t^ Mbu^u^rque* coii^rolled t ^ Red Sea choke-pointa to 
dmiinat® tte; Western Indian CHsean. Since th©n» the proposal tot 
the Berlin^ea^hdad rail«^y and the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan highlight the icsportaoc^ o£ the area* 
The South ^^stern part o£ the Indian ocean heis islands and 
Archipelagoes %tti€h are s trategical ly Ispcrtant for some 
countries, i^ i t ish foti^tion of British Indian Ocean Territory 
(BIOF) t ttm construction o£ the military bu»m a t Diego Garcia and 
the F^nch yee of the Halaysia hi^hli^^ht the geo-strategic s ign i -
ficdnoe oC th i s regicm. 
The Indian ocean is conti^eted tiith the Atlantic through 
the Cape ot Good lbp@ and Siinonstown guard the s t ra tegic route. 
The super o i l tankers* iaeoiuse o£ the i r aizm* can not pass 
through tim Suez Ginal and therelore dcpei^ on the cape route. 
In th i s way thg security of the Cape route datermines tlie o i l 
supply o£ the Western world. Kot only this# hot th» rich raw 
mate r i a l s of south Africa* hightDH the ifflportamat of the areat 
ana the roi^tte for the U'est. The geo^at ra tes ic iUfipcxrtanai of 
t h« area aiEitermiikrii %lu: cl9&m economic r e l a t i o n s hetween 
tinItea stet€!S and South Africa* "while cessa t ion oC invaateient 
might increase our c r e a i b i l i t y end in£liiei%e with Mrican countr ies 
i n our effozts t o encj^uraye a ncm^violent so lu t ion i t i^old 
ser io t i s ly h^nt^cap our a M l i t y t o carry on u dialogua with 
South Africat* I t nould cau^e simet ^bmage t o our ccoiK3»ic< 
s c i e n t i f i c itna s t r a t e g i c in te res t s** 
The united States had se t vp i n 1963 a caeiaurdcation tose 
i n l^orth-M«i®t Cape (Australia) and t h i s s i gn i f i e s the geo-
s t r e t e g i e in^crtence of t h i s area which h^a i i ^ c r t a n t i s lands 
and s t r a i t s l i ke Andatnan Kicot»r# Cbcos* S t r a i t of Helecoi acuS 
Sunda* Tl^ S t r a i t of ml^-^OA coimects the Indian ocean with 
t he pac i f i c ana the t rans-oceanic o i l passage great ly depend on 
t h i s s t r a i t t which i s roost ir i tal for the Japanese econoraic sus te ta r -
nance* 
mom 47 l i t t o r a l and hinterland psuntr ies only South 
Africa* Austral ia ana I s r ae l are dai^loped; half of the s t a t e s c^ 
the . ^ R region have l e s s than b milli(») population and out of 
3« th^ u , 3 , JllBsistant Secretary of S ta tes for Africa, G.Hennen 
iiilUwiis* explaining tha u*S, stand before the sohHcorsimittee 
of the House of Representativi^s on l e t Harch I960, u«s* • 
Soi^h African Hel^tions, Bearings hefore the sub-committee 
on Foreign Affairs , House of Eept^sentat ives , 83th Congress, 
Second Session, Hards 1966, par t Z, p» S* 
worm tlmn tMdv@ hanar#a million ifdmMt«ifit« in th& region 7Z^ 
&vii in the maian suiacatttirxint end oi these alfflcmt tliree'-fifth 
4 
ere in znaia,. Si^niiicantly* ecsase o£ th® I t ss popul&ted 
countrias l i t e sai«?i ^ a b i a ana ^mbia possess scee o£ tha moBt 
iitiportant &m s t r s teg ic oatifiral r©s»arc©s i«hieh »re nee^a for 
th® ecoKxaic swetefi.cc© o£ the tgotW, 
The strategic jteportance olf the Xnaian ocean is en^nsea 
by the pr®8eiEK:Q o^ v&@t fiK .^tural resources a&d the global scracahlc 
for thii satae. imm th«n 6S^ o£ itoria*® tr@nium ana kiK»wn«oii 
reser't^s ar« in th is region^ hesiaes 4{|b o£ %-orXd*a oii shore oil 
production (<«urea8 of o^-ishor© oi l supplitsi persi©!! Gulf» the 
contif^ntal shelves srouh^i the itidian subcoi^incsct sua ot vsa:th» 
IS 
l e s t Australia near Mauritius etuS aeouruS South Mrica }• Xn 
nalasiii* ln&9Gesi&0 fhailans, s r i 7^ ni$«» Zndia« &3rm& and 
Sir^ aiMMr© are the iBajor products of i^toral rubber proauciny m&m 
then 9CSi of %?oria*s total fptural rt&ber prc^ucti^i* eKpwcting 
t 
oaiors thsn 7St4 o£ th i s ta th© liostcm esari^ts* ta rp i asposits e^ 
(1981K p* 70. 
S. AHhtar Hsje©a, I M f ^ f i 9?fap| <?mn^%, ,lt,P?ateft^l ,??9gg^^1f,l9!^ 
p* 2» 
7. A»i;» pikkar. "sinyapi^© enc tfe int iah ocean* • i^apcr presem^a 
^^ ^ ^ j^ a^j^ natr on Xnaisn ocean ia-19 Fei9« 1974* New Eselhi. 
tnantai^se €s?ivtfiJLfii»y iron# copper, uicJsel, so€ coiAlt ar« foui^ 
in the Eastern part of th© lodi^K Ocean mnc mar Kaur4tiua and 
n&C&g&ac&t* within ana outsia^ the aOD mil@ 2^a»8 i^ iKS a t &&ptt» 
o£ b©tt>^ H»si 3S00 t o &OO^et@rsi ana in th@ B«6 Sea a t a»i:>th8 0£ 
ahotat 2tOo iceters oii the aea U:a are deposit* o£ zine copper, 
loaa, 0 i lwr# vwRdaaim &i^ oial^ftoldtiiuB* Miout 72^ o£ wc»rl0*s 
t o t a l proauctisws of Ti» are i s «xtr«cteo irtm the Xfidian ocean 
countries iml&^im, X^iSomsia* thailandH aiK^  caore than ^9^ oi 
«oria*s ^oia lis produced ic tnia region (S:>«th Africa and Atxsttralia) 
abciat 32^ of l<(?®d 12?fc of "It^ncjiton, 11% of n i c t e i , 1S?4 of s&irw: and 
8 
3CK oC ar*iBiony« This sr«g® also « i ;^ l ics 6SP& ol Aaierican Titanium 
iiaports ^ i c h i s o£ v i ta l ©ignifii^ncci for spac© cr»ft# inriistriea, 
tftiasile sxne aupersor.ic aircraf t nianuCacturing. S^uth Africa i s 
the fsain 8iippl;ier oi striut@yie minerals such as cordlas, ethium 
10 
and ©rooeite asJbestes, More than 9€^ of i«>rld kiKmn re»o«rc»« 
I I 
of chronde ere are located in south A£ric» and simbahiif© • Balow 
the layer of soeae five toi* of o i l off t.im ahorea of Antarctica are 
giineral reaources i i t ^ platinum, chrcmtiui!, gold# iron and coal 
hesiatis thotisani^ of tail l ions of barrels of oil and oilliofm of 
@* Jlilifl f^fCTCff^ , a ^ l ^ I l P Sii^apore 31 March 
9 . S«S Bhuttachari^ '^Econ i^Bic intereata of Big ro%«ar0 in the 
Indian OCfian*, IKS^. *»;featirnai tSranuBry-narch 19*78» 
10. lis,l,MyMfa|^,%.,^^|f^. Keirohi 8 jan, 1978. 
11* s trategic Rioeftlf mv ZH l^hi September I9?8l p , 26. 
6 
12 
totm o£ fish. St maty toe noted ttiat present! 3r Zndia i« the only 
Third wcaria country with the c&pacity ana authority for «ea hed 
«xpl.oratipti ana* i» 19Si* an Indian «j^loration ship obtained 
ttaoganesa millulia from a depth of 4&C)Q tinstrea in India 's SouA;h 
13 
^®9t economic siona* I t i s axpacted tlvat "Juat one Kiuare mila patoh 
o£ tha aea h@d oouid produea as tnuch as 3O,0QO tcxia c^ manvenaae* 
3«60D tons of oadiim# I7«000 tons of iron, 400 tons oC cobalt, 
12,000 tons of nicitai ana 6S0 tons of copper* Hiitt price of 
tiar.^anesa nodtales ajctractad from ona squBre mile i s approxintteiy 
14 
one million doll«r@**. The oCfsbor® prasana» of calcareous diE^oaits 
sui table for che»nical and oaoef^ industries have been reported 
from bottofs sauries in the Andaiaaii and uicobar islands and 
off Swarashtra, icerala and lAlcstuiii^eepi and phosphate nodides aius 
barrium eoncei^rations have been *eccsrdad oif the (^ .est coast of 
IS 
Indian i,akshai^te^* 
Thus, i£ vm taka a mineral distribtftion, sub^regionvise, 
i t shows tbat t t e South l i t t e r a l j^frican region i s an ifaportant 
12. Bernard. D. ^ossi ter , '^fllf, U^ E'^ J j ^ t r S ^ t o g yft^g^f, ^r^ffl^'^ 
Indian EK^ress, 4 October 1977. 
:I3* Jffl^ lWnAg »^ fl^ . IffiU^Kf I, *%gMy (acsmt^y), April f | ,19Sl , p . 640. 
14. p .K.s . i^iSRiboodiri, "intf^ffi <^mm m\ ftfiSi §^%im§*'* 
gfciaStHl'B AnftlVilg* wl* i i» »o* 8# tiew Belhi, Kovewber 1978. 
IS. S.K. Kohli, Sfe Power in ,the Indlaiq Og«fP «•*» Oelbi 1973, p.64. 
for coal, iroB or&, aaipper, goia, le«di &m roangaiiesft. The ^mt 
lKsia» i^94oi^ i» iB^crtacrtt for pat rol i t» audi l t» products i ttm 
South Asiat) «^9ioii 48 significant in th© production of several 
mimtmlB lifco coal, iron ore, bauxit«, ewnganes© si!<3 oatyral ©aai 
Tli# Soiitlmast A«lac region in important for iaaustitc, qol6» tin-^ 
tungsten «nd aincf anc the Australian region has siaeaol© 
production of several rainerals# Among the countrias of South 
M r l c a , ^uthcrn iimimbm, Mm&iA, l^ialbia in Afri<^ the Persian 
Gulf region* India, Indonesia and Malaysia in ^ i « ana Australia 
are iisportant iBiuerai proaucii^ s tatas of tha Indian ocean 
region* 
teach Sana© ar*a o:fshore areas are actively exploited 
becaicae o£ t)te rich etiiiM r^al content, Monasite, limenita, ru t i l e 
and zircon ara rainea from heach sai^s along the shores off 
Kerala st»t« in Soattei'rn Inaiaj B&nem r ich in ilownite, r e c t i l a , 
r.ircon end n^gnetit© era axtracted in Korth eastern Sri i#nka 
and timr& iB exploitation of heach 6epsmiX9 of planconite vmm& 
i n potash f e r t i l i s e r in Western South Africa. O s s i t e r i t e , & tm$or 
sooroer o£ t i n , «fas prohably the f i r s t mineral to be exploited on 
the sea-ibed, Hariri proc^uction of t in i s toaay concenl^rated n^inly 
erouna shoret! of Ibailand and Indonesia «her® i t i s dre^^d froce 
sajsmarines clkaimels %>fi to tiv%> foiles trm store* cass i t e r i t e 
production of Thailai^ and Indsnesia account for nearly one 
fourth of the world's c^fshore t i n production* 
16» Milm 9,L«%M.Mmm »ew Yorfe, 1977, p . iS3, 
8 
After t)fte Qctoher 1973 w&r anc* the o i l t^fcottt i t vas c lear 
t h a t the ccosnomies o£ the mot^rn i i»a«striel CDtmtrics aafi o£ 
japBTi *.ier« a^pen^Bt h ^ v e l y on t l ^ confciniiakt*ar* of secure o i l 
a ^ p l i e * Crofp tho Persian Gulf. For thi@# the area h^s iMConm 
m fac tor iis a lo t e l s t r a t e g i c cor.»4oisretioJti. fccouomi©* ot the 
OECC eua tfje Persian Gait have to^o linisfe<3 witb the incre^sse i c 
t he f r u i t prioa ana increasiuy coiMSye^tior* the accumulated 
pe t ro^o l l a re were ustd ar^e ini«*«t«d ir; OLCt c»«iitries* tbi® laakirig 
17 
t h e i r m&rKcts deperia w|?on t l ^ parcht.®© pofecr of the pc t rodol le ra . 
The united States trwde i n t e r e s t in the Indian ocean l i t t o r a l • 
i tnrcdiatcly a f t e r o i l aqiieeae %m3 worth S 40 mi l l ion as 
©gainst $ 90 is i l l ion with i^s tc rn fctarope and Japan end p e t r o -
do l l a r s ei9ountir.g t o ^ SO nti l l ion i#ere invested in the U.S. 
18 
Banking syat^n. I t ves estiroested tha t by the end of the l a s t 
year (19C^) tttiitcd States M^O t o import more than 700 mi l l ion 
19 
toiMi o£ o i l West Ewop® llOo la i l l ion ton* «3apan 6(K> mi l l ion towi» 
17. ^^ i teh , Mc. t^chlai4, *c©vBlqp»c.nt/f the c i saa tor of the o i l 
lii« U*S« Sfrnate Oami^ttea on Foreign Relations« UfOitt^ d Btatfis 
,t^ops_ (Congreestoi^l Research Service^ I'^ashington lb*It), 
p . 86 t o 88. 
19* ft. SubrahBoriyiwri, "The Indian ocean politics*" l i n k 
20th May 1973, p . 15. 
9 
An cstiOGtfB by the Petroli«f» Intel l igeice uaekly seys that fey 
20 
1990 the aewsiid ot o i l vfOvHC iJt 76.3 mi l l ion tsarrels per cia/. 
I t t a s reposrted by the I aayfti esearch lri?:titute of Japan tha t the 
Increese In o i l pric© dorln^i 1973-74 sKy-rocketea the cofiauroer p r i ce 
i n n ^ o£ Japen by bO^ thus depress iny t he i r yromth r a t e it. t h a t 
21 
year t o 2,m> which is the l&^Bt aiiK» 1964. lii@ £r«quei^ pr ice 
hiioe of crui:?e o i l hy the OPEC countr ies h^s lc<& t o e l n i l o r 
t renc« in s netional economies o£ a l l aevclopec^ countr ies o£ the 
v;orld* 
Thp o i l weapon II®E th® p o l i t i c a l inotruroent Lor the 
i^peci^ic purpose ot exert ing the pressure on t t ^ Kcst t o have a 
aec is ive ef fec t on the hr&Tb I s rae l c^n^^lict* As a consequence 
t o the use o£ the o i l *.eapa>n nxne v^est European cx>untrie8 sn6 Japan 
inauec? a p o l i t i c a l acclarat ion in tioveaber 1973 a i l l i n g £or the 
iniplementatlon o£ the Security Council Resolution no, ^42 c a l l i n g 
22 
for I s r a e l i vacation oZ the Arab t e r r i t o r y under i t s occu|>ation. 
I t %}S.8 a t t h i s time tha t Japan s t a r t e d suqpporting Arab c^mtancls 
v i s a vis I s r a e l . After 1973 Saudi Arabia saw a good opportunity 
t o explol te the ecor^xnic ^penaence ot the t«a t as a way o£ 
consoliaii t in^ Art.ii Unity una&r i t s ofeo l&:a£er8hip. The ©ost 
important outc^roe oi: the o i l c r i s i s oi 1973 \^B t ha t the s ignif icance 
20 . .aUaafiS^ October 1978, p . lO. 
2 1 . A«r«* r^kKt0 o p . d t . . 
? 2 . s . S . a ia t tacharya, Sk»^i^» 
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of the rere ian Gul£ reyion treraendoysly rose and «loc» then the 
a rea has teen a factor in a l l Qloical p o l i t i c a l cons iaera t ions . 
The jU^>ortance o£ the XntSi^ n Octan h£t8 Joeen explaine«3 in 
terms o£ providing tnein t ransport routes v i t a l kot tht t rade ana 
economy of the i^est. About 30,(X)Q ships t r ave l ths eea routes 
eoch y^ar tltrou^h the SUDS Canal* IBaLal manifeh S t r a i t s* Malacca 
S t r a i t s * l^£«iiu2 S t r a i t s* erounci the Cape o£ coo<S liope end throu%,h 
the HosssroMque • Ka<3a§ascar channel. The regional tra<^ of the 
Indian oc<&an s t a t e s %^6S only 1CS» during tho caid seventies but « i th 
the 0£cr countries* the Indian ocean s ta tes* t o t a l t rade was 65 
percent* The issportance o£ the In<!lian Ocean i« a l s o increased not 
only for i t s o i l tntt some other laipK»rtant products %.'hich^vital for 
vorl<3 t rade and pa r t i cu l a r l y eiekes dependent t o the v.est. 
Every year sosiething l i ke 30*000 ships* some 1*500 of thefs 
tenkars* trairel the sea routes «^ich are so important t o r the 
econocny o£ tlie i:eat<-throUsh the Indian ocean* through the Sue as 
Canal end thE> a&tel » riandeb s t r a i t * the Cape of Good Hope @nd 
23 
through the Malacca S t r a i t* On average* two tankers an hour pass 
through the Gtrai t oi Kotmaz, for ty ships a day through the chstnnel 
betveen Mozambique end Madagascar* and aloiost as many throai,jh tiv: 
23. To a l e s se r extent a l so throt^h the Umbok or Suntia S t r a i t i n 
the Indoioeeian archipelago* 
11 
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i^lalacca P t re i t . ir.terseticmal Str«lta are tho aiai© points of 
access to the Xm ian Oceac* tftore tnaa^nautical fl»ilc9 %;iae whicli 
{t^ &ans the ships oC ©11 natlor® are ©otitle6 t o free paasage 
throui^h these s t ra i t s* (exception tooiag the carrow Tiran s t r a i t 
betw««n sau^l iuraisla @Ea Slnai for %hich \m€et the 1919 Caa^ 
I^via Agrei^cfst Israel has 8©(Sired rl«^hts o£ pQssay*) 
For the tuxprccsaentcd coiicectratlon o£ t^mstexn mil i tary in 
the Indian Ocean region suotenaiice ana aep@na®nce of Western 
aconcsi^ ^ on th i s region le given an Bxctme, Afic&ss to natural 
resources and iminterrug^tedi sur|>ly o£ these msomcea are claiined 
t o be necessary £or tim Kestcrr. Indus t r i a l isea %*oria» In th i s 
connection Soviet ttareat iM pero&iv&6 to loom large end £reeacn 
«n<3 security of the sea lanes hecones an ie^ortant inyredient of 
th ia argument• In fact a l l o£ th i s i s not besea on objective 
facts* to c i te hut oim exwBple the spectre of v.^stern ana 
ilapanese aepenaemae of mnt mi»n o i l a i^ the jprospect of i t s 
^ n i a i to the t e s t i s hel<l syt as tho jvet i f ieat ibe Cor fortniaable 
military presci»»» in tuw* znsiar* ocean (2 aircraft ca r r i e r s , 
18«ao i^rshifis t^ith 2000 siarinesf 3»& ntaclear *pOMtrea suhmarlnee 
helongiiiK3f to the united States alone, besides the %;ar8hl|>s mi 
trance U*ic. ana other friendly coimtriee} • the fects are ths t i 
24* See J£u.^!^» cl^losiatiqiis, reb, 1930, p« 1&. one thi rd of 
a l l international a i r routes also cross tSm Ifjdiaii Ocean. 
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o i l mt^fpliem tiere stopped by one country £ar a period of one v««k» 
they were dLvrupted after the o i l embargo of 1973 wa6 now with 
tsargirtal ttffttct^ with the ftifikiog of o i l tankers in tht Persian 
Gul£. The point to note i s tts^t a l l these cases were the direct 
£all<->out of wc»tern strategies* whether of creating favourable 
9eo«f)Olitical structure (as in Xrai$^  er due to supply of weej^di 
prolon^i^g the 2ran<-Zraq «mr» In fact the countries which have 
suffered econoiBic»lly on aocount of disruption of the flow of 
resoiurces to the developed countries on account of a conflict 
inevitably are the l i t toral ooimtries theavelvesi E^pt after the 
closure of Smm osnal# Iran and Ir&q dus to their continuing wart 
and so on* The assured novenee^ of resottrces* therefore* is of 
greater importance for the developing countries* The argument of 
t t e need for military presence to safeguard freedom of navigation 
i s equally imtsnatdei as the recent experiences in persiaiv'c^f 
Sea prove. Th? reality i s that the geo-peditical situation in the 
Indian Ocean i s governed mocm by the paradigns of s^per power 
strategies ratDer than any of their declarative policies* 
Besides being strategically is^ortant because of the resources 
and vital asmRi&rcial roi^es* each sub region pi If^ian ocean i s 
strategically i^i^ortant in global politics* A particular study of 
each 8ub*-rt»9ioa of ttm Indian ocean i s required on aecousfc of 
their strategiis ioportanoe* 
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cmly a vmtf youghli division into subHregions of the 
cc^stal# hiit^erlans and island atatea of the Zodian ocean i» 
possible 6m to tt^ir ethnic # socio-aeooonic and cultural 
diversity* A kaan study of the Zodian ocean reqairas an attaopt 
at such syl:» division nectssarily. Zn the litarattsm to date* 
as 
pradoninantly ^nQlo*Saxon« rreiKdk and Zndia&> tha criteria ysad 
for classification h^ve been extrenaly varied* The 'classic* 
division comprises fotar sub»regic«ist Southern and isastern 
Africa and their offstKsre ielandst the Horn of Africa* the Red 
Sea and the Persian Qalf including iranf South Asiai and South 
East Asia and Australia. Th@ political developnents of the 
1970s in the north-vrestem quarter of the Zndian Ocean hava# in 
particular* infant thftt a furtlier sub*divisicm i s nov required in 
that area between the Horn of Africa and Uie Red Sea and the 
Persian Gulf» 
All ttese sub-divisiCMOi are to a great extent arbitrary* 
! • • • subjectilve and conditioned by the priorities of the naaent* 
Yet* the posiiibility of a clear definition and assignation of the 
boundaries of the two sub^rcgions shows that this classification 
2&« the aost coi^ehensiva bibliography to date has been 
caapUmdt by the mtional Liberty of Australia and i s 
entitled %p Ittf^l^ 9lraifft fr l^ltBt P4a4?^MlY gS 
Resources for Study* Canberra 1979* 190 pp^ 
It is restricted to historical* social and scientif ic 
studies and includes over 6*000 t i t les* 
26. See ^ l i « aaasS^** P* 29. 
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will be aulbjcct to rapid change* Thes© two regions are South 
and Sot2th«>E«st imU, The identity Lssed on cultural factors 
stestmir^ £ram historical devvlopnents and ethnic coB|K»8ition 
i s the iaei3ti£i(mtion of Isoth sub»regions* file tuo are 
neighboursji and yot the line separating then i s quite distinct and 
there are tret^s in progress which will lead to intereasing 
27 
divergence Isetween then* I t i s said that* India* Pakistan* 
Bangladeshi Nepal* Shutan, Sri Lanka and the Keldiw islands* 
cor«£lst Sotith *Bia# while &xtmB and fow of the five ASEAK states* 
«»hlch h«ve coastlines on ttm Indian ocean nsnely Thailand* 
^miaysia* Indonesia &nd ths city-state of Sing^ore delimit the 
South raet Asia. However* in terns of their political* economic 
and cultirf.l features* e l l four of these states are more 
strongly indinod to%iar^ the pacific than towarOl of the Indian 
ocean. 
Ihe states tsordering on the Persian Gulf have teveloped 
in course of the 1970s# whether by cooperatitm or fay conflict* 
an increased level of mtttual involvea^nt exhifalting sub*regional 
features* Yh© states to he classified as belonging to the Gulf 
region are Iran* Iraq* Saudi Arabia* the united Arab Geirates* 
27* there :Ls an increasing relationshii) between the pol i t ics 
of the Hiddle Fast and those of the subcontinent; there 
i s a dJtisinishii^ g relationship between those of the sub-
contim^nt and south East and pacific Asia btit a close 




Q«tar« BBhi'ine* Kt»«iit ane< * on the fri&^fi -> OoMin* Xn the 
btgliminy oi the 198C©, th Gul£ r»9toii at tracted the »ttenttoii# 
expectatloris aii<3 f«;r« not only in the v.«st but «l»o in l a r ^ 
par t o£ the* «iirt; world. 
In the vi«w ot the State mpertnscntf ««t £octh in mta 19tl 
29 
in a 8tate«»eRt to & OngrttiMioi^l Ccnimittte* the Isaslc interests 
o£ the United Statrn a t thftt t toe i«er«f 
o i l Stom th» r^roian Gulf* principally i»ith regard to i t a 
aigniCic^nce for AiMrica*a a l l iea t 
the pol i t ica l atal^ility of a region containing one th i rd 
o£ the world's population! 
30 
« imln^iSed access to ancl passage through the region. 
7he deirel<^mei^ of S2ii.go (Mrcia into a *8K>dftst coosniiinications 
centre* is necessary in coimecticm with the las t of these three 
points* I t '«as also inc.ic@ted that careCul observation of the 
Soviet tsaiati in the area i s neocst-ary for the successful achiemmenta 
of i t s interests on the part of the united states» part icidarly 
with regard t o the * choice points** i*e« the enterenccs t o the 
2e« Dieter firaun« Y ^ IntfHft, 9g^ff^t Rfilgll ftS fiBI^Uglr m n%^Vi 
gone? p . 13* 
29* See R» Spier©, 'us National security rolicy and the Indian 
ocean A.r&a* in pecirrtqicnt o£ State Bullf^ii^^ Vbl* 64« no. 1678, (Avig. l i m ) . 
30. Dieter araor., MMSi&** PP* 30.1. 
! • 
ne6 Se& ana the rersiais 6ul£« 
The strategic situation in tho Zn^&n ocean fcr th© £ir8t 
tiiae totally changed* acecrdiny to i t s global siQCiificanca* 6m 
to 1973 %mt* The united States navy raoalvtd instructions to 
conduct regular patfJlsi t ^ Soviet mvy vas to he deprived of i t s 
capability which i t aec^cd in 1971-73 to neutralise the united 
States' strong nevel presence. 
During 1970« there %ias not a single direct threat to 
Soviet tmiem except a possible threat from US deploying strategic 
stthnarines in the jc^ arthern Indian ocean. At that tisks there were 
good relations between Soviet union and i t s neighboiars as •> 
Afghanistan* India* Iraq* Egypt* 8ut:an* Somalia* |K»rth and South 
Yemen and Soviet Unikin eoor^3Pic csilitary aid iinproved i t s 
relations viith Iran anc. f^kistan too* l^t the reopening o£ the 
Sues C^ naX ahatt^reC Soviet hopes and lost i t s influence in the 
strategically significant area saround the Red 8ea« Soviet 
efforts to make Iraq a regional partner in place of Egypt failed 
and only a lureaty wm oigtm6 between Iraq and Coroeccm and by 
giving aiilil.ary aia the soviet tmion tould obtain the right to 
use Iraqi airfields and dock in the Gulf harbour of Utom QSSS - but 
i t proved only a counter»iMilance due to Irani activities* 
Although the Soviet Union t i l l then l^d no direct access 
to the C^f states in the sense of having a client regiioe* ^ t 
Soviet geographical proximity and i t s military potential had becorae 
an 
&n teportaiit pol i t ical factor. Soviet support t o Iraq In return 
to gain o i l eca acxuc other afforta created t a s t - tv^ t conflict 
polarisation* Zran# Saudi Arabia anC the l^iratea - with the 
pa r t i a l exception of Kmiait » stoo6 on the aide of the v«st an^ 
Zraqf South Yemen ^n the Best «i(2e« in the Oul£ a Q^opo^itical 
and s t ra tegic eree« 
The Iran Xraq conflict o£ 19SQ8 al tered the si tuat ion 
more advantayeoualy £or the Soviet union tlian for the United 
S ta tes . In early 1931« a French Middle £ast expert saw the 
s i tua t ion as £ollo««st *'oving to i t s all iance with Syria* the 
Soviet union has again secured a £oot<4told in the Middle East in 
a spectacular laanner* I t has thus iiq;»rovDd the p r^pec t s o£ 
csaking i t s influence £elt in efforts to resolve conflicts in the 
GiJlt region.. S:^e observers are for th i s reason* already 
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speaking of a *new y&kta* in the East.** 
There is no doubt that the area isctneen Iran* Arabian 
peninsula actd the Red Sea i s full with the niaiCHr in teres ts of 
both Super-powers. The only purpose of the Soviet ac t iv i t i e s 
in the Gulf Is neither tx) secure o i l flow for i t se l f nor t o 
31* F. RfincOt* in Europ^>ffrc^iv. VOL 36* no* 3 (Feb. l.>81) * 
p . 74. In tlUs connection the question arises as to 
ifshether the treaty with Syria h&s not also created 
probleans for Moscow. 
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etit t oit oil 45a|:p£/ t a the 'mat but to o n t i n i e thia supply t*rith 
c«rtaiEi cx>nCitiom« in tho sane vmy Soviet occupation ift 
A£ghi3nistan irt 1979 ^i~o cmly to show Sovi«t capability to proviae 
ar»&4 eesistarfie by loi^ r a n ^ a i r l i f t and also to ehow i t s keen 
aosire to play a aircct loilitary role in neighbocarioG pol i t i ca l 
instabi l i ty* Soviet Union*r mili tsry bc.ses are si tuated on 
mdritlcM? s t ra tegic choke««points^ which make i t oiore significant* 
Tbe united States* position in the Gal£ region t«ere 
severely thr<Eatened Irom I'JQOB part icularly due to Iran and 
Zreqt conflict and Palestinian problem in the niddle Cast* but 
thE) Soviet Union i s continuing to have pol i t ica l ana strjiftegic 
advantages* 
Hsny polit icians ane coiHeentators in the iest# especially 
but not exclusively in the United States* are conviiu:ed that 
Soviet control over o i l in the Culf liould be the dscisi'im step 
on Che way toi«Br<!:s al ter ing the 'correlation o£ tt^cea* to the 
bem£it o£ tttm socia l i s t bloct the gecMstrategic conditions for 
pre*<»!^tive ective by Moscow «ould be fav^uralsOle* and the l^est 
«;ould h^ve fev iscans of averting or rather deterring such a 
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Zt «a9 pointed Dtit that ti)e ttureats to Arabian seeurtty 
will cone froro d»nsstie uzarest* «abot«c^ <*o^  intra ragiooal 
conflicts* To counteract tfaaaa threats thay era attanf^ting to 
aavelop cloaar 09»qperation in preciaaly thoae araaa which &£fact 
33 
thair aecurity. ona another aaethod to avoid froei such thtaata 
i s the (saasivci arms induction vhich taacna the dependancy 
of thD Gulf on the weat# whidb haa iaecoBNs perw^nant dua to 
their l i t t l e isechnical Jmowlafye and inafiiility of proper use of 
a lo t OS ctrraa aquipmenta* Taia ««apon of dapendam:y %t<aa uaad 
f irot time hy the ansi aupplier countrira only for the purpose 
to ^ive ahining to the locbl conflicta with the iaiagi«ary 
reaolta for o i l exploitation easily on acc»>isat of the war affected 
vemk e<»nos3i«a which fe^uld he cooiyalled to rebuild their economic 
structure ant!) replenish the acfss. 
32« See U,y» Tucker# *The rurpoee of MMsriasn roiMar*# 
FW^tim M^k$,t vol. 19, no. 2 (mf.ter 19QQ i^) pp. 241*74. 
Tucker and other cr i t io i of Carter policy from the right 
of the pol i t ia i l apectron in ttm United States• e .g. 
James Schlesin^r (iThlrd yorld Conflict and Internationsl 
Security in survivei« vol. 22# na. 6« Kov./isec. 11^ 80, pp. 
274*31) called for th@ 'restoration of Anarican pover' in 
iAi|>artatt. regions of the Third world* in other tiOrds for 
a credible fsilitary iia:ervention capahilit/* tm the (nast 
suitable seans of safeguc^-ding 'western interests againat 
the e3q;»ansion of soviet power it* chronically tmstisble 
areas. 
33* Bm im&k%Sn% ggf^ BBffilfi ffWff^* voU 24, no. 19, 23.2.1931 
p. 6. 
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The purpose o£ a possible Bovl&t action in tht r«r»iao 
Gulf viouia not be to cvtt oCi o i l supply i'Ut to coc^inoe t h i s 
sti^ply ^^^ certain cosuSitiocs. The Soviet occ(i>eti9n in 
Afghanistan iln 1919 was only to shew the Soviet capability t o 
provide era^^ assistance hy loag range a i r l i£ t as ^m» (Semonstra-
tea in the Hiarn of Africa an^ elso to show the Soviet Union's 
desire t o play a direct loilitary role in naighbouring pol i t ica l 
i n s t ab i l i t y . Soviet military lieses are si tuated on otaritiias 
s t ra teg ic choke? pointo. Tim C2:»itinastion of o i l access feith 
po l i t i ca l Qn€ econoaic conditions is ia^ortant for U)e united 
States anc^  a l l i ed securltif due to the above conditions* The 
wash/ngton Oetnter for mfence Xntorostion has assessed the 
scenario in liie t«ay« "Zf ttm \^ does go to war in the Middle 
t&Bt region^ Saudi Arabia i s a l ikaly batt le field* Saudi Arabia's 
eisEe* locatiim* ecoiKK:aic and pol i t ical importance* &n6 high 
level of fBilitary involvement vit^i the US • a l l contribute to 
socfh likclihaod ••«, The most casnonly ci ted circissstanoes* • 
direct soviet invasion* Is not probable ••• Assault by another 
Gulf s:tate is ROre l i l^ly* Tt<ia» in the past four years# the 
US has rushed railitery equipeient ana developed navel foroes in 
the area t o a s s i s t sattdi«>backed Korth ifeinen in conflict with 
Soviet backed South Yest-eo* The n^ct tiim, the protey lear could 
pcrhai^ expand into direct Super paver mili tary conflict •••• 
The US might decide t o unilaterally seise Saudi o i l f ie ld . 
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Such 6 eelEure ts>uX& tm the result ol a s«tuSi o i l i^lsargo* a 
aerloua l3reak in sauai^Anericai: tareign relatiom* or 
hweeic&n perc^eptions that the ttoy&l family %.:ao ICWIDQ control or 
eould no lont£ier guarantee oi l aali^ery". 
the Egypt ana Ethiqpi^ are the tii;o is^ ;>octam; countries 
o£ the region a » to their atsategie position at the intersection 
o£ tKo contii^nta and on important ee« routee* This icas 
connectea indirectly at least with the flow o£ crude o i l aroimd 
t ^ Cape of Oooa mpm ana through the Suee canal* fim strategic 
importance ci£ the Hor^ of Africa has increased as en * interne** 
diate station* due to the aevelopnonts in Southern Africa 
following the aissolti^ion of the Portuguese etepire. 
The Horn of Africa serves as «n intertBeaiate station Sot 
the soviet union after the increasing influence c^  the Soviet 
union in this area* The |^»tential significanai of the area 
has recoginisea hoth by the Soviet Union ana China* That i s why 
both of tkmm were scrttsbling froen the mid^seventies with each 
other for the establishn^nt of their influence in south Ye»en# 
Saiaaliat Sut^n ana sthis^ia* The f^ >rn of Africa was« to mmm 
degree c substitute tor positions lost hg the Soviet union in 
34. tte Mi^VfSM nnnim* i^ftshington, vol. x# no* 4, 1981, 
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the hiaaie caat. Soviet lAiion hes 900a and dOBe r«latioiui 
with Ethiopiia to f u l f i l l i t s ^ s i r e to domioate on the Babel 
Hendeb otroits oC the Red Sea end a strong Soviet preeence in 
Aden lor the pirpose to get c:Hnpensetion of the lose ot Bebra 
in Soirelie* 
Xi: Ju!y 1974 i t concluded a rricndehip agreeoient ibith 
36 
Some l ie* which granted rsoscow extensive rights t s use i t s 
r)ilit<.ry £acilitiefi« rit^hte* v.tiicti« t i l l 19 77| exceeded t h o n 
37 
which the Soviet Union h^d beer yranted in itouth yemen. 
The deierx® pact o£ 1^ *77 t^tween Sudan and Egjpt proved very 
useful on account O'. the region o£ & new configuration in the Gulf # 
favourable to the United States* 11)c significance of Tyypt 
greatly increased* Egypt granted the United States rights t o 
use i t s lailitary £aci l i t tes« notably at Res mnas on the Red 
sea# but reserved to i t s e l f t l^ right to exercise sovereign 
3&, Dieter Braun* f§e In^iap. Qm^m f^ pfl|?n t?£ 9 y f ^ ; ^ gy 
peace sson «^ 1983« p. IS4. 
36« The agireement ««as only made public three months later* 
37« Dieter Braun, jm^MMmiSSSmxMsJiSBJStL&mli^LSS. 
peact^ aonp. 1983* p* IS4« 
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control as h»S meamliile bcciaae custonary* 
The Scri^ict union t»6 receiimd a dominitnt position on tfas 
BabHBl«»Man<!^ b s t r a i t s a t tho southern sOblet o£ the Aed Sea* 
Through the rel iatde I r iem^ naioeXy* South-'Ysaan and Ethiopia. 
France* in Djiboutif is the only '^^stern £orc« counter-balancing 
t t ^ soviet union's strong presence in Aden (which nisam i t must 
have more than compensated £Qr i t s loss o£ Berbers) and i t s 
mil i tary use of the south y«Rsn i s l a i ^ o£ socotra and o£ the 
39 
Cehlak isl&nda belonging to Ethiopia. 
The explanation o£ the s trategic intpcrtanai o£ l^uth 
Africa £or ttm viest i s a diCCicult thing* i t i s said* *in the 
confrontation beti#een Bast and i^st* the s t ra tegic areas o£ 
confl ict nffiire shifting to the Southern hetoisphere to the benefit 
o£ positions held l^ the Eastf in A£rica« the Soviet (mion and 
China were q«iiekly gaining ground both in r ivalry against one 
another and also by their collaboration %vith radical Black African 
t e r r o r i s t fosrcesi that given ins tabi l i ty in Black Africa* south 
38* Ras Banas was s t i l l not very devclqped a t the beginning of 
the XJBQB* zt has been estissated that i t will c»st a t least 
US $ 250 million to eoa^ i t suitable for Apwrican purpose^ 
See IKT; 2C«1«1981« p* &• 
39* Reports as to the level of p(^entisl and actual use of the 
l a t t e r <&re based on us s a t e l l i t e photoet THO a^ckst a 
floating ^ y dock* housing for about l&O Russians e t c . 
Those reports are vehemently denied by Ethiopian ot f ic ia ls* 
vrcshington poet* 2.1.82# p . A8. 
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Africa ymm the l«Bt bsstloii protective v i ta l kcsstern e<»n9iaiCf 
p o l i t i c a l and strategic interests* t^ith i t s iSevelopea inauetry. 
infra*etructure* raw csaterials and comoacaing posit ion on the 
Cape* South Africa representa the princ target of caniminiat 
40 
countries even though i t may perhaps be the ir ultimate one". 
Ttve s trategic iinportanoe o£ ^ u t h Africa existed in the ports 
and surveillance capacity on the 6ape« whichever power IAS i t s 
influence in South Africa t#ili be able t o exercise a signif icant 
control on the Sautb-Eastern route of the Indian oc^an. 
The raciiel conf l icts of ;£ast€rn an<S Southern Africa proved 
advantageous for tti^ soviet union t o show i t s s o l i ^ r i t y &n6 to 
get a successful victt»ry in the solution of the security problira« 
of several Black African countries. In an ii^ernationel c r i s i s* 
the South-i.est;ern route into the Indian Ocean could only he 
controlled in collaixsration with i^uth Africar bases in western 
Australia and Diego Garcia <»3uld not eo the Job. in the event 
of a blockadeir or particularly another obstruction of the Sues canal 
or ths entran«% to the Red See* the Ospe vould imaediately talse 
on renewed 8i^«niti<mnce for any operation asbarJoed icon from the 
41 
Atlant ic . 
40 , T.B. Kil ler d i s s Adelphi papers. Ifo. 57) # yb ,^a;n<!4fn m 
ana P» aioit "south Africa and the Indian Oceans The South 
African Viewpoint** in Alvin I . Cottrell and li»M« Burrell (ed) * 
The Indian oceani I t s pol i t ical* EooocM»ic« and Military 
Importance, Kew York* 1973* i^. 129«>S3. 
41* Dieter Braun« op.c i t .# 
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**7t»9 Qsot di8&«3veRt«9eoitii CKustsination from ttie point o£ 
vie% of Lesterr. interests «oul(S Le & finrth&r coruioll&tion o£ 
re la t ions bc t^co South Alrica an£ Xsr^el* on the lines elony 
».hich these aevelq»e£ £rcMD the late 1970 out oS ti cowmn 
tcel lng that they %«re being treated internationally ee *parUbas** 
Such a dtevelqpiBent (»lght lariK^ the o i l weapon tseck into use to 
coTApel the mst to distance i teelf froa south Africa. I t could 
a l so resul t in the end c& the imited mtiors as « global 
42 
insti tution^* 
South JkelB'e position in the Xnaian Qce«n# ana ics 
interact ion «ith tho outsitfe interests* could be e:^lained on the 
43 
basis of intraHregional ^velopeients. 7he nature oZ the 
relationship between Xn<^ ift and paidsten has i^termined by ths 
relQtionshi|> of the two Super ponera because they have the i r 
own in teres ts in the oain local conflict o£ the region* The 
esteblietMBd linl^ges betwimn the S'.;^r powers and the regional 
consistants h^ve been coverd by the changing clouds o£ 
peace af ter the developmctit ol detente end relaxation of ths 
tcns&on between the two super powers a t the g l o ^ l level enS 
the f^eerger/^e of another grdNst power in the vicini ty of south 
Asie* The develqpiscnt of Sino»US ra|:^oachmenti> Xn€:o«-Soviet 
42* Cietex* Brauhf op«cit.* pp^ 164«»5« 
43 . smi t- Braun» *'Ch8nges in Sjuth Mian intra-regionel 
and Eiiternel Relationships'* # in ghe haorid Today, 
vol* .14* no* 10# ppm 390»4CO. 
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Treaty and tlhe eatablistaBent o€ Banglaaeish ro-eatftblishDa these 
1 iiUcages in ecrly seventies > tienary Kissinger expressed his 
i<toas ebpot the changing situBtioo* th£:t "BBingladesh «r«8 not 
merely a locet conflict bvH an expression of a p^rticuXar 
44 
correlat ion of forces**. The s trategic end pol i t ical teckground 
not only of Gulf but oc South Asia %.ere changea hy the Soviet 
occupation of ^gmni s t an . The ir^portanoi of Ii^iA*PaKistan 
equation inc^reosea £or the S(^>er~poimrs in the new woria o£ 
Cola i«ir« 'R«e importance of r^kistao hPs increasea for the 
unitea States on account of her pro^isiity t o the Gulf ai»3 
close relations v;ith the sai;^ia-pakistaii is aoo^tahle to moQt 
Gulf countries« ana h»s already cstabXishea lioksfes in ttm 
region bocause of i t s moderate and neutral nature in in t ra -
Arab dilferences* Comequently* pakistc n he^ s a epeciai position 
in the dnitcd s ta tes Rr^-Strategy. A mti6 C^arporation Study 
discusses the u t i l i t y or ij^ortaroQ of a cX(»se collaboration 
%Jith Pakistan Cor the US« *The edventage that rakistan hoias for 
the US is i t s pol i t ica l position a t the heaa of the Persian 
Gulf* tl%? Unitcel States is currently builciny a Rapid teplc^^ment 
Fbrce to protect {.estern access to o i l . The US i s seeking access 
agreements and fac i l i t i e s in a nuttdber of countries. Thus* the 
ICKSS of Cl^ iah Bshar (Xmn) naval port could be coi^»ensatea by 
44, Ouotea by jack AntSerson, Titaes of Ittdia. I6»i»1972, 
a? 
la r f tc t i i anc Gi^ Bdiiir por ts to ^aiOatai}, Fifftt i tni iore* there i a the 
p ^ s s i L i l i t y tt)£:t t t ie 9»}£lsta&i ari^y couia oerv« as » proxy 
toree ^iytt i t i i^j iia t i " ^ mtniMti <2al£« TtilJ» i^^Jifi €iiff» f a c i l i t a t e 
c i r e e t Jineri^fan nic: t s Mglmn rebels* th t i t iyetLpiug Soviet 
ref i9trc«« ©nC a t t ^ c t i o o cOua$e€ i n AfghiBAistfiii mm: mmf i'roiD 
areae c»~ great i i ^ e r e a t t o t^^e us# like ti-jstope Pakistan coul6 tm 
iii(%xsi6 U> CK '^Opsrate i f ttss tT isx^kiTtMkes t o protract Fakistas 
irom t t « cof^egtianeea oT suc^ <SDCisioffli. 
Soviet tinicm ^m lne t i on i s rr^jaraisa aa an a l t e m a t i v e 
i i g i o i M l secur i t y 8t:eoario £or S^uth Asia* iht soir iat uii iofi 
WAY occupy a £^@»c^ positiDCi o£ ^ u t h Asia* nakicy £Otb tl ie 
suiCDiitinc c t a l powers £ a l l to l i t i e * inmciJ^ atiC tt ireat^nii^s tl%»« 
1 ^ atrat@^i€ iiiinortaiicc! oH rak is tan t&e t l ia sov ie t dc i^n tms the 
aaau value l^ke Zn^ia* ami pakistac lies a support ive aoci coopsrat iv^ 
l o i ^ l o r t t ie ^ n r i e t tmion :.'fj O ^ patt^^^rn o£ Eimai td. »v'tiataver the 
Disor var ia t ions* eixx^ t l ic ye^ ipo l i t ica l coiq^tilsiorJB reviaiD the 
BL^^» tu Culture d^veiapsrnts «X11 not* pr^^iaLly* taiss any 
4 i . Fuia2yairai»* f rar ic is* H r ,W^^4 lY 9t F^ f4 f lWt A IT te 




^itli regard to Auttreiie# this pacific orisntfttion Is 
even sore rvi<* i^it since i t i» oidy fairly recently that the 
Aostrelian .^ .est Coast liaa immn able to assert itm own relative 
itcportaiKze as u^icat th€ 4lci8imiit eaatern (and above allf south* 
47 easterni) part o. th» ooistixient, Auatralia ma to £irid an 
identity vhich i^a in ^seping with i t s se«^>olitical position* 
by establishing a greater decree of detachc^nfc fron the united 
48 
States ana Britain anc by increasiiH} regional co-operation* 
Australia i s also an is^portant area sor the vm»%. doe to i ts 
looi l s^ ppOlrt ability in the Zncian oceant V s^ri^ iis factcrs like 
polit ical ana ce%ia»ic explain the ipspcrtanoe of Auitralia and 
Xndiar, Ocean for each other* "In 19do the largest proportion o£ 
i t s oi l iBipc»rts CMte fron the Persian 6ttlf, Over SO per cent of 
Attstralie*8 imports end exports pass ttrousih the Indian ocean# 
but only abc»ut 14 percent of i t s trade t^ as with the l i t toral 
s tates , fliw materials anc goods fron w^tern Australia Iron a 
high percentage of exports to oulf c»>iiotrles. Heard* Cteristaasas 
4e* Akhtar iKajeed* Iiya i^R iBgsaBi ffflBfllS'l, It Jr<atelHli 99^m¥§%^l^* 
pp* l O r l l . 
47. one indication of this i s fisrnished by the liuSian ocean 
Fcstivalt held in the stsnsMir of 1979 in the l istern Australian 
capital of Perth and upon t^ch considerable expenditure was 
lavished. 
48. cieter israun* .sSi*Sii&" P* ^^ *^ 
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QOd CocoB Xalaiids in ttw Zodiac Ocean laeloisg to Australia and 
this gro^p was integrated more fully into Austral ia*s toil iter y 
49 
Infrastrustvaref also used by the us airforoe''. 
Xo a strategic sense the indien Otieao is a distinct 
entity ami i t i s seen es such thauyh for very different reasons 
by most eacternsl poi«ers, ttm enctxring ainmercial and geopolitical 
importance) <^  the region sk.ans thwt i t is unrealistic to expect 
the great {lowers to .^ithdraw thier military presence* though some 
of the littc»ral states will doubtless continue to vork tovards 
tt^t ideal. In an era of glcftsal political rivalry tetween the 
super powers fev areas of the world o&n expect to avoid sotae 
^gree of Jjnvolvcment in that struggle • honever unwilling and 
involtuitary thct participation may be* It is difficult to 
envisage any future situation in whic^ neither the united States 
of Ancrica« nor the Soviet union would fail to taise an active 
interest in the affairs of the oc«an« 
49. «!»• C. Beasley end Ian Clark. fulM<:§M tnVgWJgll, T _ , 
the 8«»ff Pgfggtt nnS,n%t^ lB 4^flR gsaMU- (Sydney 1979), p> 127. 
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YHE SUPER i;>OK£RS coiaPHGKf ATioK m: Tm imim OCI:AM 
The threat to the ZiklJAii oc^an from the Si;^ «r ii^ i^i«r« 
intervention are very mptljf highlighted hg the report of a 
aeffiimr on the maian Oc»an in 190O| 
"Keirer before in history hae there heen such c coccentra* 
t ion o£ <Se£itr active potential o£ external n^val forces - and 
taases - in the Zn<SiBn ooean. Ttaese forums are partly deployed 
cospetitivisly agairst e^ch other and* partly directed against 
eocre o£ thti Indian Ocean l i t toral states* Sitch mval presence 
%;ith i t s vast destructive caiKihility* constitutes a grave threat 
to international peace and security and carries itithin i t the 
risk o£ iaminent escalation into a laajor conflict* thBt could 
involve ths use o£ nuclear weapons. These external farces 
posC serious threats ol oar^licts that cotdd arise £ro« accidentsr^ 
nisconception 
/or rash conr.itments. Th& aetaimr noted thet ioiperialisn hae 
le f t oany unresolved conflicts anong the nations of tt^ Xi^an 
ccean littoral* which are exacerhate<l hy the supraaie positiU>n 
of e new cold i«ar« The proposal for the establishment o^  a ssone 
of peace in the 3;n<Sian Ocean has« therefore* todty* assusNsd 
urgency* and there is need for a majoc glolijal initiative i s 
3i 
eeeirch o€ ii3«rermi:ioneil peace aod security •«•• The 9reat pollers 
hev« used a nunbar o£ argunects inducing tlie need t o protect 
t he i r o i l sttppliea ana aea ianea« to justify thoir presence in 
the Indian Ocean* The p«rtic%)ants rejected these ergoBients 
since the thi-eat cocnes tram the g rea t powers themselves* Zn th i s 
context the sovereign ri<jhts of a l l l i t t o r a l and hinterland 
s t a t e s over the i r o«n nstural resources* including thc3s« in 
the i r respective ecotoeic 8ones# was rea££ir»ed« The claio o£ 
outsiae poi^rs and oi^ncies to these resources end the assertion 
o£ the i r rigihts to intervene by force in *the protection o£ their 
rights* and also holcing out threats such as the use o£ the 
I 
*£ood ifeapon* v e^re disisissed as ui^enalde". 
The strategy o£ the Super potierv operate both a t the 
inter»Super power level and a t the St^ier power • Third World level. 
There i s a parallelism oet«e«n the strategies o£ both the Super-
powers * the Soviet strategy being mostly a reactive one as 
response to united States* ini t ia t ives* Therefore* to usiderstand 
the anstamy of Super powers strategies* i t would im necessary to 
f i r s t understv.nC the United Stateo strategy relating to the 
Indian Ocean* 
India 3^nternational Osntre* .SiMnr ?fi M4i,l\ ffiSfSJR ^>o t 
gon^.o^. Peeop^ (Kew Delhi* 1980} * See the •statement 
o£ Con<:lueionsi. pp* Bi^i* 
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The unitedi States has clear strategic interesta aioa 
objacitlvea in the Xnaiao oceant "The US haa both conventional 
and perhapis a strategic nuclear crilitary imprest in thB 
Zn<3ian Oasan. military objectives £or US conventional forces 
iiK;luae tfaii oipability to (i) protect {B ecor^oosic interests in 
the persiajQ Golf* (ii) eeploy or threaten to t»e force in 
stipport o£ US diplORatic objectives in the Miadle East* (iii^ 
secisre the Indian ocean air an€l sea routes against harassmerft or 
in support o£ other objectives 
interaictiisn* (iv) intervsoe/in the l i t toral and related to 
a l l o£ these* (v) balance Soviet Forces in the region an<S 
attain sv^criority in a crisis.the us also possesses a potential 
strategic Docle^ ar ail itary objective oi deploying t when necessary 
or <»>nvenlBnt b a ^ t i c missiles aubo^rines targeted on the 
2 
USSR. The OS vital ifss;erests incluas the preservation o£ 
<«estern access t^ Persian Gulf oi l resources* aad the naintenence 
oi a local geopolitical balance. The US believes that any 
dMicisive threat to these interests can originate only £ram 
Soviet action in the region or fron such action intenoven with 
intra«>regional instability* This challenge to the US positions 
2* US Set^te Cociiioittee on ftoreign Relations* united States 
Foreign Policy Objectives and overseas Hilitc^y Xnstalla<» 
tioryi* (CSongressional Research Services v»ashiagton 1979}« 
pp • aO"n3« 
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i« cot juat theoretical but v<ery mucb real* &a vas eviaaoeed 
l3f thtt ^vi£;t action in Afghanistan ana the Horn et Africa* 
Tht) ^ v i s t iini<m is contiguous ana oipcr-looking the Persian 
Gulf ems thc! AreJbtian Sea and h&r ssilitary paiamr can be directly 
projected into the littoral* nore so becauae her baaea in the 
region (in yremen* Ethiopia an£ alao in Vletnas^ are aitua^d on 
fflQritine atirategic choke«pointe. such Soviet threats had baocHRe 
raore a«naciiig t(X the US particularly after eventa in ACghanlatan 
and Iran whiicl} had ahifted the geopolitioil iwlanoe adverae to 
the Its inteiresta* Since a reduction efi neval foroi in the area 
i«oi^d only Increase the preponderance o£ imnQ Coroes the Soviets 
have in the Soviet union and ASghanisten* they could well afford 
3 
t o chai^lon the idea ot an Indian ocean cone of peace"* 
In £aet« the Indian OODan had bcgim to figure in the 
Riilltary atiretegy of the united States as early &s the early 
1950»* president frutDan }^d tlvin s^ l^nin atottt the need to draw 
Pakistan into the system of western nsilitary blocs on account of 
her strategic location in the Xndlan ocxan* Xn an intervie«i 
Admiral McCain commander o€ the US pacific Fleet (published in the 
us l^ aval XniBtitute proceedings« l^ay 1969) * called for an American 
sqtMkdron in ths Zndien Ocean as early as 19&9 • "Besides an 
3* Philip i^iicox* US issputy Assistant Secretary of State in the 
Bureau of international Organisations* Backcacounder 30«4*62 {ABMsrican Cetitmet hmi oslhl)« p. 3* 
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4 
XAdian ocean 5Q/«iadroB wm need testta** • th» Aaeiral had •ophftsiMd. 
¥b«ti asked vihat base he IM* thinking of« 1>!C Cain pointed to Diego 
6arci& in the C^Qoa Arch^i^uo* Cofosusndiny the csceilent 
strategic Iccation o£ the islaod« he saidi *Ai imltm i s to ttis 
Mediterranean« zslego c^rcia ia to the Indian Ocean * «iuidistaot 
front al 1 pcdnts^ • Adniral ^e Cain wanted Diego G rcia to 
be aev©lcped not only as a mvel but also as an air base* He 
had been qolte forthright in cxpressii^ the American intention 
to ixse Diego osreis aa a military base« though sonewhat later his 
governownt %ias to ^^evarioate and eypheaisttoally call i t a 
coffseninioition base i^ hen the (»»v«rrn)ent of Zneia protested* 
fhe tis mvy f irst artne&red in the Indian oc^an in n^vwnb&t 
1963# in coiiTiSCtion ^ith the CEmo nsnal exercise *i<iidlink* held 
off Karachi., in which the US carrier rasex pa^-ticipated along with 
&OKm aubffiairitBS HOC other wtc:sB%s» It «^ ss after this exercise 
thBt the aiatesarios Ghazi %*« treosferred to the pskisten t^iry, 
Again# tht' saise |%ar an arranG<»Rent was signed between the united 
States end Australia for setting u^  a comnunicatioa station at 
narth«>ifest Oipt «^ich was cotat'^ issioned in j^pril 1967* This VLF 
consirunication station was desigi^d to c»3i«Btinicate with subnerged 
missile-firicig nuclear stabeaarines • the i^laris aad Poseidon types* 
Cevendra ^ushili* Ifff m^^ ggflflt A §tff8ttqlff 
p^nsiofiff p» 38* 
3S 
and ectffseO an JUnportant lirA in ttm lunerican mtvark o£ 
ccH«nanicatloa stations extenCio^ t^om Hsolulo aoa Guao to 
Asmara with Cltgo Garcia in the ccotrs. 
the penta^o is saeking oore ana more new nil itary 
Dasos in the Xn<3ian Oc»an in order to iippl«na»t the new 
strt^tegic 6oetnm& oi tha t^ h^ita Bdusa iilie the "llnitea 
nuclear wir* or the "prlcBitive nuclcMsr t i r s t strike** The 
Xndian ocean has hegun to £iyi»r« mtxcQ prcsaiinently in the plans 
o£ the US military strategists in thm ^MHB a£ serious reDu££s 
at the tmoiE^ o£ the Creeaooi £ighters in VLetnam* Even dyring 
the \mr in Xftdochina* the proclamation oi the Gutn dactrins by 
Nixon in July i969 and tha Xie£ence Secretary L&ira*s statesMsnt of 
June 1910 extending the area of qperation of the US peei^ie 
Fleet to the Xndian ocean signalled the US intentls»i to leilitariae 
6 
the Indian Ocean as a part of i t s new glohal strategy* 
Xn the view of the State Oep^rtment* set forth in mid 
1971 in a statsfBcnt to a coi:^rss8ional committee« the priority 
interests of the United States at ttmt tisMi concernsdt 
CevenSra Kaushik* yftft I f^^^iq ff<rffOTJ^ glyQ^«yq»? gJatiylffPt 
p« 3S« 
6« ^ij?^d.^ 
7* See R4 ^iers# *QS Hatiocal Security policy an€ the Indian 
ocean Avsa* in J 
1678 (Aug* 1971) a tegftgl^ffgtyl g£ §H%^ 9BUn4r»i vol* 64« 
u 
oi l from ttm mraUm Gulf # priseipaUF ^^th regmrd ti> itm 
signUica^eift £or Awirica's Allies* 
tlm pol i t ica l slulsllitsf oi^  e iregi0D coc^aiaiasi oai«tliira 
of the %»otM*s pqpulatioei 
util^l@aea access to and pattege tferous^ tlie region* 
In coimecsti»it witb the l«st of tho9® tlare« point* • sieatioii 
w«s esaas o£ the ne@a to €»vmlop Pimgo ^ r o i a into a *a^Sest 
ccsB^BuiiicatiGms c^t^re* nrthecmortt* i t was pointaS otit that 
Soviet aiwi in tho area raquJ^od €»tra£iil ohtarwitioB on the 
par t of th& tmitae s ta tes pertictHarl^ with regard to the 
*cholEe<-poi»U*« !•©• the entrances to the flea S^a mn6 the Persian 
Gulf. The 'iriew WM eicpressed that in the foreseeahle fottsre 
thip signiXii^noe of th&' Indian ocean £c»r the united States 
%ioiild regain sttbetantially inferior to that of the paeMic ana the 
i^tiantie ana that i t tionid not me6 t o control the ocean or 
individual s ta tes in region* provided t l ^ t £reed9iit o£ access t^ere 
preserved* fMscent in i t ia t ives hy l i t t o r a l s ta tes % p@ac» wxam*) 
aid# hotievcr« al£eet the principle o£ free yse o£ ieternational 
3 
utat^rs* 
In mteh I93l the Gt»ngressiona| Research S^vioe o£ the 
Library o£ Congress sutoit ted to the Hoi^e of Representatives* 
8» Dieter mmm, ,|? f^ In^frjR OWJB ftrglgP t f ^mi^% 9ff fffffff mm* 
pp« 30«| t 
n 
foroign A££alr» Cawittett e cuoipreliGOfliim r^ p^ort on tim hist(»ry o£ 
9 
US relatioia with tix: Third florid* It had been drafted in 1980* 
a£tcr the soviet inv&8ic» o£ ACghanistam Four ^ t i o f » were 
offered to Cot^em, iiatod without evaluative jiidt}«aient# which 
could fona a haeis ifxc future /tnerlcan s^olicy towardo the soviet 
Union ana the; third borldt 
1. a oonfrontation policy* 
2* a i^ ieoG:>ntainBent policy* 
3, a Plexihl€ Reaponee policy* ana 
4« an EcoiaDctic security policy* 
The haaic features of these qptiona are wt follows: 
The policy of confrontation lould aim to halt and push hack 
Soviet expansion in the Thijrd Korl<^  ant to re-establish US 
leadershi^p hH a l l iq;^ proprJUtta iBcacs « eiilitary* eoonsiaic* cultural* 
etc* itm rcirsian Gulf wouie iae a priority arcs* together with 
central i^ Derica - ane' tlu; Caribbean• 
under neocontaincient* the stain emphasis of this sore 
restricted version of the above qption «s>uld be on the military 
aj^roach* incluoiiH^ military assistance to individual Third uorld 
countriea. The policy wauld be limited gaogri^hically and on the 
whole would focus on the Qulf region and South.- Msst usia in 
MSBLiiA* Washington D.C* 1991 (US a>veraiient printing Office) 
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gsneraX and* t^o a less extent* on Central »mtricm %ne »&rth^m»% 
Asia* 
Thi9 policy oi flexible response eterte iram the eseunqption 
that the Soviet union is only expansionist with oertaic liisits end 
that llisited co*«pcration is tii@f@£ore possible beti^an tli» two 
powers* Zn tbis option too, a ptiacitf is reinfcnrcwBent o£ 
powers in the: 6ul£ region (ana in the xadian o^an region oeneraliy} 
using ffiilitary ensacM* 
unaer ecoB3(eic sectarityt priority would be given to sectaries 
us ccoiK»T!ic interests (raw naterials* inv<estraents} principally by 
diversifying SOUTCK:^ * 
in 19(^ 0 the OS Chie£ o£ liaval cptration* #iftriral noorer# 
eu^gested tb:it ciigo oaroia ehoul<s i« built ^p to proviae a base 
for eereel reeonrai£3Sance# hradiiaartera £ixt a raiall pemanent 
sta££« Bnc faci l i t ies lor serviciii^ aircraft • carriers on special 
occGsior49. <;rwo Curthcr fimctions were a^aed 13^  the ^oint Chiefs «• 
ot Stat ft tm builriny ck a tcodest coi^unications centre and 
fadi l i t ics lor receiving strategic si;a»iarinesi> libwever* the Senate 
<Sid not apTrove the plans* the main reason being that i t did not 
think th»t an anwi race with the Soviet ynioo shoald te initiated 
in the Xnaian Ooean« lnstead#only the co^iBiii;icationi centre was 
to be set ^m Between 1970 am 1972* $ ^i^ million were allocBited 
10 
for this purpose, in early 1972 the pentagon pressed for an 
10* ey 1976* port faci l i t ies* an airfield* a fuel a\a|> and barracto 
had also been build with these funds* 
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exteiitioii oi miVBkl operatiom in ttMi Indian oatma CIIOIIB the 
rcasans aKntloued were that the end o£ tint VletiiKn war wae in 
8l9ht« that the soviet ucioo haa siaae poXitical and atrategic 
9aim as a result o£ the X|}<3o«^akiata&i war and tlwt the Sues 
canal war likely to bG Fa«<q^nea. Ae a £ir8t OK^ W in the direction* 
tha aeaali muml unit stationed in Bahrain (HZl^ *^S7i:X)fU «aa 
reinforced* 11x3 ooissGauBicatioxui cxintre on Diegp Oarcia came into 
service et thc^  baginrxii:^ of 1973 under the Qepartnent o£ mfence 
ce a link in the worldwide <^in ol aucli inetallationa* Zta 
principal £ unction t^a to close a gap in the high-frequency belt 
anr? to transioit satal ltte infonaation to navy ^n^ « ^ force* 
Diego (Garcia t.-as of pivotal iii|>ortance in the nilitary and 
strategic meaiiitrea •> soeie short»term end others iBediin»tem -
^dided upon at the beginning ot 1980 (e,g« the seciring of rights 
to use military fac i l i t ies in tte l ittoral states# the depl&^miaot 
11 
Fiorce «• RW) • 
ttm Reagan A<9binistration» as t l^ mv York Tiises disclosed* 
has now fashionca a new military strategy for Asia* esiphasising a 
alii ft in planQing ana forces frao KorOwEast Mia to Southi^ East Alia 
er 
11. Dieter Braunt ,||m Inmh Qff?iP RffSiton OS C<ntfiKt/'P^flW i»W?. 
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ai^ ttie Xndiaia Oce«&« This csnCidental u.S Plan* from tihich 
the paper pub(U0l)ea exc«rpts# calls for **Q lo»s« partnership oC 
9£ Asiftc &8ti(3&8 by aenlisg ^ith each air«ctly» insteiid of 
trying to aouia them into « foroiai group**« In particular* tlia 
plan ca l l s for an "active at£«iios partOErrship* t^itti Sapan r««uiri»9 
i t to eafagoara sea am air lanaa i s i t s wigliijourhooa* During 
the last six isonths o£ 1902 the us Dtfanca Secxatary Caspar A* 
Weinberger visited the countries o£ Smith-sast Mia and Australia 
ana mv sscalana t% '^ice« His latest v i s i t to this region coiacidea 
not t^ithot^ good reascwt with the ^ s i t o£ presiasnt o£ pukistan 
denecai s ia . {^ i^nberger urged the fSUm poners not to taise an 
alaosist view o£ japan's military bttild«>^p• In Slcifapore* be 
announced that th© Pmntm^s^n planned to strengthen the US Seventh 
Sleet which covered the pacific i«est of iia«!ali and the Sf^tian 
Ocean |yy addif^ two eircraft-^arriers to the existing three* 
*•«••• in no other area o£ the world i s there such a high premiun em 
VS a i r l i f t and seal i f t capabilities to sustain the credibility of 
OS Okilitary strateg^^. peaotftiste {presence o£ ffiaritisie £orce in the 
Indian ocean signifies 08 interests* but friend and foe alike will 
sieasure the i^epth of US cosimitiients by a dHsonstreted capability 
12. Richard »illQr«n« "us i s Fashioning tsmt Military Strategy 
for Asisi", tfty mh TliWi* Jf««» f* 19^* P»3. 
13. Dilip milwrieet "US Bid t o Contain Soviet 'threat* in 
paciCic", TiiflSB of India, JSovmhex 7, W82, 
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t« rmpoma r»pim.t e»^ effectively %o paftm&Liml tir««t« in tim 
f^ioti and tim v-^rc&iime viliin^j0mm to mmpom to tli»at«« fti* 
recent egreenaents cooeludea w t^h mts^t omn end SQeetle for m 
aeceea to faeilitiee in ttmm countries* tamttme «rith tt* rttOTF 
(IMpid ceploitetnt «roiet ^ati Force) coi30^t# reg^resest inportetit 
ciret* atepe in ^mmste^tim ttiie OMRiltneot***" 
Zn ttm Specie ic context of sedtarinci oil resources ot t ^ 
Oulf ©na tbe d^ntrtfflent of Rspia Depioynent t^ >roe (arf ) for that 
perpoee, the united States is in neea of nasQuate base fscil it ies in 
the region* Some l»ve been obtaintd es in tim esse of it>a)i:iese 
(Kenya), Berbera (Somalia) , and Masirah (Onan) . Egyptian bases a re 
a l s o being used by US f o r c e s . Yet, i t seems the US m i l i t a r y i s 
determined t o o b t a i n bases in Saudi Arabia which has so f a r 
r e s i s t e d p r e s s u r e s cons ide r ing the consequences o£ a v i s i b l e US 
15 
p resence in the Kingdom. 
In examining the na tu re of the Super power p re sence , na tu r e 
of the Super Power p resence , s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n has t o be g iven t o 
t h e long s tanding a n x i e t i e s of the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s t h a t the USA has 
been deploying in the Indian Ocean reg ion submarines armed wi th 
Submarines Latmched B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e , (SLBM) . With t h e U .S . 
14 . USICA, Bpckarounder, February 7, 1981. 
1 5 . P .K.S. Namboodiri, I r i t e rven t ion , In the Ind i an ocean, p . 153, 
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Introtftictlofi in 1964 o£ long range polwria A»3 Ui l l i s t i c missiiet 
end in 1971 of the ro8eia»ii C*3,», Ixjth with a range of 2S00 
oaittl«al Biilea •••• t>ie Arabian oea laecaias a plauaible tieploymnt 
option for tlie v«S« The Trident C-3 ex|:«nded the SZ^ Bi range to 
4230 Bilee ana the forthcsKing aeveiqpne&t of tht I%>ide8t ZI (C»&} 
ttiseilee* with a rans^ oiCAOO-i^lm nautical caiiee« hoth expanded the 
target area wi^ thin the U.S.S.R* ana the accuracy of ^le missiie 
as bell aa the ocean area to ise aearched by the U*S*S*R» But the 
soviet StiBM concern i s highly apecolative &m the a«S» has 
o f f i c ia l ly denied such aeployoent to the Indian ocean* The u.8«S.li* 
tac i t ly adnitted non^deploynent in the 1977*78 tsaval Anas Liisi^tion 
Talks irhen i t a^ r^eed in principle to a f re esse* The Soviets had 
entered the tulks largely to forestall such a depl^atnt* Af^r 
all* the closest xs^S^ qperatiog basea capable oi supporting a 
nuclecr missile • carrying subtiarine are &mm i s the fc^stern r'acific 
and mtB In i^Bin# both stieh a great distance that transit tifl«s 
to and £roii! th» ln<3ian ocean would significantly reduce the on* 
station time for each suhsarina* 
The ranse of poluris an£ |)oseidon wissiles i s relatively 
linited* and while the Trident signifies a narited J^rovcment in 
that respect* their i^resence in the Xadi&n Ocean i;oald greatly aggra* 
vate soviet Anti-Sulniarine t^arfare kMU) problems, iimultaneously* 
U*s, targeting f lexibi l i ty .would be enh^ o^ced vis«««>vis some targets 
in the soviet tmioi) «• because the Soviets t«ould find i t most ciiffieult 
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to aeploy AS» forces ttmrm adeqoftto to ec»it«in tint ttiroat o£ ctt^dk 
froa tiie «es .•••• Tlw Red S««« tlw Persian Gulf and tto* AraJaian 
Sea provide •tsem o£ tim teat locationa for U.S* aea t^iaaad miaaile 
(teploynent as a ditarrent against the soviet union* 
one o£ the argtmente against the |>resent aeploysni* o£ 
ShBm in the I^ndian ocean ia that i t is not econoniaal because o£ 
the long traiwit tiise* aut once you have the iDri^nt vith a 
longer range it is possihle that i t would not have to transit all 
the %«y t^ to the is^rthnestern part o£ the Xndien ocean* Zt could 
stay farther ibeek in thB eoothem Indian ocean ana target £ron 
there* 
h threat to ssudi oil £ i e l^ tt<m the Soviet derive toward 
the Oulf has heen pi»rtreyed as the need £cr the nilitary Measures 
by the united States* one of the techniques by the Onited States 
»fas the creation of fi*D*F« 
The RCr es a strategic concept ^mm originally ev^wid in 
19 Sa in a stdSy prepared for the Roclsefeller fbtsidition by pro£. 
lienry Kissinger vho i«as then with the Hervard univereity* ftm 
concept remained levil for long* i t was revived frosi tiae to tiae 
but was never put to ln^leaentation* the basic thesie iias to e ^ 
conaidereble mobility to m forces for their dsployeent in far am^ 
threates by atEians of augoienting airlift end seal if t capabilities* 
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The REf cooc^pt renftined relatively domwint for owr a 
aecsade until anticipated tbrests toPasBian Gulf o i l and reoendb events 
in Iran end M^^oistaii agein reaised oanoema over rapid deploys 
inefKt o£ t}*S. gorcKS* 
Foreign tmieoae Secretary Harold Brown outlined tbe purpoee 
o£ the Rapid mploymOc. rcroe aa £ollOiret 
''in thill Challenging daeadt* getting there f irst with the 
right kind oil capahiiity lasy b& even more linportant than getting 
there second «ith the (w»st •••• Mobile %»ell«equipped« and trained 
conventional forces are essential to ass ist a l l i e s and other 
friends stK^uld cond^ions so dictate* ac^ should otar aasist«nce he 
needsd«*«« T)ie units dQaignated iot the RtF will constitute a 
reservior £rot!t which to dra* a capability speciClcally tailored to 
the contingency at f»M, (andQ could he anywhere £roei a platoon cf 
16 
rangers to a imlti«divisi<Ni corps'*« 
the following uw cot^iogencies are often used as exwapiest 
(a> protection of an ally (usually in the Middle East) 
against aggression la^ a foreiffs powerf 
(b) protection of vital a«s. econoiaic interests (also in the 
Middle East} <• as in, a mission to defend foreign o i l fields against 
either fcreign invasion or danestic distorbancei 
16* LffHriw^^ ^^ l mi^l^ v^lAmm* u^^igao, 
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ic) assistance to d frlsEiaiy 99Vttrii^e£tt iptrtmpB in mtSM 
^»^io&> which in i!icapacit@t#a 1^ violent ^iKril ie metivitft 
(0 iitt«rv^iatio{2 mgmimt BQvimt mmrogmtm troo|»s 
(pertsips Ciiisftfis) seeKiny t e r r i ^ r i « l @giir«ii<y.sce!iciit (perhips i n 
j^cttnill^ tlie HTf $» soiBQ to toe ©n iaterv^nfcion 
fc^rce ifitli the Oul£ as i t s main area o£ op^^ations. in tiMi leftice 
0f tlNi It73 energy c r i s i s ttmte tmim tmmn sct«e«cs t o melm ttis 
Arab oi l* Iflie vm@ ims Iseen s\igtl»ited CKi; ttie 82 j^irl^arae Divisioiif 
tis nar ints amS tlie o i r r i s r isasea s i re r s f t 9i toie sixth a i^ 
n 
ssventh f l««tt ming I s r ae l i e^iriimim for rmtmlim ii^ the ^^ntaxt* 
Zt is en e^tn fa<:t tha t the real te r fa t of tha RCf i s Saudi Juratoia • 
B e r r i o i l»£i@ia* <»£fshora o i l £ ie l€ Q£ l^beiaia* fcsttmar^* Cha«»r 
and @sti£» th@ €cx&pi@xas @£ auapmh anc Ras TaiHrt» tswntMn port* 
l^haran air<»l3asa« i^sratts s t r a i t s sna the capital Raya^ • ««hich 
can he swiftly cei»tir@a hy tha nm in the £aca o£ a i ^ Soviet 
thraat* l^)a atf* as an 'oirtr-* ths horizon* capahility* |»ro9iaes 
protacti(»i to tht ligiitlJiiacy o£ tha sauai mm&rchf against any 
18 
internal i]|»l»eavals. 
I t i s also being raaliectd hy mmw^ knsywlaai^hla AMricans 
th^t the i r p r c ^ ^ n ^ has owrplayed the Soviet threa t t o the 
17* msprntB Ma^assine Kareh, 19 7S* 
iQ. lochtftr iKjeea, ^^i»n Qm^m 99mitP^ ^ msl*mh ^mmtkitit 
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QvHi M»ciarit:f* imvia peumsio* Caaciii&-r tjli^r Secretftrjr of State # 
l!Mui piibiie}.]^ «cfeiio«rle6g€>d ttiat tlie Carter dsctr int MHI H I * 
thron^tiotit aiQM9 thct oeitleer the Carter t^ or thtt Slogan Aaniiiistra* 
t ^ n tm& GVter <»»naifectea a ^tail.e<: atuc^ 9i ttm toplloitioiie o£ ttie 
poi^ss" ox* ^t9 «lt@rnativ«!i8, Bevsoei is aiao r«pcHtt<9d to hawi eaiat 
""ttnerc! IB no aign thP>t tti® RijaislAai iijtttsi;:; t o oow in to tlie 
Otilf any lULfl^ s sooif« 
A forti^r us ^anlaaaaa^ar to Saudi jurat>la liarwinD F* E&lts 
liae plaadta Ss^ r a "clear p^rctasptian** oC the "netura of the 
oaourity threat &e tt^raata that could d^i^^r uS and {^estara 
interests** Ei l t s coi^lodes thtit the e^Jor cha l len^s cacfrontieg 
the US in the &il£ are "ragional and pol i t ica l in tmtwtmt not 
20 
external end m i l i t a r y . Ha eaationa against giviegt *ttnaeraerved 
pracfBinenc©* t o the "specter os a military (^yaai^lon to t l» Gulf 
s a o ^ i t y picture* raiaad hy the Soviet isove in Afghanistan* An 
unrastraina^ reaction to %1m "paroeiined Sovlat isi l i tary threat**« 
tha ABiericas d%>loiBat r ight ly i^arns^ <x>uld "anhelpCully heighten 
regional tei^ions'^* Xt. £act* the ohiaf aoorce o£ threat t o 
•aoyrity l ica in diaaenaiona anont looal rulera and their apathy 
tomurda the legitimate d^isoaratie aapiratioca of their people. 
All these att^apta ^ire irJltiated t& project the US poner 
ic^9 the region in a aiora viaihle faehion* a»r thla« steps tiiere 
19» Citad hjf P.K.s. nms^aomsi, a*p. Ai^nd ana sraedl«ar« sat»SS^$ 
p« l@3* 
20, mtmnn F. Ei l ta , SMMS^*' P* il3# 
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tmksu to aem periodic tmv&l taafe £erose into t l » Arabian Sea 
Gulf r«9iofi* ana t o t^rai9e the f ac i l i t i e s on S i a ^ otrcia* Tbe 
as prasetice Mia i^st oiilF ®i«a<S a t tlia Soviet tmiois Imt alao to 
R@«t futtira eostif^anciea im tim ra^ioxi nAiicti iiciuld affact tha 
Mmttt&tn is^ar©ata* 
lil^go Ciarcia uaa o£ pivotal i»|;^rtati^ i » tHa tsilitBirjr aitd 
s t ra teg ic ma^iattrea «• aooaa ahflrt tan» atid ottKeiTB maaiym tmm «• 
<l< r^:iaaa lipou a t ttia Isegiimiiig of i9S0 {a«g* tDa aeei r i ty of dgb ta 
t o oaa mi i i t a r / £ai:ilitiaa i o th@ l i t t o r a l statas* tHa aeploptent 
of Harisea* a<!l^iioa atc»raga of arB» om ahipa for me 1^ tlie Rapia 
in 8 1974 is^artmeot of isefesc® ap|>r«»siriatiofi &mm-m» %Mm 
tsmpsa:tmem joDtif ied mx^mian oi islego QaroM to aiiit i t s mw 
ftia mval •Offitsiinieatios a t a t i o s providea t ac t i ca l help t o 
ahora and poiiA: t o itoint ooNnauoicatiOfif ^n& iM a c r i t i c a l l iok 
i a tlie Dafeiica Cositiimicatioft Sfstemi, A sm^ mtmskm Is iaaiog 
aaaifoed t o lOiia atatioii to ai^i^ort periodic preaasoa of aa 
Zndian oceaS' Task €roi^« thiJt proiect p rovi^a fac i l i t i aa t o 
jUsprows Eiiago ^ r c i a for loglstl^saliy atpporting t i a TaaR <Sroi;^ « 
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lt©cer.t o^'fifeo i n tim ni^aie mmt thm energy c r i s i s aisa ttie 
potent ia l for tostilitlns in eit ert a 0ul»Jeet to chronic itst«l»ilJU;]f 
lMi<«« iieeviMitateS e reHn^it ist ios o£ lis nstioeai i«t«rttst« i n tim 
toiei&n ocean «r@«« px:9is^emm timt loay a£f«ct ttK^e interests aoa ttie 
a<Seqiiacsf o£ ineaoB »»^ eimilalsl.© £m: t t ia i r protection* TheiSHi 
national intisraats %ihicti mt i ld ra^ii ire an occaaioaal i&creaaea mvf 
preseisot arai ( i ) £re« access to a&d t rans i t i n the IntSian Oc^ an# 
ili:^ protect .Ion o£ ts eation&is* ana ( i i i ) protection of sea lanes a^ 
cn& l ines of coRiitmication* These events &M interests are the 
hasis o£ a ntquireaient to provide log is t i c simport f a c i l i t i e s to 
sti^l^i^rt a task £orce operating i n the in^iai i oem^n area* Fac i l i t i es 
t o te provided are the fBiniffioiQ required to sii if iort s u r f e r and 
a i r operatloiai» 
I f t h i s project i s not pro¥iaea# t l» re w i l l tm no fiaced 
s i t e to 8t3pp9rt carr ier task £or(»^ ^Maecetions i n the Xnaian ocean 
21 
area *«• 
The i i »^me potent ia l i t ies the cti^^o O re ia tmmt proviaes 
are not; the otftcom <^ any £c»ftititoiMi aevelopnent* hut of careful 
21* m Congress* Sentte« Coe»ittee on Appro^iat ions* Second 
Si i^ l^ i iental A|,|^qpriation for fir 1974* qttotcd i n tianaraniaii 
m^basmh* m tf gt i t t f t^ fgy j^fl.lr?l^ iB^Mp i i9 fp i t IHf 
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ana ailil3erat« pierniiog. tOmir&l zm ^a l t tm& t ee t i£ lea imiom 
th© S«»ite hciariE^s on elesp G rcia that t l» f ac l i i t y o» thi« 
«Eia!l a tol l* would suable the us to "inflneiac© leajor •tiift0 iu tt>e 
glolaikl poiftr l9&l®cce over the next Mc&^» 
&ie@o Gftrels has liicr««8«a the options for t^ troopa 
ae|»loy»@»ts In tin* fedJUio OC©«B «re«« witlt i t « v»«t r«««rves of 
iml, i t can co&trilH^« mtimximly to i^i#»t aavai r^aeplosrnefit 
between tlie AtlentiCf pacific AUS Heaiterreiieftii fleets* 
m per the l a t e s t pUm for Eiog© Garcia» the Isese i s to l)e 
t»sea as s iauiEiCltii^ p&6 ioar not opiy a i r aiid neiml nissioiis» h^ 
a l so for laws fcr<a!s. In eecanaUer 1980, tlie us coi^frei^iooal 
Budget office l i s ted out s ix ^ t i o n s to c luster iriist i t cal led 
the "ii«ai-«ovi®t t i r e e t s to US interests* in the itM^ ocean eree# 
Ml of tt^ii mllm^ Cor stati^misg o£ sn ai^pliibioiss »Bri»e brigaae 
o£ 3,000 ffien OR 1^90 Gg^cia* Such aepiofoent %ra0 sougtit t o be 
9KplBima Ijy asserting tt»% *tDere i s a preeiiyis os (guick reaction 
even thot^h t h i t say mem^ i n i t i a l l y usi i^ a amali force o€# say« 
3#000 t o 4#000 wmwtt 
'Omm i s a new diotansion to m strategy in tlas Znaisn Oc^in 
region which » i l l require serious s t a% and istonitcnring in the 
years aheadt that is the iaipartonoe of snaisn Ocean in s t ra tegic 
22, p*K.@* Riii^xiodiri, lnl«;yfflUffi iBilftft In^i/^JR mnR» P* m, 
23, yUe iBtil^ gHiUlgCTyfft (K«w ce lh i j , 25 December 1980* 
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Reagau f^i thrust £s»r tlie mm 9pmem m£mK» mitmtivm • p^^uiarly 
eall«a tins **»«»r mm*" 8trat@9y« '^^^ laswt* are p«»tieeafe i s tliAa 
regard. F i w U y tise »if«r-p«wer» have corns t o mly heaviljf oo 
»e t€ l l i i ; ^# tioi; o i ^ f for cof»rei3:i£>c<»l i^iir£iir«* IH*. ml9» im a 
Ducit5^r Qo^lixit »il.it;ary tatea o£ iNit@Ilit«9 toaty iocludNis? 
•» photo • recdmrnittttftfie® wi th rwRrJck^lii capfthi-litlfis 
^ camss«mic{(ti0iii wi th 70*»@0 p@r cent o£ eoiiKCtiiilOfttioii 
^ i i i 9 routed through sate l l i tes* 
• electronic f t t r v^ i l lms^ ©fid iotell igeBce gathering 
» occset) •urvi@ill<aoc« 
« iiavi^ti€m# ffietaoroiogif c;te* ana 
* emtl's imrf^Bg» o£ • cticiettr •ttaele* vmrm thft ii&e o£ 
sa t« l i i t«0 imm maae i t pm9iM& t o get a r@«cti&B t ine o£ 
30 iRt8« or so la amm o£ XC£M attack* 
Sdtel l l t«8 c«>i38titt»;« « v i t e i iii|pE«di«iit« hut at th@ same 
tim« are esoat vi i imrable o£ tha st r t io t i ra for spaca nartara* l^f 
pTDYiaa eammm eostroi.* cowstmicsticm and istai i lgaBca {€3S} 
funeticma In a h i ^ l j f aophtatieatad ««r«>ii8^iiig proc^aa* Hso*^ 
a v a i l a b i l i t y o£ aat@llit@8 with ooa a i i ^ r pd% r^ could aariously 
14« jOehtar l^ajaad, j ^ ^ p fismn flaiillllirl i R l i tePt l 9 roBfy i l l t« i 
Si 
asgrade i t s capab i l i t y t o c s i ^ u ^ a nuclcsar ^-ar* dsd even lfflp(»B« 
ser ious it n^icaps i n a conventional i ^ r . Satel l i te«ir t t ierefere* 
Qimf be aeemea t o l ^ prism an£ pre£«rrea targets i n any aixclear 
war* S^iir laroad iogredicf i t^ iiotild £« oeaeesary to conduct 
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success!uH £n t i »8a t f t l l l t e (ASA^ operstiona* 
Tim inprediei i ts of ASAf • t rate9i r sure ««ell on t h e i r w&f t o 
cofcpiottont 
flMjr $roi»INMUHid ele i^ro-^opt ical deep a i r v e i l lance 
systeis (QEOISSS) « i t h tl ia c i ^ p ^ ^ l i t y t o detect a ta rge t 
th@: aise &t a dinner p la te a t 40»000 IQB* a t t i t t i d e t 
cociatructioi i oi t l ie fou r t t i eu rve i l l aoa i laixacatorsf 
cacKsciiced ear ly t h i e jfeart a t ti^gd (iarcia# t o be 
oon|»let©d i n 19dS« 
«• iBiiP Sp^os eomirand aet ^ i t s I s t v ing i n 19S3 f o r 
ff»{ia9@iief^ o£ space at t r^e i l iaacei and tt ie anft i«itH} ^ 1 1 
be ac t iva ted i n 19S& ae the i ^ c e Operations Centre £or 
cam&tie& ana cont ro l funct ions* 
m i^^Sht s t rategy mmt be seen i n the context o£ the f a c t 
t h a t the Indian Ocean occtipiae nearly one t h i r d of the sot i them 
heaisph^te {the reg ion of greatest v i U m r a b i l i t y of soviet 
s a t e l l i t e s ) and besides Piego Oarela i^ i th i t s 12«06O f t long 
2S« JiMx* P» x i i to x i i i . 
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air f ie ld* tiKS United 5t«t«« h»& ftCceM to mmif faci l i t ies in the 
region* freincli isiaisai in tim Xn^iftii oeean era also factors to 
be tatsen note o£« beaidas tlia eseiatenoe of pro«>tJS AUttraiia ana 
aotith Mrion. 
The kay quaation ifi the ccadng jpsara isi hon wil l th@ Indian 
ocean f i t into ^ I7S atratagf for eiaplDpiefit of air«>lau»ehed ASi^ 
«iipl^ r"a®ist? f i rat of all« to tm aij®cai^£«il« OS ASA? atrategy wil l 
8@ea to he glQ^l in ita afjproaehi and for iiAictots) affect AS/.T 
ayatem (of which mtSM emf ha onljf one swe^ ayatatt) wi l l aaed to 
hm latinehad in a euiti^diraotionalt mtiltiiiiada* oo«#rdinated 
integrated operation to ainoltanaotsily intercept aliiQ*t a l l 
Soviftt aatellitea* Soviet land teaaa and the regioaa aotith of i t 
iiMSluding tlse Indian ooian ooimtitota aearlf one third of the 
earth's surfaoi* At ani^  ona tii»a* tharefmi^t a Itupg^ mmibmt of 
Soiriet aatel litems may ha expected to ha oner thia part of the 
gl^«« t^iclk mst^ tato ea teiic^ &B t& ^ntifeea to get to areaa under 
the direct juriadiction of the ifs and i ta ail iaat an onaceeptahle 
level of tiQie lag for sueceaaful ASA'S* atrategy* ftie ia^rativea 
for the iftiited Statea to he able to la^ich At<A^T weapor^  in thia 
part of the gl«^ef therefore* are ohwioua* And hance the 
iaportance of tha Xndian ocean and i ta l i t tora l * eapaeielly whin 
i t ia rei^Biliered t)«:t the aoathcrn h^siaphare i» cote c r i t ica l , 
l«di«tn ocean* thua* playa a aignific^nt role in atrategic 
and 0{»ce war @eenarioa« I t ia intereatif^ to cote the hroad 
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p&t^llelism la ttm cheofmtOQf o f t i ie mv^l&pmomi o f &Lr»et ©scent 
HZt sfrntma a b l e s t t l ie tmct^roimS oi m s t ra teg ies ana f B i l i t e r / 
deplopsefit 1ft the IndJUin octant* 
l@6Sls £fipestig^.tions i f i i t i & t « € f o r mt &g U3M space 
B^toms Div is ion* US mvf p a c i f i c Fleet s t a r t s 
^ i s i t t o ZnaSsn octtsn, 
l965-^<h fjiego^OKroiA created as ar i t iUi l i Xnaisn Oessn 
f ^ r l t o r y * Ml%Bve6 t o Imim taeen &im on m 
I n i t l a t i i r s s * t^imqo GirolA i$ss«a t o Wh f o r 
&Bitemm purposes a f t e r looa l populat ion trans'* 
fer rea t o f t i t t r i t i ^ * 
I9i$)t t iSM empior i i ^ aUrect escei^ miS[ Csnti«>3atclllte> 
conoetpt* 
i970i p$JBgs> Q&tQiM cot!»»«yai^ition s tat ion be^iwrnm 
q p ^ a t i o n s l * 
I f 7!H nn^ pirposes n in i s t i i r e space tn tiopiog 
i f i tercept CMC • 
197<Si AagXo«4iS egreestent to c^cpsna the scope and r o l e 
of 1^90 Ciercia* 
1977i 0SAF ttf^oirsl I 53*7 a i l i i o n com^sct f o r ground 
l«ii»cli&a* d i rec t sscent« non^^nuclc^ar mi^m Concept 
mmm 
26* J e s j i t jlir.Qti, • Indian ocesn i n QleSml S t rs teg les i Sotie pere* 
pec t iven* , i n Mh ta r «aJee«t *lafl|ffr! fi?ftBt gat f I M % RWlflr 
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o f HtJ* a:eat#a» tj^go ®cale joiEfe i # ¥ « l - e i r 
exercises incliieinsr f f iai i i i fe»?t «li©«» OS ( i»i t l i 
a i r ctait ca r r i e rs £ot«rpr ise anH iciaidey) # UK* 
Zren ana r«i^lst«i i took par t In ms l^Mmn oa»«n« 
1900^3% E^@d Oftrela @s$p«iiaiia s« m v a l « « | r Imse* os 
sav^al ca r r i e r task £oreo ^splofed i n ZtMmn 
Ocsan# i c ^ l i r^rsasinQ t o two c a r r i e r laatt le 
g r o y ^ i n it@3» fa? %«rli«ad on a eonbioation 
o£ SRAH/Aitair « 3 Ixsoster roelsst iBmxHm^ from 
UMT vw|& a i rcra£t« S|»ae@ t#s ts Q€ mt mt^ 
s ta r ted i n 19@2« f«»iS a i r o r a f t oparatiQual 
w i t h I s rae l ana Saudi jyraliia* 
I s t %aoa wing o£ IJSAT I ^ C S Cofsiaaiia 
a e t i w t f i d i n ^tmmrf ii@3 a t ^a t i^son M'B f o r 
nansigaiaaiit of © Iss i i e ^aaming ana a^yaoi 
s i r ve i l l anoe nettiorie* US ^ i ^ Cam Coriaad on 
SAwmtf i#l9S3 t o cxiver Snaian c»»an nsgSon* 
I984«4»0» 4 S ^ Miss i la w i t h mm irait i iati irs homing vahiele) 
weapon isasaa on ^ 7 t es t £ i re6 £ron f « iS on 
^antiary 2l«i@@4 i n spaea* I n i t i a l ^ l e r a t i o n a l 
capaMl i t i r pXem^a f o r 1987 w i t h 28 waap^w w i th 
on« F»l& sq^uaaron* i3aploy»@nt o£ t^ KV weapon on 
B(^^i€an ti3€m&i M«V planned* c i e ^ Garcia 
espansicm f a c d i i t i s s ooce|ilata» Masiralvt^Ban 
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t3ttiia»yp planned £cr ooespl^ion tm9i&i» othec 
faeiXities in Xcdi«n Oc«ftn« 
p«Eit«9oa ejqpects to have HXY vwhidle* 
iSftpio^tf to knock out mmtml l i te t at aitituaes o£ 
24»000 loB. altitude ea^ioying Minutcmao o£ 
frident*! saisoiXe tx^oaters. 
2iia i^oa wi&9 o£ USAF ^paca Ooama&d planned.^ 
be activated in 198S / to function aa apace operation* Centra to isanage 
aatel l i te control centre* nilatar* ^avaatar and 
^&em alMittla aetivitiaa* 
Indian ocean r<»gion# therefore* forflsa an important eleneiit 
in OS {K:>litic8 o£ intriwion ai^ the concosiiLaot miiitary presence 
ae part o£ ita £,lc»i3ai atratagy but i t ia alao likely to play a 
crucial rob in apace and strategic warfare* iieanifhile* aryucionta 
o£ i»eraian Gulf o i l and freedon of maritine navigation provide a 
hi§h level ee legit imcy t o US build up in the Xndian ocean ragion 
against the baekarc^ of the larger looming S^iet threat and i t s 
pr^sen^^ in .(ifghanistan* 
The Soviet onion haa bteosia* lor a nuaber of factors one 
of the most ij^ owerful Indian Ooean hinterland states* Soviet 
interests in the Indian ocaan start troa wayback in t ^ »odern 
tiiiies* £ven during the socdnd world var the draft of a secrst 
protocol proiposed by the fiasi aensany to thi Soviet union in 
Koveiaber 1940 had evidence of a dasira of the Soviet union Is 
%o eoiuJxe a foot cold ixi th& X&aiAD OcMm «na article XV o£ this 
aoettsect st«te4t *Th© Soviet tmloo aeclares thst i t s territoriai 
•spiratiofi c«iixtr«8 Bovth of th£ mtioiml t#reito£if of the Soviet 
mion i s tho direction of the inaian octan** 1 ^ Soviet ito&on 
•tarted aeployieg ivftvel Coreee in tlie in6i&n ocean io 1967 ana tiiic 
deploynent %^&m cdocernea with ABV activitiee oS tt« vnited States* 
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etrategie e^nerines in the sneisn ocean** • The cc»roieaioning o£ ttm 
eoimvmication £jaee at Rortti v«eet cape in ^a»t£«lla eaae the Soviit 
tmion api^retiemive &hovt deployment of US strategics sulnariaes in 
tlie Indian oc«an« 
Since mrch 1963 sovlc^t naval ships began to naiw csalls at 
ports in South Asia* the Arahian sea« Persian Qulft tme Sea an6 
Seat Afrioft as the shif^ o£ ^her ^eat powers from otttsias the 
region bad bsen d»ing itx a long tlise. in the f a l l of 1968# two 
8<|ua<^ rona of the Soviet nmvu crolsed through the ZsiSlan ocean ana 
airing 1969« imits of the Soviet liavy paid f r i ^ a i y v i s i t s to a 
number of porits in the Inaian Ocean« 
h Soviet a<|tiaaron coeiprisif^j a missile • •arryiny cruiser* 
a rocketolaiuHShlnu aestroyer ana tanker paia a friendly v i s i t to 
rort Louis, tlie capital of Msiiritit»« In April 19^ ana in oecenher 
27* a»J« Son^ 9^« BUl ggYlfl JttJ,tU?|ffi. P* 2S7, 
28* Repoet of the Ad Hbc coswittee on the Indian ocean* UN General 
Assesihly* Jour ml A*AC 1S$*1* 3 t4ay 1974* p* 20* 
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1969« e soiriet sv&xmeixm ana & supiort imatmX wis aiglit«d in tim 
Hatacca Stin&ita «iliii« proceedlag to sitigapcre* tn ttm l a s t 
quarter of I969# f^siriet fw -^tnl atilpa again irisited tim p<*r«lAii 
Oalf «im* foar of th^« ssaas © cs l l itt tlse port of »? i^«ais^e in 
Sosia3.iA« 
^ 1971 end tlie ^ v l e t mvY )^^ tm&& mbom SO v i s i t s to 
16 comitz-ies on ttm perioster of tlw Xn^ian ocsfto* soviet 
warships iiassee through the Stra i ts of t^Xacca in smnmxy 19711 
%»hsii the coiB«)osag&alth Coisfersiics was going on in SlEeapore. ttmre 
has lasen no pmtw&xmm aeployment of her f les t in the Indian ocean 
I^ the Soviet union* Ths perioaio crtsises h^ Soviet vessels i n 
th« I i^lan o«sean acoaBidiate^ «l> to 1971 ahotit 120D ship*fiays 
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anniiiil^ corapered i4th atsotft 1#1C© for tha m mvf» 
Znereasoa soviet ac t iv i ty ana intsres t in the Indian ocean 
i s a lso e^ la ined hy the ^o« ic^ aepenaence o£ the Soviet unicxi 
on the sea route through tXm znaian ocean for aowHsent o£ goods 
hctween the m,et and iiest eaasts ot the countrsr* tim t rans-
Sihcrian r a i l roate has reached i t s sa t t re t ion pt^wt and the 
northern roixii^ through the Arctic ocean gets froaen in «inl^r» 
The Indian oceim i s also is^ortant to the mm on aeoount o£ the 
seaborne supi>^rt o£ the various space explorations* Since 1967 
29. pataiie ^u^« ,1^ ^rm ml/^n fPC, %m mirfl mfU 
(tiondonir 1979)« p, i24« 
30« j a s j i t llingh# oe.^^iit.» p« 49« 
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Soviet Bp^&B Cy«rtt 8^^^orU.iig ships haw |9Q«O contiittiously 
deplc^d in the Ionian ooMm vihidh IHUTVCS B» SO eatrgsncy sea 
recovery ar^a for soviet %««« ships* 
Ths Soviet tJtdon is oow cm ta^ s Iriiik o£ tmesmiMxg the most 
povsrfui Xii£:UiD ocsan hii^«rlQiaa Stats taty to hsiog only a €sv 
hours auay hy air from the ju-shisn Ses« the persisa <lu2£# ths 
Bstoel Kecdsb Straits ana ths Hern o£ Africa# and also htesiiss o€ 
i t s arned p<»t«ntial alone ths £rontiars of ths l ittoral states 
o£ ths Bor^^iwsstern Znaian OC«sn« fhe Gap«hility sad aspirations 
o£ ths soviet; union Mvs sxpiainsa in ths fnid-^sventiss for 
e3obilisation<-potai^ti«l* Ths nsir involvtnent o£ ths asvlet union 
vi th rsgiomS. states ^m9 against the eo-rparison o£ her earlier 
»nitual arrangsaasats 
involweiBent^wrs ne<%f»i8ry to prohibit ths i<^tsrn coatatoment of 
the sottthern £lank o£ ths Soviet union* Such arraaosottnts involvsd 
bilateral «0ri^f!!sntsviiU^ is^ia« Sgypt* jUEghanistan* Birne and 
maonesia* 
The e^iploitation ol the regional instability ana a gensral 
propaganda against ths Ksst are thu tto laeasired «espoi«i of ths 
Soviet union using £or hsr best desire to secure a "sons &i Soviet 
penetration** Soviet occu^tion in A£g!)anistan la advantageous 
to the Soviet tmion vis«a»vis the Gul£ region* A distance of only 
IIQD km* separates the B ku area of the USSR fron Abadan and Basra* 
and the Soviet union concectrat«is sne o£ the strongest air«<ontif«eiits 
£9 
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In the ar«a» in ttiis it&gion* tim Soviet tmioo i« sloiiiy 
a l ter ing tUc aiilitary tetancxi of forces to ^ r o«m adimii^gesf 
*Tti«» Soviet llcii0ii is laakiSQ ii^sreasii^ tis® t>i i t« etratetiic 
positioB ena i s leavii^ i t to the otiier a idt to iM k^e itftoif 
pol i t ioal i j r vuAneratiie! tlrodgli itus estdeetvours t o dNuiin 
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f a c i l i t i e s in tlie laai&n ocean are«** 
Soviitt i{3t@r«its« it) ttw icaian <X^«R ar« not oisl? 
po l i t i ca l # econonie l»jfc s t ra tegic too* The s t ra tegic e i fo i f i* 
oeiice o£ the Itaaian oceeit increaeed for the Soviet tinioh 
perticttiertjr af ter the aevelopaent o£ nuleear-poweretf atihe^riiiea 
<»pable of letit^hini* iiiicleer i8e#i)» ^ range ha l l i a t i c miasilea* 
The s t ra tegic weapon &ttpXofm:m can km aangerous against the 
soviet w&$^n tBore tmu against the lis (i^hich i s altogether iet a 
c^i££ere8t l^Beiiaphei^} on Bct^vam, of the phj^ioil coii£igtratiem 
o£ the Znaisn oceah« Hie control o£ the Xoaian ocean i s 
neeessary £or the Soviet iMaioR to nst^uralise these oev iieapmi 
system ana t o presect a siteiiar threat t o the i^est* That i s 
Mhy« soviet See ^ n i e i strategy shifted to sea control strategy* 
The i i^^tSRce of the In&iAu ocean increases for the Soviet 
31* see Johh Sricicsoii* Aigh&Kis^Bi ..llhe. soviet ^tiv^,^yi 
ffR^jlm 9gffffffigMPt!«tff I9r ^?^ K4t l f ft r9U<?Y,t y>o^n» I9d0« 
p» SK^3* 
32. Gieteir arauii« ae.cit^y. a t a* i2t p* 67* 
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tmis>ti# le^ cftiat* i t provjUSes ft^jL»iNi«ther tratisil; e%»ui;« for traii»f«r 
of floot %mltm hetwmim tte Soirl«t fer fiastern mM Klaek $«« fleets« 
Baltic ana taorthem fleets* tlrnm® Soviet teelmiqEiaee imwem ei^yr 
io the lig^i o£ lo^i^^em plAimiagt *lii tim Third mel^$ the 
policy ie to huild a strong Soviet o^vtl ii^eriwii^io&ist c^fjai^itf 
in order te» ne^reliat teeter a mv»l power rather thin to 
interdict t}» h i ^ i ^ ^ of WeeterR leeritiffie trmae and eoniierot* 
The policy# in short* is i^t to provoloe a euciear i«ar «ith tht 
west imst to persuads the west not to prmoym a mie^ear tar with 
tht yssn hy httrtii^ l^iviet iefcerests in those areas in t^ch Sovist 
diploffisey hets ^veloped a staloi. the Sovist policy* t^ iere^er* 
possihie i s to establish forward positions o£ soviet infliai^ fiai 
through tisHily* dscisive ii^erveetion* in the knowledna that the 
Mesterii response would not lead to a head on dash** 
The Soviet attesi^ts to stiei^hen h@r political %a& 
military power in the region i s the proof &t Soviet perditions 
of the strategic siioMicai^e o£ ths Indian oc^an £or thent 
strategic gec^litlcai gain i s useful in vJUtr.ing political control 
oiier the i%'estem vital oil l i fe litie and gives hirth to an 
illegal territc^^ial interference in tht regioti* Territeariai 
encroachpenti in the region waald l« ^finitely t^^tieg hecause 
this would «[^ an a gmm in strategic terns 1:^  hivii^ oantrol over 
the 6til£ oil lifeline of ths %m&t» This can be arranged if the 
33» Bliahani Sen f^ta* T^ ,^ . ^^ % f^^e. Hew Utlhi* I980« p* |4S« 
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Ti»km are overtafceo •kiifulXy* Ijy taking Advantages o£ the 
weakaeaa o£ the busier atatea aoa loaa t^ nerve on tho part of 
the limit* one author eXwmiMBma the iKstion about the soviet 
"capabilltjr fior tx^naoeeanic invaaion of large continental 
areas* aa "aheereat fantaay** ana utritest *preaent soviet 
naval atrategy# i t muet tm concluded^ doea not aupport the 
popular vie«« that the Soviet union iB bent on the bulldii»up of 
loilitary forces essential to any cin of world donination ty 
force**• M to the prospects of the Soviet Kavy dsvelqping i i t o 
an instruBKtnt o£ of fence # the above««ieRtioned JMerlcan naval 
authority f i n ^ evidence in at^ yport of the view that **Soviet 
naval stratuigy will renain defensive for the forse<«ble 
36 
future**, 
At the xntornatioml Conference on the Indian ocean held 
in 1971 un l^tr the auspices of osorgetown university*a Centre 
for strategic and ifjiternational stuaies, protesscr oles »• 
Nolans ky of the Leigh imivecsity rejected the thesis t t»t ths 
soviet union was "musclii^ in into the Indian Ooeaif • (^toting 
COQsnander »K:Gwire« fe»ioerly of the Roy l^ fiavy and now a lecturer 
at the lAiiiPersity Co l l e t o£ i^les* atolensky thus recalled wliat 
happened in the ln<3lan oceam *7he soviet Kavy iRored reliK:tantly 
34. Robert, mslm Herrick, gQVM Hnl Styflt^gYl ftftiY Ygfltf Qt Ttefgy ftftfl Frag^te* t ^ Revai institute. Annapolis^ 
KGcyliind) # 1968, p» 143, also p, xv» 
36* JUJtiki. P* ^^f* 
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into ttm taaiJm oeesn impixm oi %im £act tim% i t ««• *op«riiUo» 
iialiy i l l prepared for sycli a aove** ftw Kc«»Ii»*« ae^iai^i «^ MI 
heavily infltieikced ia^  PuiMtagtoii** itiitiRtiv« in tuiipl^wefitiiig 
tim polarifi £oroe a@pl«»ired in ttm mMtm:r»mmm witto unita 
37 Qperatii^ i» th@ Af«MA& Sea* xt was aot the *i«i«itergt witbdrai^l'' 
but «iaat«rD ac&iotia ^«p@ci£ical i^ ttm iX^mt into tim Xnaian 
Oceaid t^icH impaliaa ttm oataistXistiseiit Q€ a 8oiri©t mml praaa&ot 
in ttoa araa* mQt&tmkf (»mc3.i3d@dt "I^UB £ar £rop thm aggressiva 
ifit;efit «o Cr^ u^Ei&tly aaori&aa to ttiaaa rec@Bt &>vt@t m&mMt m»€sm*B 
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Etaia osncarig seeias to hftva l^ ^n tsilitar^ < f^eiioa"« 
Tint the xndian ana p'acifie ooeas qpac«tioiia play a 
a^coeairy t%>l© ii) tlia soviat nilitar^ a^ataf^ tiaa bemn reeogiiiaca 
hf l^ 'aain^ ^ I'-itatern isiqi^ rta lilie o@of£r«if jfii)«0i *ili» In^iaii oeaan 
raiil» avail lo t^sr* bazvly iMriting a wmmi.&R in soviet atrat^gic 
writinga* ttm mmll aquaaroo »aiiitaiiiea thttra ta&a a fiag absifiog 
role and ia i;»irobal»ly concarnaa to aescuBulaia qparatiag ajcperiancsa 
ifi caaa US wisaile B^imtlmm era a««r €«piO|ea lo ttia M&M»m 
sea« tiheece tlia^ eo\iJtd atti^k aieo»t all* i&viat targeta imm 
fik^am ia tte '«feat to centc<ti ailsaria in ttm @aat« Xt 1m higlily 
ufaikaly ttiBt the soviet xeSifts ocean a^ tmaron ia i&taaaed Cor 
action agaiiiiit inSlaa ocaan aaa roittaa* or to etjfe off liastftrfi oil 
1972, p» 3ia# 




Anotter AnerScan se]aolfir« pfoCescor iioii«r€ wrlgyins* 
rirector o~ th© Olotsbia univrrsit^'s •outheris ASIAR xmtitute* 
IK li4« papeir preaeotei! at Uwf cj0:iyret0ui: ytiiv*tr«i.ty GoeCtirefice 
on tti« X a^iiir^  oceas c«il«d the Soviet 9oim t&» *itrate9ic«ily 
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^krrmive*'* t^iygios sug^est^a that tr4i utiita^ States should 
propose cxmvm^Bian oC t }^ maisc oce^n into • nuclear^Cr^ soi« 
to {ilia/ r^iivi^ f«a^s about e^vmlopsmm, ot posei^n n iss i le 
sul^eriirs* 
The tact i s that t!ie Soviet ynion is tr^in^ i t s kmnt to 
secure « *zsmB ot' Soviet penetratioif ir. this rsglon hf sxploitii^ 
ttm n-^isms^l i sstsbi l i t^ end a yeaeral rsfentoieiit syaicst ths 
i%©st« A €^i 4l to this is ths a€vafstai#s that ths Aig^Mfiistafi 
oe«i^atlor. provides to fm soviet union vis«a«vis the Q^Hi tmi»io»» 
Tbe Soviet iiiival stratc^^y has sriiittci from sea denial to sea 
control. Tlis Sovi£2t policy i8# it. tact* to ««tat»lisb Csnisrd 
positions &i: tteir it;£luiencft throu^ h^ t insly an€ dccisivs 
ii^t^ vent ion %ith ttm itmndeil^ 'S tli^it tlie vssttrrv rssponse toultf 
cot lead to a hcati on clash* ths ^ v i c t prtcsptions ol the 
©trat^jic siijniCic'aRcs o£ ths Ineiar» ocean nay hs sunenorisea as 
tiiO Coiai siurategic geopolitical yain in vinrJ.1^ political 
control ovT-r tla^ vital o i l ll .glirie ol .he : KSt fuak^ R territorial 
39* Qeotlrlf Jole&s '^tlie l3evel^«eRt o£ f^viet Strategic 
Thinking sines I94S». in gtrttg^Y ftn<fi gjgglgi CCanhK-rai 
I90C9,. p. 38* 
4C» J. Gottrell ana ?J*K* Burrell tea)« aSUfiiliA* P» ^'^** 
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«iicroachfBcnt in the region higlily tentytingi ana this territorial 
encaroaehneat Mty wicvst (proviaed the ristai can he ne^ptietefi 
8kil£ully) es a reetdt o£ poiit icsl opportooitlee eriaing out of 
the veaknasses o£ IMl^ er atatea and laeic# or loaa« of mrve on 
the pert of ttm mst in the face o£ a threat of global war* 
looking alMma to eiMsrging ch&ngea la oillitary technology* 
\m nay aursiiae that a failure of glctitsal arfw control efforts* 
eapeeially the collapse of the hSH Treaty could qpen the nay £<»r 
various kowtm of mw ana destahilisiog a i l itery activity in the 
Indian Ocean hy hoth 8C|>erpOMers« ineiadling possilsle miclear 
deployiaents* Cruiae o i s s i i e di^loyKents « i l l pose verification 
problems thcit are l ikely to aggravate nuclear anxieties in the 
Indian ocean region as veil as in other parts o£ the votie* Oiven 
i t s location* thi northerr. Arahian Sea could acqiuire special 
sensit ivity in the conteact of ti*S* ant i*^te l l i te and other 
interception eyatetas related to the strategic Defense Initiative 
ond aoviet eoimter-eieasures* The present relative stabil i ty in 
superpower (tonventional naval aaploynents could ahrqptly change 
in a ciiBfitf} o£ increasing tension at the gli^sal and regional 
level* Qsnt^ inuing instability in the region* arising from 
regional and extra^regiom I factors* could dr^ w the superpowers 
into a dire<^ confrontation* Among the nore explosive focal 
points of instability were the war in Afghanistan and the 
concomitant conflict developing in the Afghanistan •i* 
€S 
rattistmi iaoraeriandsi laao«»E«ki«t«n teiwionsf the Xmi«-Xr«(« wtr* 
and tssc«rt«ii%y surrou&aicg tb« political fntiirv of Zran* 
Xean i s a focal poiat oS Sovlet« i^iaMirican distrust* l^tt 
l^it«a StMUm bftses i ts C^ iM r^si Coeiinaiie £orc^ plannitie oo tti« 
*vor8t ease" scaoftrio of a Soviet seisuro o£ tht AtedKi o i l 
fiaias* TtMi soviet yuitm f«ar* ttiat tho tmited 8tat«« mmy mmk 
to imtsm imuk omcm ayain a nilitary ally* The a«S* ana tht 
u*8«S*R« ahisuld t^wAimm to exarciaa the G3itf;ijal restraint that 
tlwy havs diiBioaitrat«a ip raosnt years in Iran snd stmiild caaka 
as»r>rqpriats <liplonatie affwrts to reassure eacdi other that neither 
will iotroaace eoebat for«as or aubually threatesiiig hasas or 
faoi l i t ie« thsre* 
l^ie groifiog teiaiioii on the ASghftnistsn «• Pakistan border 
TBi&kBB a negotiated settleoient of the h£^»niMtMn conflict 
increasingly urgent* the united nations a»diation efforts hfts 
produced ac«wptane» oi the pricMSi-le thst e soviet ca«itbat force 
witharewal within s defined tiiae period and e cessation of 
foreign su|>port for Af^ i^an resistance droops should he orches* 
trated in « coordinated set of agreements. The u*8« should he 
fully s i^orted hy the powers ciirectly concerned end hy l i ttoral 
and hiisterland states as i t seeks to huild on the progress so 
far laade* 
It is apporai^ that an enduring Afghan settlsMent would 
require parallel Soviet«^*aier4cafi dialogues relating to Pakistan 
6& 
as well Qfl to %rmn* At this ittage* i t i s ai££iciilt to envisage 
tbe muBtgensm ot e "sons o£ peacB siid Netatrality**» as has laeen 
[proposed* in whicb ttie solitary presenos o£ ths su|>tri>Qwers %«>uia 
t)e sKelttded Croa Xrai>» MglPfiistaii asd Pakistan* ^iwrthiess* 
ttm 9*S* and tlie u«S*S.li« shc i^ild begin to explore undarstandings 
concerning t ie nted for fiiutual rastrciict in a l l t i res o£ tliess 
countries* Vhi» region adjoins tbree o£ ths tirorid*s nost 
populoias natikms* and loany countriea« inc i t ing the imitcd States 
end India* hsive an interest In aeoess to the adjaoMit oil^tearing 
areas* ttie jpossil^e develQ|mei3t o£ nuclear «fea";oi» lof regional 
poifers undarlines ths ini^ortanoe o£ prudsncs and restraint hy 
hoth si^rponers in dsaling with ^ i s area* 
Changes in military technology* notal»ly the advent of 
cruise Qisailes* anti«satellite weaponry* and spacs-'based and 
operated anti-oiss il© systeiBS* could naice the Ibdian ocean 
waterspread and the l i ttc^al and hinterland states a theater o£ 
growing tensim) h^tieen the st^ perpcMers* fsarked by an expanding 
competitive search for fac i l i t ies in the region* the iispact o£ 
tt^ae changers cannot be naaningfoliy discuesed in regional arws 
control iieg«>tiatiocs llsiited to the Indian Ocean* stich as those 
on laval liinitations conducted lay the 0*3* and the U*6*s*R* in 
1077-78* It tiotsld b@ desirable for the sMper poners to give 
attention in sstBc fora to issos of specific concern to the Indian 
ocean region as ^ r t of their global ainss control dialogue* kt 
the sane tine* when and if i t i s appropriate in the global context* 
§7 
the svperpmmra ^ouie ve9mm • ii«parate dialogu* on r«9iozMiUy* 
^£in&a iasiios witli «n ty i to the possibility of a freea* sn^ 
8i^»€muent reat:»tioo8 of tniiitary empl^ymmm &nB f ae i l i t i c s in 
the r j^iofi* 
Any r^ioeally^aifinetf erm control segotiit ict* betiwon the 
6^p@vpo«er« 6etme6 to lae «ppropriat« in the glotei context ehooltf 
prooeedi frao a ri^issQnitioii thut the efivJUronnent for eudi ne§oti«« 
tiofie has <m&ii9e eince the 1977<»7S aielogtie* The oaitea States 
perceives a Se»viet seourity threat to the region priaiarily centerea 
in the iana-hiisea potentiei o£ the ii.8*«*R«# the Soviet ^ i o n 
pereXiv«8 a 0*S* sacurity threat prinarily cesterea in tl«$« naval 
pom&et ai^reisional pOMers perceive threats erising i^ o^ei both 
regional and extra«regionel soirees* 7hus# renei«ea negotiations 
eouia no longer be lliaitea to t»vttl limitatians alone iMit «ouia 
have to reflect lar^^r traaB«^fs# Mnong cnny exeiBplas that coaia 
be citoa« the u«S« peroeives a poteotiei threat fron Soviet 
strategic aircraft or tactical aircraft posing an olfensiv* threat 
to neighl^ioring states* basea in Afghanietant the soviet tmioo 
fears the a^>io^nt of aaal«<apalAe aircraft besea on 0*8* 
carriers in th@ Arziblan sta« ana various l i t tere l states voice 
concern that Diego Garcia eight beeone a base for nuclear forces # 
or that bo^h sjperpoMera might deploy cruise o iss i las with nuclear 
warheaas in t^he region* The prebleai of traatoffa is c^plicatea 
by the £act ii^ hat i^i le both siaes feel that their vital interests ar« 
involvea# tt^ direct security of i t s national territory i s involved 
in the perceptions of the U.StS.R. 
e8 
ARitC PaOLlFSRAgaOK. ARWS liACS jtflr THK CONCEPT Qy IKPlAK QCgAR 
3tie Z|i<!lieii Oce«o in vitnesaiog lfit«iiB« ams r«e« k^  •acteruftl 
aea intAimal {sowers gor the Iftst ten y^wrs. t%i« respoimitaillty o£ 
artns inflow itito this region goem to tliose countries lAitt «r« striving 
to establish an interventionist cspshility* tim wmin reason of sms 
race i s the l«tok of ioSioanoos arms industry worth i t s name in tim 
states of the region* except the unique exmiple of India* 
The teirw anw proliferati^i oan tm analysea oely after taking 
into account ^pariahles like the ec»nonie cost of the militac^ related 
prograimes# tine arns aaquisitiem prograseie pefHi«* the opti^e^ 
military capaMlity thus acquired by these states* an^ various types 
of eeonoskio mae politic^Hsiiitary linkages between ^is artae 
recipicnte ana arms su|;^llere« 
Cespite a large niandser o£ reasons* the associated te^tno* 
logies falling into the hands of a^^rsaries end soan tisies even 
at great risl<. of the weapons are the laain reesons i^ieh insists en 
increasing i»e of anus transfers as part of diplonacy* these have 
heen well eitplained in strategic literature* The lamieaBe abil i ty 
of amis supplying countries to fashion the perceptions of the 
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tieourity of tlie reo«pient stetes im notable, Tim raatilts ar« climr 
or certified taf tha develOKpraent of intervtei^ion to tim bilateral 
and r e t i o o e i 4i<£warsary a i tuat io t ia* 
Certain general oiseenratiom on fti^ state o£ techi^logy in 
the area ^sill goirern any dlacuasion on airsia transfers• Firstly* 
the stimulation oi necessary ^m&nm and tamilariaation of tho 
a o ^ m «feapon syst^ras for the developing countries «•» dcMoe l^ y the 
anns pro^ttcii;^ countries* military aid during 195Qi* Tim beat 
exatsple i s of the united States which alone gave over $ 3 tm 
tiortii of &rvm to the l ittoral and hinterland states of the Indian 
ocean bettfeen 19&0 and 1977 and sold over $ 11 l»i ariM disring 
1 
1973*197?« %B other wcards military aia through various security 
pacts or ethi}r«iBe created the necessary demand affloog the l i t toral 
end hirfUurlaiad states. 
Secondlyf the military aid MIS extended to those eowttries 
particularlyt ishich )«ve a low technological L«se« Thailand* Iran* 
Pakistan* Jordan and Xri»3 k have been the maiA military aid 
recipients of the us i^ K;>ng the l i ttoral states of the Indian ocean* 
In 1965* the 0*8» teilitary aid was suspended to Pakistan and tn&iMm 
The soviet Union for lo(ii& and the Oiira lOr palOstaii have beeoitie 
the main amis suppliers after 196&* 
P.K.S. itopboodiri* 3Btig^i^i^?a m ifaft Ift^lan, gfiiin« p* 9i< 
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The aiiM supply £or national re«ourc«« «M9 the second 
eaetfiod* 7hiii la largsly A phecominoii o£ the i97Qi % i^eii aone oi 
the iMintaC«ett2r«rs «f!^ered into long t«m deals £(Mr o i l in 
exchai^ Hs for e m s . 7he FrsECh i«sre r«^ortea to have mtitmr&d into 
such desls with irsq ana Sauai jurabla* 
The aintis tor other prinary coiaiao£itles ymm the third tiietlK>a# 
It is reported that egyptiaii ana S^tf^ness cotton «asre eKChenged 
2 
for soviet ainw* 
r<»rthly« arsis sales vmre effected through long term d e d i t s 
£ittcd into bilateral trade toetveer. the supplier ana recipient* 
Lastly« ertBS races ere also cooducted by ie@ani ot loam aod 
grants provided by one recipiest country to another recipient to 
purchase oros in the qpen inarket* 
The diefence expenditure o£ the area as e % o^ie secaes 
ingressir.^ continiiausly in con^irgaity tiith the global trend* There 
has been a continuoc® and steep rise in the defence ipependiture 
o£ I'i&at ABiMi, year after yaar in the seventies* The defenoe 
exj^nditure Trnrn been a steady rise in i^rica* The defence mq^t^ 
ditore in o t^r areas has been fluctustians* 
2* l^ M«i$iifi Affairs end Katiom^ Defence) ^vis ion C«iyressicM)sl 
Rei 
MM 
^orej^in jisKai^ra eras e>af;»oDai Mecesn^ tMVMMvm v^onprwiV Hiw 
eseaich Service^ imtofl §%§m m^im.r9UmM\Wi%im 
§  gWJMlff WilHrflfY MlialiUaail (^^hiogton. p*C* 1917) 
pp* 86 ""eB* 
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Vh& deifence e^pei^iturft of nine a»uiKtrjye« namly «> SouOi 
Arabia* Irftiii. Zf^ aie* X«irmel» Irvq* Soruth Afriai« A)jitr«lift« Egjrpt 
Ana F«lcistftn^ i s sore than 7S pereant out o£ the total defence 
expenaiture «>£ the region* HiKoept theee nine coontriee the 
^£«no6 e3(|»«sditur« remained conetent ia other*« ttith the eoccep* 
t ion o£ Xntoneeia n^ here i t e^ are than <^uhled between 1971 aiMl 1977 
end oraan where It imxeaaed hy alaoet seven tiawa ($ 119 nn to 
3 
$ 648 eut^, 
Bxeept Saudi Arabia anc Auatcaiia^ thoee couotriea which 
have the hielbest defence e3q;>enditure h&ve fotight one or store ware. 
That is why i t can bo attributed that war i s an iaportant factor 
which increaees defence eixpen^ture in theae coisitries* 
The origin ot the *regioiiel influentiais* amaog the Indian 
ocean l i ttoral states was the result of the qua^^plinQ oi crude 
o i l prices in 1973 and subsequent ii»:rease of prices* the crude 
o i l is the priiaary energy nmterial Cor the O&cs; couRtries and the 
increase in prices of crude o i l ^ave birth to the problera of 
balance e£ {SNiyiiicnts to cr s^t of thf»i» Two regional influentials*« 
Saudi ArabSst an^ Xran# were choeen* priimrily because of their 
enoret^us oi l resources # to protect the t>^stern interests in the 
4 
region* 
3* jL|y|^ ,^|. 
4* P.K.S. Kasiboodiri* ^lattfllftteff IP Y!» l i l ^ ^ OflMB* P* 92* 
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ttae SEtin purpose o£ the aesirc of i^th these ountrie* 
(Sauai ATQbifik and Zrai^  ruling eiit@s« to buy t ©stern arsun and 
e<}uipo '^nt le to achieve a guatrantee to secure their regitae fstira 
extern&l aggrc^aion* Tbe aevelopitctit o£ rautuBlity o£ interests 
betMEten these oi l proevteiim countries cut the %imt are hssea on 
three objectives* first# the o i l explcration in the region ^as 
c^ne by the w^i^rn ocxspaates %>liidli a:^ >eted « close relationship 
bett^een the oi l pcocucioQ cotmtries e l i t e s and the oi l cor|»anies» 
secon61k|r# the close cooperaticm o£ Egypt ana Ismq «>ith the 
Sociiilist Moc o£ countries had been realised as a threst to 
their regincs by the iBonirohies« which was the result o£ tbs 
Egyptian Revolution o£ early 19&Qi and Iraqi Revolution ot 19608. 
The »>e8t enif! particularly ths united States was regarded the best 
protector bjr the ruling e l i t e s due to the situation* Thirdly* 
a vtsf strong bond between the nil itery estabXishoents o£ the tiB 
us «n^ thi? irccipients static conc^ ^med %«8 the result o£ the ersM 
transfer relationship which in turn was transfomed into ircry 
intiniate political rel^itionship boti^en the ruling e l i t e s o£ these 
countries and the US Goveriment estal^ishment* 
tim {»einteiB»C!e of an inainterruipted flow of o i l by 
establishinj a viable r«»iatiomhl|;> at any cost tiss the iiiain«i 
purpose of arms suppliers 
/eagerness* probably* the supply of highly sophisticated equipsieift 
to these co'untries VB& a low risk of arsu suppliers willingness* 
tiot a single recipient or the o i l procuciny cotsertury i s in a 
position i.Q (saintain snd exploit the equipnent adequately* The 
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result o£ thie Jkmt66qt»CY o£ ree«plcfit countries i s ttmir depsiuSftuc^ 
on suppli«rs eymn £or tho inaintemnce oi tim equlposnt* 'thm ttm 
<Sep«i3attiK;y of i'Jtm ¥mit Asisti cot»strie« i s incrsaaicg on the arns 
si^pliers in risspeet o£ their natiofisl security* 
Ths %isst asisD coucitries ot the tnSiMn ootsii rs^ion heve t i s a 
thiM to i t significantly oo ftc«:oa0t o£ oiftssiini armi trsnifors 1^ 
ths US. 'J£!bcs0 countries t^im <£aivctaiieia thsir eeoticaiiM to thst 
Q£ tim us SQd i t s a l l i e s on acc^uiit o£ ths peoamtm o£ taoasmisatioaf 
initiet«d bY tl^onslves* Lastly ths Isrgs motmy faalsoos of thsse 
eaui^xios i s rscirculatcd in the MMitern monetsry systems • 
The influx o£ pEitro«d0l 2«rs 6i6 provide the o i l rich s ts tss 
with noeeos to ei:tonca thsir militsry csps4|lity» fhis monsy hss not 
gom to ttm USj^  e^lmm hat s l so to the countries ^^•stern Starope snfl 
to tins vmn^ iBot tliis militsry spDodingt o£ i^vieh s largs psrc«»tsge 
Is GsrBt&rK^ d tor ereatii:^ the l»sic i£!£rsstructtare# trsining 
progrsmias mti& iroutim tasintseance* Isrgsly bf iatmign sjqmHTts* 
constitutes ori:Ly a snail part of ths eiNifftll pattern of the rseycling 
of petroi^dollsirs* & much larger percentage i s spent on dsvelopiaental 
programmes* m'mv&e, in both cases« the pattern of over dtpmiDiemwm 
on tha ensuing loss of national autonony in the use of technology 
thus ol^taima applies equally to the military as well as c ivi l ian 
ssctocs« 
The seconS important ams supplier of the ZodlSB ocean region 
i s the Soviet tmiocu The Soriet unions arns svqpplying share Is 25 
percent out oc: the total araw trenafer of the region* The main target 
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of ttm urea £or ttm ftovtot Union Is the •aws» tlw ii«it jiii«ii group* 
The soviet activities in th* tr^iMn Oc«ao to laalenot th» m 
presanoe tieiro « ratailistioiB o£ va <gr(mltig iMimnum in tmn and 
naiml dapioyae^ nt ie tha Zodiaii ocaan and the big^ K s^t oi l ii^jort of 
Baat Europeao couatrlea from Xraq* 
Aa iotK) A« tho eonfr^mtation ia confined to tagiooal powera 
oiUly their amia proXlferatiofi poaea a linitad threat to world 
peace ana aeetirity* Xt ia whan the regionel conffotifeatioa 9«ta 
Xinl^d up uitli 6re@t power rivalry ana their intar^ta in a given 
&rea# thet aai'ioua threat im poaed not ooly to peace aod eecurity 
of tha region but alao of the tforld aa a i«hola« i f «• take tha Arab» 
la real i rivaliry acd the lra<|»Zran war aa two axaiq^ laaff we find 
that in the m&m of the firat* regional €:anfro»tation« ita logical 
arma proliferation* ana the aaaociatGd Great power lintegea peaad 
probleiaa e^  global peace* !» the aacond oaae tha ^frontatiofi i» 
Btill local iatsd in nany waya. Thua# the lifi^^0|«.t«iia«aii regional 
powera and noic^regioml powera# eapeoially Great powera* need to ha 
axaffiined in d«pth» «^le atudyimy ^^ ^ ^ l^aation of ar«a proliferation 
in the Indian Ocean region* 
Th^e ia no dov^ that# over a nmbar of yeara# Great powwra 
hava created their aurro^it^ and proxy powera who can be uaad aa 
inatruoanta# direct or indirect of their coercive diplonacy and i f 
nacaasary* can be a part of tha over all areat pdwer atrategy in the 
global or regional context* Such aurrogatca or preniaa are 
n 
buttressed lay tin Grest rovers with ttm necvstary {toliticsl economic 
ana military support* X£ om SMlyaos the inflow of mcmt sod othsr 
milltsry rslstsd support £roB orast powers to soeh rsgionsl pewsrs 
within the frasework of surrogate or prmcf rslationshl|i« one f i e ^ 
that i t has lieen one of tim leost iiBportaiat factors leading to the 
proliferation of &r«s in the Indian ocean region* ffis advocates of 
ariM control niist t»iss that i^sit ii^o aceount* 
Ona fBOira source ^ arns proliferation* in the Indian Ocean 
region i» hy and large* ignored t^ those who study this subject* 
fhat i s the Qrsat powers* direct fldllitary prcseooe a&d/cr their 
oapabilities to proieet sue^ presence at short notice in the region» 
Zf wnss proliferation weans a quantuB imp in the capability to use 
tiilitary coersiooat any given tie%# this variable along with the 
linloatges of Great powors with regional sitrrogites and proxies* shsold 
be analysed very carefully* This analysis becoiws all ths more 
relevant now because the targets of this type of arstt proliferati^ 
are not the Greet powers per se but the regional powers theottelves* 
A.ISO * these linkages pose as a great destablising fores in the 
internal politics o£ the re||i^Mil powers theeMelves* as osn im 
illQStratcd tiy the events in Iran* Thus* this type of anus prolifs** 
ration poses a direct as well m an indirect c^llengs to pea^* 
security end stability of the regional powers* 
in 1977 ana 1978* the United States and ths soviet union 
conducted four rounds of negotiations on arms limitation in ths 
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Jn^Um ocean, mcot^ing to a report presented to the fah Force 
by an inner iaeiD mmber yHno interviewed weany &i the AieBricen 
policynakere end prine^mie involved* the dre£t egreetaent touXd 
have prohibited both «ides from altering *eiynificaiitlir paet 
patterns and levels o£ military deployvante* in the region* 
5 
acquiring ncvr bases ana expstnding then existing faci l i t ies* tim 
report sale that a convidsrable area o£ agreeoient had eiecrged in 
the negotiatJiOEW ooncernins the precise character of the past 
patterns an£ levels o£ deployments by the t««o sidss* Thus* i t 
was ©nvisa^d that the Soviet Vnl<sn could continue to dsploy 
18 to 2^ surface vessels* vp to one half of theie cami:iatants« Tim 
United states could contintis to station i t s three-ship force at 
Bahrain and icould continue tu? send thpss tasH forces per year 
into the Indian &€:©an* at least one ot which could include a 
carrier battle ^roup^ provided that only one task force lould 
be deployed in the area at anyone time and that i t would not 
6 
renain £or more than §& <!teys« Similarly* since neither side had 
previously c^ ieployed strategic banber aircraft in the region* neither 
could introtftuce such dsployaient* 
5. Claudia %echw«>d* m ftU f9im <S«^  ^<»^^' ^9^) ' P» 37, 
6* ijygjt^ jH-a p* 4 2 * 
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The rem»om for the imUat«r«l jmriom ifitharftw»l £rofn the 
tmlim Diere »vppo9m6 t o be related to the ovente in Ethlppi** hut 
la fact they lay elsewhere* The crucial factor was ^le Pe»tasp&*e 
oppoeltioc to axiy amta llnlefitlone In the Xodlan ocean* I t le 
well kDo^m that oven hofore the f irst rouod o£ talKa began* the 
Joint Chle£s o£ sta££ had deelarea i t s oh^ectlohe to any agreeisenta 
limiting oiilitary activity in the inClan Ocean* l ^ n when the 
negotiatione diid etart* the Chainaao of the JCS in hia sieiBoraoaiA 
o£ August 9«197f expressed his aisagreei&ent with the assecoe uf the 
proposals beicig et^isidered by the two sides* haa later# when 
there were sonie s igss of progress in the negotiations^ he issued 
a new statement in aantiary 1978> urgiog Carter to suspend the 
negotiations# whi<^ he roon did* JUl o£ this Is easily docoaented* 
Since i;hQ u«S. dots not aAait to the deploynent of nittrlear 
weapons in the region i t might well take the initiative and iSeclare 
« raoratcariun on tt^ depioynent oi a l l nuclear weapons in tim 
meian ocean and i t s natoral extensions* Such a eaove would win 
great popularity i:or the u*S* throughout the l i t toral states and 
would place ithe onus on the tJ»S*S*il* to follow suit* 
The new Trident XX aulasiarincs will k» able to target a l l ^le 
indUBtry and the eiili ary targets on the ii*s*s*!i« from the 
Atlantic and the p&citic« S^smz strcitagists s t i l l argus that ths 
folaris should be deployed in the Indian Ocean as « **counter*faroe 
roeerve* to enable t i^ o*8* to either follow ^^ (^  pn-«^irst striKe 
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or t o £ree tti& trlda&t £ ^ i n i t i a l targetirig* But tmm iM 
rmeoMkSmixt, 8ii»:« tm friaont XZ SM Invulnerable a t the present 
level o£ technology* 
Tbe l.<:^ it o£ aeploying 8ce<i-ZAunc}ied Croise Mlnslles <rt.ow} 
with nuclear Vf^ irhcaai £raio eulxanrinos or DBVOI aur£aoe vessels Is 
l i t e l y to ^ow» but they doc' t a t present have the recge to reach 
Soviet targets £rom the Xn^ llRn Ocean* niere i s no real sdvantage 
to e i ther side in deploying ei ther Polaris SbWm or aims Cof a 
nuclear type) in the Indian Ocean or i t s extensions* Th^e would in 
£act« be en Qd'^stage t o the u*8* on 4a gloiai scale to have en 
o^roaaent not to deploy SlCMs because o:. i t s los^or* taore populous 
coastl ine then the u.S«8.R. The Soviet incentive wuia be a 
reatiction An tlhe cotsplestity o£ the nuclear capabili ty that the u.S* 
would otherwise gain tn the Indian ocean* Thus # the advance in 
tochnology of «::ertein wEiapons could f ac i l i t a t e agreenient^ provided 
po l i t i ca l I tadsrs «ant thcra* 
one C3n no losyar tttink eiaout tl^ ie tailitar^^ future o£ the 
ZBdian Ocean in ter«as 0& ship mym and essjestic a i rcraf t carr iers 
s a i l lug through* ue have to think about vimt will happen as outer 
©poce gets mil iteri^ed* litien the ant i««ate l l i te systaas ere 
Phil l ips ooteroaad, Mtaino for the F u t t ^ (LonAan 1993) 
p . 157* 
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aftployetf* ttm 0*8. nay £eel timt in oraeff to carry out nissUe 
It^erotiptloia £roa F-1& aircraft» Diego C^rclat one can argue* as 
in the oaao o£ the r^laria autsnarima* that the imitad States 
atK>aia ha able to e:> i t without depIoyiiiQ i t in j^Jiggo Garcia. 
There im not a single eaantry in the Zoaian Ocaan rilond 
from the Cape ot aood flppe h^ way o£ the Morn o£ AfkriGA* the 
Persian Gulf* the Arabian 6ea« the Bay of Bangai* the Strait of 
Haiacea* to tlie Great Australian Bight* i^ hieh has not militarily 
eos^roeiised vith the V«8* or tho soviet Union for reasons of 
security* ideology* s^litioal convenieacs* economic pay«off * or 
c!2<|>edieiicyi i)a other trords* for ttm salts of national interest* 
Xt i s jQot at a l l certain f^3i» much the big powers have 
contributed to the militarisation of the Indian ocean oiileu and to 
what extent tt:^ Statai nithin the rcg^ i^ on prey to extreme secirity 
consciousnesa ana self-serving policies are responsible for i t . 
I t %fill be argued that uar or "hot* peace obtaining in the ocean 
basin i s basically a function* not so nuch of t ^ C9*>Soviet 
regional rivalry but of conilict and instability eederaic to the 
l i t t ora l . 
the iBcet striHing characteristic ot the Zi^ian ocean area 
i s the fact that the average ootoitry foars i t s neighbour more than 
i t does an outsiaer end thftt i t rel ies on the maior power to 
iBsintain a modicnn o£ order by the^ countenmiling military 
m 
pr«8eooi* The lt&* d68irabl« alterimtii^ totting to agree to a 
eaodi» vive&ai with th© ralatiwely powerful hvA E^tentlalisf pnxSatcry 
risilaiia states* 
The aain tlureat to tlia GCC o^ fnlaers coaea iK»t £co8i the t^ ana 
the Soviet \jnioi% hot from «f£thlr.f how to a>nteiii the polit icisetion 
of the people aiod resolve contredictioos aue to staqpendous o i l 
wealth on the one hand ana an essentially Bedouin ethos and nidset 
on the other* *lttere is also the i«ave oi Zslsnic ftindsweof l i s a 
onleaehed h^  the She* i te mullahs o£ Iran* Z£ the various Oulf 
Kiog^ns* sheikhdom and emirates are plainly hesitaat to own ti|> 
the t^ role in guaranteeing their %iell«4aelng« the us Oovemnefit 
i t s e l f has no such qualoss indeed publicises it* i^ hen the us Assis-
tant secretary o£ states for Kcar Lastem and Souith Asian Affairs 
Hieholas A* vuliotes suggests tiiat the twin thrust of president 
Reagan*s policy i s "the pursuit of peaoi an^ the pursuit of 
security* # he does not shy from adaittiiag the ohvious that "security^ 
refers also to the tensiare of the current rulers «3nd regines friendly 
to ABterica* ttie us position^ ever since the espousal of the so** 
called Carter Doctrine* mm consistently heen that ASMrioan military 
presence i s an instrument to "staUlise" the sitisation and confoms 
0 
t o the *'initeres(ts* of the t i t toral states"* 
8, Nicholas A* ^ l io tes* mpt. of statfi ^ i c t ^ ^ (reprint)* 
June 193a. 
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tior does the Soirlet unloii* £or that fiftt«er« aturink £rom 
stating ttM ccauBsiiti^ ct to the "m^^ly - fre« coifftfieA •«•« 
comolidBticg their ir49epenatiic«*' whicb« ttm Report of ttm Central 
Ctsmimittee to title aetli Canyreee o£ the Conatsriiet f*ert]f o£ tiMt 
Sov i^ ODioxi* eeera "ttis Imperieiiete •«•* ere trying to bind to 
tbeiai^Xvee ii^ '>^ <Ser to deel oore ireely vti^ tl»»ir oatucal ri< )^M# 
and to use their territory for tiieir etrate^l^ aesigM**« 
ftie ' '^c of crieie* «* aeseriptidn t>i the Gul£ hy 'Zhiesgnew 
ersEoeinaici elato f i t s the are loemte h^ the Xndien oceen ritaiand 
rid by tcoaion o£ the tyjpe genareted by fe&r £Qr territorial 
inteerity* Tfike the case o£ the Aaeociation o£ South East Asian 
KfBtiona (ASEA}^  •««« a 8(oa»l for eoonooic aevel^ piK f^it in the 
Third iiforld* Singiapore ie the coet vooel Mean proi^nei-t of the 
us mval presence being conaucive to regional stability* Tt» 
Sin^asKsre Foreign Minister SimathUBby Rajarathnais said i n I98lt 
* unless the Soviet Challenge i s taadD the oore o€ the m foreign 
policy and met i«ith the s«ae resolve ana sense o£ realism the 
Soviets bring) to their cause* then a pmt sovietica ia a high proba-
i i l i t y in thei l9aQi**« That i s not what we in Mia want* he 
declared* "biit i£ that i s the only itea on the shelf* that i s what 
»• Masmsma §I^ Rtft^ lMUOM^ the aeth eoi^ress of the CPSU* 
|<»»8CO»« D* 19« 1901* 
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\m v i l i haw to settle for*. 
Statemertt;* • i id i «9 tbe«« £>y l i t t a r « l cotaitry Isttdtra pronpt 
tlie 128 tt&€ the !»>vlet union each to progressively increase i ts 
Caress in ordiirt pirpQrteaiy# to keep pftoe nith the other. 
!)e£ini09 the tlireat ptsrely in US «« Stylet terms helps nesk s^kller 
C9tmtri«3S «ppr4.hensions of evsn ds £aeto local slUes &h9« they 
hope# i«ill L@ diterrea cf hig power Sotcm close by aingspore Is 
specially cocoeriis^ that i ts phenanenel eoonaeiic success slight 
I I 
give edjaoect ootistrire idess for e quick yrsb oprratioo* To 
Corestell suc^ en eventuality priine Kinister Lee Kusn yew ttts heen 
plugging ft\u«y st the ides o£ collective ae£ence to ssfeguerd the 
Asesn* m hSfl heen orgig^ Joint military exercis^i to tons yp 
miiitsry sltil]4i« In June 1982* the Ansus powers ana tm» M&lsysis 
and Sir^pore participatea in operation * Selfish 82** kt about 
the saiae tiiBe<. thailai^ Joinca the m sixth Fleet in an elaborate 
exercise co4si»iB6a "Cobra Goia 62** 
Then tiiere are the loaning trouble spots t is!«MI territories 
wl^se t i t l e owing to the es^lonial legacy i s hcia b^ one coonury and 
oontestea t^ another on the basis o£ the principle of yeograqphical 
immmmmmiimmmmimmmtmiimmmmmm 
10» This tatsnent b^  MJarathnan} VMB eade* significantly* after the 
lbn«elig]iea ftareign ministers sieet in nmn mlhi* Feb* I98l« 
\*^ hers Singapore tess striaent in its accusations of non«alignea 
bias in tavour of the foviet union* 
il« CT ^!»«^p affpncpic J^ gyicfe' J«» 13* 1983* ThiM issue coi^ Mo* 
tratea on sinyapore* Much of the letterial on Singapore in this 
paper i» arawn from this particular eaition of the FEEft* 
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contlxigtiity* 'itntrnt the ttinlce^ zslAsat in ZndiBn costrol ar« 
eluisi^d bf ttm Kaiaivcs ana the t tcab&r cl»ii3 Qg&lQ *eaa.nimtermA 
by HOW ]?eXhi hy Zn^^nesl** 
A rough pattern of intrav-littorftl conflict thtt mmergem hw 
mojpk and l^ naAfilA «t IsH g^erlvsaaai bu^ ioielm i^nsmhiqvm and the 
rest o£ £}3lack states in th@ csctisie^t to pmsvent South Africa £rocB 
QSiniiig HBtittl sod isilitary prsdsmimnoit* Zc ths (M£« the status 
qyoists are £<mr£ul of Iran asd Israel hist take cottfort in the 
lat ter heir^ a btiivark e ^ i c s t extresaist an^ ra<nical aiemests in 
tSm ''Arah mtilOfif and st^it baraly c^nccaiad glea at Zraq racaiving 
the MouB at the haneis o£ Iran* 
EX •••• Colonial leases anc oii<-st^ 3r« installations o€ any 
vintaga are currency to n^gotiata development aia# arwi transfers# 
and treda eoncasaioes vith* presi^ant Siad 8arr«# after haing 
discar(S@€ by the Soviets £or Bthi«^ia »•• ikdis AlAba hairing eon» 
sented to a l l fac i l i t i es <2evel9pBi&nt o£ hases on the Cahlaic and 
rarsian Zslanas in the mA 6ea * appraached the 10 and offered the 
ex-soviet base at seriaera for a i^ioa 40 siiUlon in wei^ns as 
f i r s t instaliisent* 
k tmm sat of problen« also arise as# ^mder external 
presstjres* dfttions ot the Indian ooean area turn to rival sources 
for military and econoiaic assistance* Such external isipoaitlons 
make i t difeicttit tor the Africans to fcxrge a oaeason iterspective 
in regard to* security end peace ^ the mdlan oceae* the Africans 
04 
a«teiid6iicy on outsiae power* lemcoem a l l t l i* »ar« merited laecdus* of 
th* i r eeoaosie ana pollx^ioai we*kii»i8««« 8e«idt&« rteoafe world* 
widt eeanonlc inecessiofi a«d en^rgir or is is have <9Rt««d a tot«l 
aicrtJi^tion oi MricftQ aconoMies* So 9t^tio&« nxamrovm i&trft«re«» 
giDOftl £i9SurM> t»v9 sur£«<e«< to atstAbJliiMi the coctinsnt. f l i t 
coxiflistf l>@t%f««n 8sKmli» «sid EttiloplA* for imt»i»e»« dm tm 
»mtn es an ea<:«XGtio» of tr«ftLtiof3BX Glaiiai ovssr diipiited torr i to* 
rlc»« lu Erltirtta* « aeriotitt rebellion oaotiinies tsecttusc trio 
Eritro&ca tiave oevor ecooptoa Sthispian Bomwigotf^ I t ! • oaturoi 
that aucli traditional a>»tiict8 aliauia oona haodir far expioitation 
bjr the extornal poirera to 6vmp aima and amaotenta and tberaby 
traiuifortting intraHMIfrican re la t ion itito pesvoanei^  Hootiiity* 
Batwaan 1979*80^ far iisatanesa* wmcm ai^^lied arma to £thldpia# 
Tanssanla ana mw»mhiq\m* Af agairast tlii»# American mpnm follotted 
into SmmXi&0 ^nya« Sti€an# saira and racontly into Botao^ a^na. 
Xn 1980« thtt m adniniatration raquaatad dollar iOO a i l lion in 
•cscurity aii^portii^ aaaiatanea for Bot»owana# lAsotlio* Swasilaod* 
wmhUk end MsasKsbiriiie!* 
Tradittonal antayoniam aay alao ovarlap tiitti idaolo&ical 
diataocea* In £ast Africa# idaologioal and leaderatii^ factors 
eaisft in tlia t^ ty of building a ra0.onal consansis« Dia east Afrioin 
coiitmtinity set up ty tcan^ fa^  Uganda and Tanaania laroiia dc^ wn aa a 
rasult of conflicting dtaands of ttm Qtcebers* Lat«r# in ttia period 
of ^ i i i *a r^gina ir« Uganda# di£f«rancas toetwaan Tantania and Uyanda 
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«rt9t«4 into an opmx armed conflict in 1979* Sliiijl«rly« mnsatilo^ 
r«cya tml^tlom^ detwriorfttoe with thi cloaiare o£ beratra b&tiiMi& 
the two cottiiari€«* Keo^ m QX»O Iftoloi i^ aoa Tftoaaniao aaciallffiD 
«0 tt threat to itJi on^ n isi^i>ecatst ecacomic aevelopwant* 
With thill ©nas stoclqpiliny« ititrft-<Afric&t£ coiulict* ttftve 
ii30rea«ed not oply io cintor iHit in im«iaiity find difNiMions* 
During W76.^&0g several tannea con^licta flarea vp ic £«»t Africa 
a»(S ttie Horo o£ A£ri<»* These conflicts led t»> o££etr« ~o£ sectMrity 
assistance* including isase facilities* to the extarml poiiars 
hy th9 local protagctiists* ThtM* tlie OSA entered into agreenent ifith 
Kenya to btiild* wit^ dollar 26 niillofi* naval sijp^ort* facilities 
at l^eiBlsasa port* At the end of 1960* IBA also signed an ayreament 
with Somalia ta si^ ^ply dollar 4C million worth of anas for the use 
o£ military an(3 port Cecil i t las at Berhi^ a* Zt SB not clear if the 
Soviets too hsips gained base facilities i» Ethiopia, hot increased 
Creat Foi»er rivalry laight unfold ftjscoif *s military goals in the 
fiorn* 
Generally the eoi»ss>t of the Peaoi zone is regarded aa e 
concept of pactification or satisfaction* Zt is comt^ttited £y two 
consistently c;ontradictory factors • one intentis a <»>nditioo whiGh 
refers the aj&sience oi tension* var« c^n^lict and ttnaoilt while 
the other it^icates the aiethods ttrough which peace oain he adUcved 
as good sianagiMient* orderly resolutioa of conflict and the establish* 
ment of harnony and the destruction of distturisanoes throti^ 
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unaerttaodiag aed fiegotittiona* XR tmct # ttm littorftl states 
ftlways act «siiii»t tlmior cmii ^txli&e dtcision i«3leh %«r« taken 
*to praserva tisair iDdipaadeiica* aoveraigtsty ana tasritorial 
iotagrity* through reaolvlng thalr politicals eoononie ana aocial 
12 
pr6i)laiBa u&aar coi^tioaa o£ pe«s» mm traaquilitir*« tbi raaliza*' 
tion of ttm en& o£ the conflict o£ intaraata asoi^ the mtiona* 
ia an esaantlfti factor imt the achiavaooi^ of peecsa* that ia «hy 
the oonoapt Qivas pr@fer®isca odcalataiitly mora to tha raa^lution 
or rofiiaction o£ ^mClict through miitittl aegotiationa and iiii^r8tftD» 
<3i»g taore, rather ti^n tha allrainitioo of tha ciaah of intoresta. 
Zt ia a fact that ti^ia proceaa ia oo«plio&t@a to oatai i t eltiaiva* 
306ia ej^erta aiiggestea th&t i t can ha aehiaved only through atap 
by atap approach i^ a,ch onergea froa atabla war to unstable «ar# 
from unatahle «ar to tatatahle peace ana from unotahia paaca to 
atable paaca hy aaliharata aaciaion* 
The inlfluei^a of the Csld mt during 1970 in ^le region 
was on ita cl:L»ax nore than in aarlier aacaaaa* uhan a valuable 
aiacmaiona on the conoas^ of peace zona in the Sn^an ocean «i«re 
going on* Rai^ looal conflicta &:mt in foreion ponera* which would 
harOly have obtained or even sought oppcrtunitiea for exerting 
SXSamsm* ^ AHhtar wajeed *|i?tfMB <?ffifm 9M^M If 
S7 
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such aeci8iv@ icflocnc® h.a ttmam tmga^tlvm esrdltioss not «xl«ted» 
An united ca(K;.iinity in tJtm Xndl«n ocean region nlylit have teeone 
a powerful £»ctor in tiw intemationel eyetesi* A nunber o£ 
•tten^te o£ re^ioml cooperation Mhm« Arab Oai£ States ati l l 
resiain only in aoaie cue ta the lads ofi aolieerity of the eamnmnlty* 
in this aituation* regiotml con£liota or dispotee csan not he aolvea 
by tmglots&l attoc^a* 
The iccrecaea isiiitary end atrategie activitlea in the 
Indian Ocean during the eecond bsHf of I9&0e, of both the euper 
po«iera ^ve hirth to a new realieation aaoag the littoral stat«» 
of the indiaii ooMn* tmictt streaaed sn the conoi^ Tt of Peace au»ne 
in the Zndian ocean* Wtom 1968* the liiiitea Soviet i«iion*a reguler 
naval preaenoe in the Indian ocean wm the retaliation to the 
Angio«»Aiaerlcan argtaaent on uie^o aereii* Thoee coimtries ifhich 
w&tm ruled for a long time hy the external poiiera tiirou^ their 
navnl po%ier» partiei^arly objected to this er& rmSB» e^inaequintly 
the concept o£ peac^ i SSose took ahape. An external poi#er can rule 
only on the haaia of i ts naval- potter* i t la i«tter to deny the 
right to dat&nnd or arpe^ to the freedaia of the high seaa of tiae 
eictemal poisiera through the «olleetiv« efforts tlian to reduoe 
the same right on Uie haais o£ thsf argument thet the area tsould 
13* pUiti^ araun* jTUfi mflteanrnitniiBfrfiliDn flfi fiaWhUct tar 
fft]t^ .'toBft? p« 174* 
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Im mmeixfd inm tho S«st*KMt conflict and from ottitr ^xog^motm 
conflict** 
tb» firiit fomulAtioo of t}ie pwm^^lmmtA9 of th« pwace sow 
in the ZnAiAii :K»difti> ocean mm oon^ietca «t the Son^^igned 
surmsit at ttiaalia ia 1970 «na subaeqiaently activitiaa shifted to 
protBotiog the proposal within the tmited l^tiane* Sri XiSiiKa played 
double rolet oms o£ the apokeamn and t)» aecood of ocxMrdinattxr 
and the leadinig role of Mr AaieraicQ the periMinent united Kationi 
repr^ientetive in looking after Third i^srld intereate in the nego* 
t iations on a miv international lav o£ the aea» nae not eurprieiim* 
14 
The £ollm}ir4g %)ere i t s ntoat loportant elemente* 
^ The region should not offer the i»re«»requlsites for 
in« l^<y«a)ent in a military confrontation betneen the 
0a|[^ r<*powars* Zt should therefore he free frcm military 
haaes« frtxs the regular preeenoe of nivies and from 
nuclear weapons* 
• Tho l ittoral states should not ei^er into any military 
comicltioents with the sqper powers (especially military pacts) 
whiclk ware obvioiwly conceived in the context of global 
si^er-power rivalry. 
14» jUli^« P* i7S* 
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» Tb« littoral mtmtm »«nt to c*««rvo for tteiM«ive*« 
by tmmtm o£ a speeiftl r«gine and in kaeping ttitit 
the a>acopt of (^ll«etiv« Mie^aitasKtiiifttSonf the 
6ec;Uiioa to limit x^ MMi of trtm PMNMIQ« ana of 
• ijidiars* as «i»ii aa rights to fly over the region and 
othiir military uaaa o£ the ocean l^ eictcmai potiara* 
sri LBRisa** Prieia Miniatar Mra. sandaranaika* introduced 
these tooota in a apaach to tha united liatior^ Ganaral Assephly in 
October 1971 • the vote on the correafjonc^ng raaoiution followed 
lb 
tvo Bio&tha later* fhe kty aentaoca readt *ttm Qanaral Mwamhly ••• 
aoieamly dtelarea that the Zsdian ocaan« within lisdta to Isa datar* 
isinedtf togethar with the air apaoa ahova and tha ocean floor 
aabjacent thereto« in b^ehy daaignataa for al l tioe as a sona of 
peace* * The (jreat powara «e e urged to ester into iaiaediate 
conaiiltatioaa vith Zodian ocean coaatal atatea* one of the aiata 
being to *elii>ii3ate* £rot» th£» region al l *aiiitary ioatallationaS 
while ahipa en^ airora^t iiere to be prohibited from uaing the 
Indian ocean ior mny threat or aae of force against «•*• any 
li 
littoral or iiilnterland atate"« 
The reiiolution %«aa ai^ port«^ d by Si9tty«o«e coyntriea* not 
a aingle vote iiaa given againat i t (probably beeaoae of the 
ayrabolic contain of ttm *peace* concept)* fifty five co^ntrica 
15* The text ia given in Appendix 
Dieter Braun^  J|ft 16, C c ac jSIm, Ingiift. g^ Wftt IWl«,lafi„fll..ilriatf.llffil 
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iseludiiig a«^«r«l Xnai^ ii oc««n littdritl stata* of B^O mnd 
mr^rnm i>ftct, wmmlY f^xmtxmlim^ Sdutli Mrix», mijkysift« 
South Yeiwo, Thftilaaa a»tf 9ifi9tpor«# K«i>t «««y 
thei^olve«» It €oul« l» Msueied on the lA9i» of tht littcrajt 
0t«t«8 favouTftble noting £or the msolutlont thit« tb«Sr scipfMrt 
£or its contest WAS umualUlea in m fsw c«s«s only* There vmsm 
no activ« st^rortsrs of the rMolutlon apart frcxn ir i Lankat 
Zndia and tims8nia# ana other oountries either irotetf vithsut 
ccxmE^ itt or else expreseea mie^iyiiiga evver the operatioml parts 
o£ the resolytion (partieul«rly 2rafi« tfalaysis aaa Xsaonesie)* 
Altogettwr Jihotit half the Znaisi} ocesft littoral states shsreA 
11 
such mieolvitigs* 
One aeothiir vote also ii^reased in favour o£ tl» r^ot^ioc 
at the t«eB):yHievehth regular sessioa of the united Msti3as in 
1973* on i t s siapllaieiM»itio& ana this hM since been repeated 
every year. The estiiaatea riNiult of the resolittioo of 1972 vm» 
more clear ishafi 1971« thers nere now oinity five votes in favour 
of the re*olution ^nt thirty * three ahstestions* At the sane 
ti»e an hd Hoc coRi^ittee of fifteen eouBtries « twelve littoral 
16 
stetes ana one hiiiterlana states* toother with Oiins • Japan 
«;a8 coAlnsteta* It MM expected that this coniaittee will prove 
wmmmmii'mmmmmmmmmmwmtimmm 
17* K.P. luya* oMgjt f9r tfi ai>trwraitri^ 9fflia. grfltg to %^ faaig 
SSi^SUi 1577) #p» 70. 
18* Tim aggregate figure of Itoth vas yiven 9i9 forty on this 
occasiofi ana during the 1970s i t increased to forty six» 
n 
cooperative £or ths epproprlattt and peromnent Ciaii.il»eiit of t)ie 
fNiftCtt 2OI10 JLn tli« Xndittfi oc««n« Australia was ai«o on tbe 
co«Biitt««« iiot^itiistandioc that i t w&s & mcober o£ e western 
security a|1iiftnce» sc vere Irtn mm mkititmtu 
The Cutiffe o£ this steteswnt o£ 3.974 wes simpacted and equal 
doal>ts CO ezir^miotm, dlsappointnents and selfw^ceptioca of the 
reacMi '&>tm cofioipt le^re s t i l l there« iKiatigascar« Kcrth Veooo, 
Ethiopia, scnalia and Tanzania* the representatives of th© tcmt 
great ponemsi with a nsval preseocw in the region eKsressed* diai^ p* 
proval o£ th» littors^l states* some <^  thi^ In abusing tenas* 
Those €»>ustrie8f which were accused that they h&d permitted any 
yreat potier railitary right* denied this claim ane acquitted 
thossel^ims absolutely* They stiresaed vtpQn the Sitcfetary General 
ta withdraw the pre«ceport and <!leciared such, report invalid as 
soon as pot^tible* An @Kpur9ate6 thirteen pmqm version v;ith a two 
page appendlK and ^th^ut a map %«8 then produced* This as^ared 
in July 1974* )a»iri2^ the saae dscusent nutoher with *Rev*l* added* 
but i t was mym an uncontroversial sutsrasry of data* most o£ which 
n 
had areadly bemn pi^lished •Isethsre and were well Isx&wn* Ths 
f i r s t version was rejected by several oauntries despite tlM retmoval 
•MMWMIMMWMi 
19. Dieter Ittra^* THiinflitfl 99Hm fWglgB 9t »Bgll9^ 9t gttt« 
P« tin* 
2i« JiiMt.* p* ^77* 
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Of asny a@tail8 &n€ Sii£gm&mw^u» £rcxB the f i r s t vermian mm one mmm 
c r i t i c a l tec® of tim Soviet uttioc ana of several l i t t o r a l «t«te« 
wer« e9tai}i«» 'Stm ©stablislxn^t of imtiiiffiity mmowd th t oouiitri@» 
e»fio@riiea i s ^ f f i c ^ t * ev»ii oc the l;«siii of ttiis sieftilsit ol: comnon 
aei»Rili)etor« • Bigmt^iBs to tlie PCNI^I mm pr(^a«ftl w«r« very 
vocftl as long <^ 8 tlie pro|»aftl ^m in i u i t ^ l 8t®^8« h\s!t «• soon s s 
%tm quftstiofi of Qctiisl pir«s@Rtatioti ot £ftctya| position cmm vn^* 
theif imte no loi^i^r united* W& t s m *@ceat v-^^^^ rivalry* «iss 
ttm wAin t&ct&e £cr th@ sovie^t imloii t o t»to «0 o&tsusivs stop* 
ths ic^rolim^itt o£ tlis eieteriisl potters la tl)S rsgl^oal 
issoes mt&» the prolilefB psra coitiplicatad* To ifisiet ttit r e g i o a l snd 
•jctoriAl aatians i s fsvour o£ tliis tac t that coifjpstitiDii asa r ivalry 
ara aactgeroys to l»oth reQional ao^ ©xtemal poiiers a i ract ly or 
indirectly* ttaiit i s %rliy« they should realiaa ths wine of the 
a l l a i t a t i o e &i ooiipt@titio» ana aotuai r ivalr ies* I t i s in i t se l f a 
i^roulean taslt* The colloctiva ©f<.orts o£ ragioml s t a tes ^ y tm 
an affective mBM& t o raaeh the ipal* Ths aiaiii prohlem in the 
eol lact iva effort iSt how to piffsti&ae ana agrsa t h t rsfionai pewsrs 
t o accept the phasoiaenon of collectives security of the region* ^ow 
the prohles i s that* tthether th i s prt^posal ^ 1 1 he aecaptea or not* 
or «ould he put %Tomi construction only sosie nations in the form 
of a plan zo give hir th a regional poi^r bloc vis*«*vis exteriieil 
poiisr hiocs* 
there are different hrai^hes in the conospt of the peaes 
gone in ttm Indian ocean* St i^uld w^ he wigtA t o accept ^ e 
solution for the estahllshfficnt of peace Worn in the Indian ocean* 
$3 
witlkotit eme^m t» kmsit t t e facta l^eaiiaie ttw aeoiptABCM of tlw 
»flthar«%«l 1^ ths e)£««ri»l pmimm» wotii^ a^an tli» cofitimetion of 
rcHSiocKl pmablcm* suS aiff@r«t3cea to po«« oKsat^ aountJil^ Ie ehcoge^ 
to tim pmc9 ifi tlie r&9io»* fl)©£« Ift e dou^ m^SQ memm mgiofml 
sinaller and i«««ker states «lx»iit tl^str mm seeyrity and develepneot 
^rw) tt& ^i«^i^ t^^ ci stcofiytr stftt€8 Q£ ttm ftrea* ftus ioftMlity 
of tiw«« «t<ftte» in tfm solution of ttmix probities through wm^^$m» 
t lo i^ UQ& tbsir militarist at t i taas eoii^l timm to invita ttn 
•pn^B^&m of the Ssj|}©r ronors ic tlie etegion^ respaetCuIly ratliet 
t ^ a lisving afi «$ra«atsit nith tlia MtiQer states 'm m^tm'^ terns* 
Bmm of the »ewiy i»^ »«>exKStnt stat@s oafsrntss to invits tlis 
tailitary iwttmrvmtubimm o£ tHa mxtmcmi |sowars has eaqpanata to ^si 
cotg|}i@xity «»f ttoe i>«sce proi?l6ii* ft^ coraaqutDces of tbais iros^ical 
situation are tiKtt tlie re9io«3&|. poiwars ara sa^portiog the canoi^ 
oC paaoa zoioe on tlia oue hsna ©na sul3S«^aaiitl^ on tim otiitr aiso 
coece^tirata t l ^^a l i^s on ttm c^ilitarf iftuiia ^ vhieh eimourafies 
a scraebia £or a i^pinaiiea in tlis ragioa* 
from tiia exteriati poiiers a&^ aspa^iall; t^ Bvpmt poif@r*s 
cr i t ical point of vimtt tha purposa o£ t!i@ c&t^mpt o€ rssea sons 
is a @r(^s traosfprcsaiofi ot tha fr^idoei of tha seas aofi tiia 
violatioii o£ thosa rulas whic^ are iKse^ on txaaitions »or« tliaii 
laws ana convantional intaroatio^l laws o£ tlia saas* ttm Big 
E^onars oofitaDd tlmt "a gtQ^^ . M Sfptas in mm r a s i ^ can not 
23 
estalxlisti suparata legal ragiroa i&r th i liigli saas in tlia ragioo** 
mmm 
22* SWm tmr Ssofc I972t p* S$7* 
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They percept4!K§ thftt the ftcc^^taece of «»ch a pr^posftl wotna neafi 
tti@ reduction o£ thult tm^g9i%$x>tml tr«d« «nd flvhifio act iv i t iet 
end hinder itist«li4itioB of •ta^ baerg@d caibios wad pl^l i iwo alofifi 
with the ov@rflightiag8 ena thsir intornfttiofiftl oacurity •rrange* 
iiafits vould he threatoned* 
Xn spite o£ inaressitis st^ ^ j^ort* th€> concept of peeicm Wowm in 
the tn^ien ocsean i s s t i l l regerded ae both iiapracticaihle end 
unworkable on eeoount o£ working problem i ^ n i t e objectives* whi^ 
has remained lamoived end tiPserates aoae diplccietic p«rci^tiota or 
&>ubts* SccMi «Kperts aiso i«ml that the UK treatiiM»rfc of the 
issoe o£ peace ^oe <^n€^t i s taarked by *over simplificatioo 
23 
S)issepresentation# # euphs»iim*« The concept i s elso criticised 
on a<XK>ttOt o£ i t s inciarit|p or about the restraining of oceanic 
moveiBents* t^hiie referring to the doctrine of the free€bfs of 
soas which providesArighft of free passage through the internationai 
waters # the conoept hopelessly expects that *the freedom of the 
34 
seas wil l be subject to inportaet voltoitary limitationit^ To 
subMnntiate i t further the cx>ncept appears to follow a se l f 
1975, p* U 
24* Ceylon*n PIBtgrftnOHfr- 9^ iP^Sm^ Q^ gglR gfg"gnYt 
»s 
eonto«dictor:r pe^th as on OIMI siaft i t dscXftrea thit «»rship» 
and tfiilitary aircraft aboold not te aliowaa to ua« tt» Ocaaa& 
•for a»y tfer^at or use o£ fcorcci a^airoit th© movmtmlgiatYt territcr<^: * 
r ia l irdtcgrity or ir:Sepeiidenoa (of the regional aouBtriaa) in 
contravention o£ the purp^a and firincl^iaa a£ tha Chartar o£ tha 
tioitaa mtiona* while at tha B&m tiste i t rafera to ^the right 
t o frae end tmimpet^C \aam o£ the sone hy tha vesaala oi a l l tha 
nations ia tsoCCfaetad* Such a £r«aaao can not b» aisaoltita* 
The odncept ^ reaoa zone in tha Indian ocean can ha 
aubaivided into £ive mar* or Icaa independent variahlaa eac^ of thMi 
ia ns^ neceasarity dependent v^tga the other fcr ita eompiation or 
fulfilittent. The total efforts to vork out a solution of thasa 
variables even independently* would amuont or help in tha 
achteveoient of Pi^ 3P0 easily* 
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These five t^in v&riatloa ares 
(i) €reat rower rivalry in the context of tka Cold ^at, 
©ap^;ially regerdir^g the deployment of the atrategic 
nuclear weapons systaos* 
£XSSfaSS$M, in Aiittar Hajeed* 'Zndian oceani Cbaflict & 
Regional Cosperation* p, 141* 
lUshtar K2jeed *Xndiaii oceant Coc^lict & Regional Cot^^ration* 
P» 13&* 
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im Tim question of aKcucle«risBation# es|M»ci«lif %hmn 
'pmrt:mtve€t itom tha p&ifA o£ vi«%» of ttm amlimr 
iB t^tpon powers and ttm fiofi«HDiiclear 'k-eatpoe powtrs* 
Su«^ a m^tieremm in perception i s el»o4^£iectea 
ifii the 9 l c ^ l v». reqiotml approaoh to t l « quBstion 
o£ aenuciearissQticm. 
( i i i ) oreat pother interest in the region* tlae linlcatpe 
J^ atwoQO regiomii and Kssn'^ ccQisc^l ptnmsa aao i t s 
possible tepact on r^gionol security* 
(iv) Ttie nec6 to evolve c uon-eiionea security doctrine which 
can preecnt an al ternat ive to the existing agctrines 
tsesea tjpon the use of force an£ the inevi tabi l i ty o£ 
C3n£ii€t# i*e« hased upon the cDncept o£ sen that 
is essential ly nohkmimiMn in nature* 
(v) ti<3Stly* the nc^«aliynea States* thoij^ih c^t a part of 
tl^ te bloc systofflw ere ptirt oZ the i^resent global systMi* 
Tii> be effecti^^* ospecii^lly while laeryaining with Great 
pssiwersf these States # singly or collectiveiyi mmt 
asanowitrat© their capability t o fulf i l their obligations 
tcmerds the intem&tioml comniirtity i^iether they be in 
tUis context of the basic issmB of pcaes and security 
or more *.**«• questisn ot gu^ranteslng the itmbdom of 
mivi^t ion in major sea Isnes* UnlcNM they ere able 
t:> demunetrate the capability others would not only 
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igsotm them iKit Also ieml £r«e to t«ke stach actisos «• 
they pi^ht ae«iB ap^rppriat* to safegoBrd ttoeir national 
interi»t»« Ttiiia* theaa stataa are dud&y bound to areata 
oimaitioiaa vHmrmbf ttmg can individually or collectively 
a:>ntribate efCeetively to the sNatintenanoe of intwrna* 
27 
tJbnal CHTder* at leaet ir^  tbeir region* 
i»ractJLcally« tbe comsept oan ise divided into tiio tdain 
diviaionSf one relat^e to the r eg tonal states whoee ^ain prol>l«N» 
i e eecurity and <H:onatsic atirvivai* The iaagimry Morld peace o€ 
these countr^ Lea does not exceed the regional harrit re due to i te 
underdevelopiLd position to h&ve a %lo£«l view of the prolAea* The 
second divis^lon i s that the regional peaoi i s the £ix«t step toward 
the iilohal piDSce* Thct i s wh^ r the peace Zone concept becooiee 
helpful to tine latter so« i t i s believed that the concept of peace 
gone in the IntSian odean i s inseparably attached with the glotel 
peace and can not be realised before the establishment of the 
global peace* 
ffie aeniand for the rsipovel of 8^ e>cr powers* a l l railitary 
presence froisi the imdian ooemn^ based on the onited Katiofui frame-
«orK# by the fart>•four Indian ocean l i t toral and hinterland states 
had beOMne more forcible in l*i79 on accovsnt of SSBMI converse 
situation* fhe only one sM^ nber of the Ad tftie Coennittee* namely 
37* JM^» PP* i3&»13e. 
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Attstr«ilA mm i i t i l l permitting US bMes on i t« aoil (in osntrast 
to other csumitxitm wliich strctted ttm limited efttur* o£ their 
r#»pectiv« CitGilities) and tuia to fac* di££ieu(ltie«* Ttet i s why 
^•nhccrr« pointed out the prevailing differences hetween l i t tcre l 
st«t«s« ana sKttrted thit an isolated effort to hold siqper poner 
rivalry i» a cUffieult work t i l l a l l the l i ttoral states shotild 
begin by signing of t ^ i&n»Prol if (ration* Treaty on nuclear weapofis 
(a deiaand which Ataitralia never tries (^ repeetii^) • The Soviet 
union* an observer at this conference« vigorously si:^r:orted a l l 
26 
the radian asrsan^* tfie schedule fcr next su^ioit (^nferencse oi 
the Koi>>AlignQd had hc^n decided in mvenii* hm la^rtant decision 
was also -Mk&n to hold the large confereocs of a l l l i ttoral states 
and o£ the most iai{>Qrtant nMriticie users of Uie Xndiin ocean in 
IfSl in Qslanhio (this conference having been called for as early 
as 1971)* thei nesting also mde an ag^eal to a l l countries in ths 
region not to aoqiuire any nasi ear weapons* as such a »ov» might 
entail a threat to world peaee« 
The ESC; spoleasiijan (feoiB Luxeichourg) made a joint stati^isent* on 
the indian oc««n reaoe SBone# during ths tjnited liations debate in 
28« *The finil.ed mtions Ad Hoc CooEsittes on the Zodian oceans mind 
Allsy or s^ns of peace? in tiazry fsr« Boroman and zan Clark Cedi}, 
IHC a?<aftP 99ffi Iff 9X9^1 P<?U l^yi> Boulder, Colo. 1981, 
pp» 311 f» 
29* see u^ 0€!peral Aaaenbly, mmiH 9tul}m hi%%UM, §86 HligliiSJiftltf 
mnn 9& %tl^ tn l^HB OSttBl official Records, 24th 8«ision« 
supplement ao, 4& (A/34 /45} , uem York 1979* 
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Deceal?er 1980« tiie css^ic« ol imicb «•• that th» m chartur had 
be«n vloletea in 1980 l^ «<»ria«« evectn connectea with th« Soviot 
ieterveiDtiQD in AfgliaDlstaoi trust* the hftvis o£ ^li saeurity policy* 
hfta been a^verly uc& r^misea* Ths zi»!iaii Ocean peaca zooe idea took 
aiff^rast icaws» ans the ££C mevOmr atatea therafora conaidered 
30 
that the its^ll-zmifxg principiea ahould applyi 
« • fha fmited itetioiia Chartar s^ iva ev^  ry cotintry the right 
to juDdividiKil atia coiiectiva aal£*<^£aQea« thia right 
ahotad not be curtailed hy an indian ocmtn paaca «^3a« 
« The aecurity o£ tha Indian Oi^ an dmsandad jiiat aa nuch 
on i;ba coastriaa in tha region aa on outaida pmmr»$ 
and therefore tim forawr ahoold £ir«t aort out asioag thaaaalvaa 
their re f^ional aedurity relatione* 
* Thexe ahoiHd ha no reatrictiona <m the i^ raedom M the 
high mismi* On the baaia o£ the ahova prineiplea* tha 
^C leefBher atatea adopted the folioning positioni 
m The Innadiata* total and uncscmditional withara s^al of 
foreign troc^^ from M ghaniatan# eraat he a precondition 
for an Indian ocean peace 2one» 
10. meter ftraun^ |tW mitm <^ Slfm Bifllgfi Qf ggBtUgfr ^ Hffft fyne? p« ld2» 
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<• Their threat to s t a l ^ i t y io tkw Xfidiftn oce«Q does not 
aeriv« prim:ipttil|r from anif nftval foresanot ib«it r«tli^r 
item avactovB caciClicts pro€ueinii tension «dthlo the 
region* 
•I* Thct A^  tiOKsk Ccxtmittt^ e eliouid define the get>*9raphic»l 
llsiita ttS en Xi^ien o ^ n peace :^n»# shouia crew uq^  eriterie 
£or aei:in|j3s rail i t er / preetmoR* ei^ ehouKt exanine ths problen 
o£ verification* 
fmr e l l theae reeeom* i t nee prewature to hold a ierge 
conference in 1981 • "&» Burc9>ean txamia&rm ot the CoiKBittee 
«9ijia# however* continui to co»sperete in these matters 
ani! eeeR to der i f y the unresolved qiaestiofis iDentione^U 
The powurf cd. oppoaition or <Si8iqpf»roi«l of the Soviet union 
abotst the ch^ n^s^  in the regional tons of the peace aone coocept 
can iae aooeplped heeayse i t wsuld also shift the focus eway from the 
American military activit ies in the «rea iihich i s her real taree^* 
I t was expleimd early tim% the soviet union hf^ s oely a position 
of eacternal lootiniSary in the area hut which has a clear sifpipcrt 
by a sufficiet^ ntjnher of l i t toral states of the rc^gton Soviet 
position indicates that# if any effort i s to he takmn tug the 
t^ 'est for the purpose G£ alteration in the previous vn taandate 
31* V9S/PV» 04« 1 baa* 1980* united tsatiocs. 
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•i^stantiaiiy could ttaro into the cltrnm rel&tixivmh$p betwe«n 
the Soviet tmi^i &nC the ii^<*Ail«iaea« Any DO^IliCfttlon lii the cm 
g)«naate can tm achieved only patsiiiQ thr^(;^h the di££erent sta^^s 
• lovly not at one titee* Tlamre «ire only ouig^esticms and directloMi 
t;hic^ can eitliver. Lhc idea but not a t^ ir way ttrough which tha 
alteration »eiy Im pezpetoited only on accooot of the diaeordB o£ 
the Eaatvi^at; and ^uth« 
Thar® ia a viaenspread iwpzemmion tm% the iMSian ocean 
peace sons r«»soluetic«i ia India's lailsy. ^ t a caretul atudy o£ 
the in i t ia l rc^aolufcion and o£ sulseequem, d@valO|pB i^t;a mhonm that 
while India iit^porti^d the declaration in i ta origin! I 1971 vercion# 
ahe haa aerioiie reaervationa attout the aulaeoquef^ interpretations 
of additioni to diatortions of # and overlaya to the resolution* 
The 1971 ite^ol ution vaa wry ep«K;i£ic ajbou^  the ec^pe of tha 
zoi^« The Ziodian ocean covered tha ocean only and aiao i ta iiRt«ral 
extectior** That ie# i t Mem treated an a i«ter tx»dy 6nd did not 
include tha adjacent land laaea. Also the siain thruet of that 
reaoiuti<m yma directed against the Great rawer rivalry in tha 
Indian ocean and did not try to find a eolation t o tha pol it ics 
of tho l ittoral* mr did i t x»tm the aeeeptanoe of the sone hy 
great powers eolat ions 1 upon reciprocal okaioatioAs hy the 
l i t toral and hinterland states ••• By 1973 the conr&ittea tats 
atfsen^tiii.^ to reverse the preorities* The ^reat pomtt rivalry 
sotMBhow heaiRie secondary to regisnal pvot^eos* 
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ttm afigiiml laea ^m» that ttie <Sr«at l»o%«r9 alKsuld n i t 
aish^nce thair esilitary |»retM»iiai l40 tt»i area* I t «^u& widely 
acc«pt«<S« a.fid n^irer 9££iciftl.i|r mt^A* tha t tti« :tt^ 4Sl4iQ ocean warn 
about to ix)a»K« a theatra tor tim aaplojpeat o£ m»mm« mm 
we t#aiitad t o liar iiuc}.<ear weaposs frora an area wtiiioli mm osoca oc 
laaa free tmm tims till thien« fliat I^ MI oar lo@ic* But tim 
graat po«;era »are abl.@ to divert atteotioii fro® ttmir ontn 
a b l i ^ t i s o a h^ &e!mm6i,m t^ h&t tim regioeai poii^ra 8l£3iild thesMelvas 
accept aii»iicte«ri»iti9ii £irst* ThBf westt able to tiw isbtiipulata 
our reflof^il r ivel r iea *»«• At the tBooieiit i t i s i^ry a i i f icu l t 
t o «i»fi«ag« tiolc'ii!^ ttia C^c£ereoai»««# 
Bueth&r* inaia tr^a csEiaiataiitly aqp»{^rteil tlie p@ac« ascota 
proposal* l» this cotitesct abe haa appoaad tim pakiataui ptopsmal 
to aeclara soutii Asia a Qiaclaar £rae S9f)e« I t liat laea^ atated 
tha t on« way of aciiii^iig a pmmo$ m>rm in ttia area 1^ to cxeata 
niK^lear free i^nas* wtsere tb@ local state® would itadertalse not to 
flsanttfactiare miclaar weapooa end iitiilear powera wou&d give 
gusirantee ttiat ttn&f woidd i»^itlier attacli these a ta tes with nuclear 
weapoi» tior Ibring »tacl©ar weapon t o ttmt area* fhia proposal was 
even supported W Sri i>an^* 
India welcomes tim attosopta to create niaclear free aaonssi 
but tfm att®!^t tsuet he in i t ia ted 1^ the atat^a eonoerned* 
Xndle holds the view tha t no regiiae ^ n he pySt on any country 
iM tha t ic n:^ tmiwraal and »cMe^<^criwtiii&tary* And on t3p of 
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tidiM thB proposal to et^mtm « i»icle«r freo sooo i s «n «r«« i«hich 
i s not « g«ogr«phic»l entity l i t e ^rican or mtin iiiMrica. tiiiic* 
to on^to « i3i«acl®ac trm9 wovm in Stouth iiti« sieftas aeoortfiiHi to tlio 
Indian ir^ro»«Btativ« In tt»» U*t^ .# a*C# Kishra **to anforca a 
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Qeo^aphioally limited oon«iiroli£erati3» treaty"* 
S i n ^ ZfuSia ma tie^ aca again aeelared not to oano^actura 
atKrlear weapons and carifitted beraelC to lim peatxlul UKa of noclvur 
<3&$rgy« taer atacd i» not in contra vent ioti to the its reaolution to 
oreata a «oRa of peaca in tlio Inaian ocean, mt stand via*««iri« 
nt>T ia iaaaea on the i»i'«iloaoplir o£ equality* noi^tUacariminition and 
univeraity. iHanoa tba Indian e£fort to iaolata tttt south Mia nuelear 
free sona iaaue from the Indian ocean peace sone prqpoaal ia a 
significant dLplonatie tmtv to rtighligfat the prohlait ralating to 
militarisation and tha nuclearisation of the Indian ocean* 
@ivan tim nuclear capaMlity o£ Israel and South Africa i t 
i s aiiserd to declare the i^st ^ ia or any part o£ iisia a luielear 
free sone* B;;nce India has thus hy tsHing a atand against the 
linkage o£ nwslear free sone with peace aone proposal reaffiraed 
i t s faith to oi^mit t o peace sone proposal* 
32* 1C.IU Singh* K.I  i»» » 3Hg.|Bg||fiQ<Stt|Bt ifa, UB%1 tmv^mn <peihi, ism > p, ; 
im 
Even i« ttio «9i«ir«-r«9ioiiiil povert air« refiitlng <^» «e«»pt 
the we>im o£ ^««ce |»roposal £'or tli© X&diaii ocean vsiriowi ottwr 
m©a«tir©» are l»irtg pr3^»tad« a i l €meeptiiml^ labelled &m (SiBoxwrnm 
sieiit and ansa cai^rol meaaurea vhich in r ea l i ty thay are ni^* Such 
tteasurea are {i} tim ss>uth iPian aiiclear inaapoiwfree ^t» propoaal* 
( i i ) ttie »iid<!!le East iit»:lear weapon free warn propoaal and iiiU 
the African Ciuclear-i^iapcsi free ao^ na propoaal* 
The three propc^ala laay ^ aimlyaed together* whatever laay 
hemi l3ee» the i n i t i a l jtiatixication t-^  pot thsm fonaird the prppoaala 
have lost mmsh for their ^eaaihil i ty in the laa t ten i^ara* in 
eonaiaerlng thesi one haa t»3 take into account the i4de8preaa belief 
t l ^ t larwil* a l i t t c r a l country on the Sn^ian o<oean« has hid a 
nuclear arseii@il £or th© laat aeveral yearsir even according t o the 
reports o£ the Clh to the US Governe^nt* S& alao ia south Africa 
in a l l probahiility a ntxclear %M p^»n power* t^ith theae two cs»intriea 
siMipected to have nuclear iieapons, to talk ofatfiaSle l aa t niK:lear 
weapon-free watm or en African nuclear weapon free tone i s 
iii|»ractical« £or ttm following reaaomi 
A ntielear»iai«^n«*free ssne can not guarantee against a 
iseiotier country carryjUeif out a nuclear tcmt outsiaa the sone and 
stockpiling a cleraCeatine arsenal^ nor can i t enavre tha t 
research i s not carried out outside the scope of i t s Atonie Utmrgf 
33. Chrifitc^^her S, f»j «Israel and liuclear ifeanan*a' in K.sulrah-
Bsanyiua 
lOS 
A9»Qcy which alone inay ^ oSITerea for ««£eg«»r<!it siia lntpectl43»n« 
Be*ia«« these lo«ir««RQant»ble diffioHties 2iidla*« objection to 
the Sdu^ Aiiian nuclear««M«pofi £rc« lone ia ««il kaown* Xt 
tfeisareatea « trkgion artlfielally* Further Zndia hsis also talwn 
the staod that there can oot be a lliaitm^S approach to the 
queetioG of ire0€Km iram nuclear threate ana dingeira and hence the 
Whole worl6 ehould be declared a nticlear*«e^c»on*£ree tone« The 
nucleari(eapon»£ree zone proposal ie yet ar^ther ettenpt (the tm 
being the Clret) at legitisiaing nuclear ««apone in the hands o£ 
a fetif nuclG<ir weapon powers and iiepcNiiisg a protectorate o^r the 
nott«>nue|ear«%feapon powers through a myBUm oi security guarantees* 
Zn i t s r^iolution <1) o£ 1946 the m General Msembly called tot 
a l l wea|soi» o£ naas destruction especielly the nuclear weapons to 
be eliminated* Any legitlnisatitm o£ nuclear v^ eapons alone # mong 
the £our cete^pries ot weapons o£ siass destructiw) (atonomic* 
bioloyical« ch^aical aod radioloyical) wil l be a retrograde e t ^ * 
F<»r these r<easons Zndia has ei^ peMied the South Asian nuclear»«HBapon<» 
£ree sone pri9^>dal« The only nuclear•weapon»£ree worm the Latin 
Afl«riC8 one <• i s in a well dewarcated area where a l l the countries 
are nembers o£ a security pact (the lUo pact) and a political 
34* Morarji laesai's Address to the m special session on 
DieersHHoent* Text reproduced i e jy s i i sa iSUto l l f c {{Jew Delhi) # vol* i« tbs* 7 6 @i Juiy^August l»7df p* 14. 
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groupies (the OrganiaetiOD of /mmri&m states) • Ttmy Ituvw ftlso 
a almrcia perception o£ aectirity tlireat* For a raeion which batf 
been used t9 the nomu 6octxitm £or over a century and a hal£ aod 
the Rio pact fc»- ov@r a quarter o£ a century i t ««• easy ©mugh 
t o accept eie t^ernal QU^ranteee. The Latih fgmrixmn nuclear free 
zone ia a uit^ que <!®veiop»e»t not c^paliAe oc being refieated else* 
%?here« Even ttiree Sm portent countries auch as jtirgei^ina# Qreeil 
and Cuba have not finally Joined the nuclear t«eapon free sone and 
brought i t into being* 
lo t 
ttm isain focus £cr cooperation aeany the doveloping csuotriee 
hae t o be o,n »<iesures £or «cccltrating their develo^ieot* t»At 
Bt the B&BXi titm, e.8 Car es possible* possibi l i ty tcxr irtcr«asiii& 
the vol\£R^ of. intrci-regiocAl t raas 8i:ic Civersifyiii^ i t s con position 
has« t o hs prol:ied hecBtas« thcty are necessary to rapid vi^ owth and 
de^mloprocnt.. Coq^ratioo* growicg out ot larger trade spportanities 
ana derived fro^) tlie tmrndlB of develqpeicnt planning* are {mutually 
cosplemcntary* hut the l a t t e r aspect i s l ikely to t&Um prec»det.ce 
in ecofi£]cr-S« re la t iors aeiong the leas ai«elG|>ed countries, 
For the developing countriest part icularly en^^ed i n the 
f ield o£ regicM i^ai eooperatioii* main proiaems ot developoe&t are 
in tenml in character* and irxslude t l ^ effects o£ population 
gtonth* ummploye^nt and labour uti l isation* tack o£ basic socio 
econcxBic in£ra-etri3ctures and managerial and technical s k i l l s and 
know-how at^ the probl^iis oi: srain train* Scholars generally 
MMMMM 
1. Tariok Singh * Economic Cooperation and Coispl^Mintsrity 
lUBong l.ess Developed countries-* IMPj., aWT^trlYt vol. 34, 
^ « 4* October 1973* p« les* 
X08 
2 
mgrem that cttrtftio stlptotfii requiremcats o£ th* l^i« develcspea 
cotBitrieB are t o b« fulf i l led by the aoveloped oouotri«« t o fcalss 
a •u»sc«88 o£ mnf regionei coo|»rfttio» even aroofig the less 
devirloped countries and ttmrnm includst (i) £1OMB O£ official and 
private r&^o^^atC€@ irom developed osuRtrles c^ nd t«r«i o£ aid* 
iRCludlDg dciot repayraedti ( i i) markets and ^ i e e s £or priaarj^ 
coflBssoditiesr ( i i i ) prefetmwicmm ^ r imports o£ aaciu£«ctures from 
the leas dav t^lcapcd coimtriasi Uv} tzaxwfcr o£ teehnologyi (v) 
an international oods gov^^ming privats foreign investa«nt« Joint 
ventures« an<*l multinational ^loperaticm and <vi} intamational 
monetary reform* 
Any study o£ regional cooperation in South Mia «!ill fas 
incootplete idth^ut an analysis o£ similar moves in the ttiird world 
in general# a;rvd in Asia in particular* Sefora the second world 
war* japan had atten^ted such oooperatic» based on the ccmoBpt o£ 
"Asia for the Asians'** but; these motivations were Isipc^islistic as 
evidenced £rc»R the i r l a t e r day policies toi^ares China* Bunoa and 
Korea, m fair as India i s concerned* a very early tnanifestation 
of atteispt a t regioml cooperation was made in August 1926 when the 
Indian national leaders hecaats signdtories t o the Kani£esto o£ 
Asiat ic i?ele^tion at the Beirville r^r is Congress for reace* in 
which i t v^ as aaidt ' l^t Chine* India and a vast of Asia tse free* 
2* A Slowtti S* Marcio* on t l ^ South South CO(^peration (Lond3n 1981] 
P» ISO* 
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Ttmn yott would tmv& Imilt \3p a fanilv o£ £ree people ttiiling to 
I ivc together la cot^jcration ana» move than that you would hftv« 
ellstioated t t e iscst potex^ oftueea oi tfAr** Agaixi* la another re«olu» 
tloQ on Asia» Cooperfttl90# ttm Ml India Congraas Conailttea said 
In September £ree India wHl Inevitably aaak the CIOM 
and firiondXy associations with her nel^ i^laoiar^ Uig couetrlea and «oiild 
especially sisek t o develop caoB^n policies Cor defenoif tradb and 
ocooomlc and cult<»^al devfflopni nt vl th China* i^ima, ^ialaya# 
intsoncsla* and C©yla» as %«11 as tha csduaatrles of the middle Cast* 
tyrli^r the £l»i t eight years o£ the Rev Er&« a jnxa&mr o€ 
conferences ^lere held ot the South and &>uth«^£;aat Mian natlom to 
b 
att^ BRipt reylonei ox^peratlont 
(m tliie Asian Relations Con£er@nce ««as held a t tttm tmlhi 
on Harch 2&, 1947 and ««as attendt-d by Afghanistan* 
^titao* Burma* Ceylone* China* India* Indonesia* nalaya* 
l^pal* Manilla* Iran* phlUlplnea* SUm, Tlt^het* Turlmy, 
Vletnaa* Egypt* Palestine^ and Soviet Central Asian 
lUipubllcs* The CocCerence dlscui sed Issues o£ freedi^si 
3» S*D; Kunl* f^gjtorml g99Pvg^,^,teP ^R go,¥^h,ilff,ito (National 
1984), p» 10. 
*• 3:bl^. 
&« S»D» '^.un;La f?t>«elt^ *« {up. 24«>25* 
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i9Crv»taeiA« in Aaimt racial problcras* inter«>racial 
migfratior^f igrlcialture anf ioduatrial develqpeEwiiti 
( l i ) a Ccmference on Indonesia imt c<»xveciDa a t mv tjmlhX 
in '3&tmry 1049 which «raa alao att^naea by Aottralia* 
Sauai Arabia* Sj^ria* YeiRan acd pakiatart. Beaidea* 
aiacusaii:^ the aet t l^aect o£ the iDdbneaia queatioD* 
i t tilso aiacusaed the eatabliahosent of a laachinory 
£or cocttinuoua contacts t 
( i l l ) iii> »ay ly&O a C^sf erence «as conveocd a t Bagoio* 
Phillipine to aiscues €Ct»K»Dic and cultural caqperation 
end collective a^:urity in AaiA« ^na «MMI attended fc^ 
Australia* caylona* lodiat pakiatan* philippenes* 
Thlland and Indonoaiai 
(iv) on 1 July l-'&l the Colombo plan uas fontally launched 
for cco8c»nic and technical cooperation ane t ^ nembtrs 
viere Xn i^ia* pakiatan* Ceylmie* united Kiagdom* Caroiaa* 
Australia and Kavziland; 
(v) an-i^thcr cooferet^sa o£ Colombo powers ^mo held a t 
Colombo in i ^ i l 1954« attended by Burma* Ceylone* India* 
loaonesia ana Pakistan to discuss eosnoiaic cooperation* 
in<ao«China si tuation ana other Asian Crisesi 
ni 
(vi) the f i r s t MroHikSiAii Confereooe «•» held «t Banduny 
(XncSonsfi^ *) ^ April 19&&« tsu Aiscvma ec^noraic aoa 
ctdLtural c;xperatioii# probl^s^ oi coionitXi»in« and 
A£ro*Mi6n contribution in ^oria peace and was attends^ 
by A£0\aiiifltar4, Burma* CstsboiSIa* Central Afrioin 
l^deration* Ceylcme* Ctiinat Evnrpt* Ethiopia* Gold 
Coast# India# in<^na8ia« Xran* Irmq, Japao« Jordon* 
Lao«# Lebanon* SilKria* Libya* Kepal* rakiatan* the 
Philippines* Sau^i ilrabia* Sucan* Syria* Thailand* 
Turlsi^ y* Vi&tna»* ¥a»an« 
ftiese conferences eonitribi;&ad significantly tomra i the 
development o£ an imc!erstanding ang avalt»tion o£ regionalism in 
D9ia« llowavar* there KNIS VO c lar i ty ana precision about the ct^ omon 
purpe»es or even the concept o£ rt;gionaii8m« 
The main thrust o£ a i l the early atti»i^ts a t regional 
coqperation in jysia centered around pol i t ico-s t ra ta^ic onsidera* 
tioiu!* anC cconorziic aspects of cooperation vrere touclMd very 
^NMNMiltf end without csoch successi and idienever references to 
^cor^xcic cooperation appeared tht^ did not ^ beyond the ea^r«Hiion 
6 
o£ pious vislties* Tr.is \^ as pr ia^r i ly because oi: the pol i t ica l 
iColmibUk 19l>€>) * pp. i*12* 
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vert Mm polntna otit Isf <i fcsifier Ceyloiie*0 wivm minimtBWt ^imvat 
we if«r« t i r ea eaen strivir.Q to ^-git^ «li@ a r ^ of m^qtsenefit ftms^ 
m ana iron o«t oar aiffAjpetic^* I t i«» « ai£fi«tilt tai^ - arm 
oi th@ t»i:^ iii«$fS l ^ t contjrol of himmli^ iBf^ gea tim tai>lii and 
shouted a t uno^ihQV *ifOu ant tiothii^ b@tt@r ttAn mn awarioan 
a teogeS To ndiicti the othur i«stc«rt©d *»»»* eq%Mi h€«t "Mi6 fou are 
nothing hotter thai) a fttisaiao stooge** I t «as a t this siocmiit 
fi^aght with trnmiom th^t i Imt mg own tamper a« Chairi^h ana 
^scploda^a* I ehot2te<l tg> th®m to atop hicKerirag and liehave thatoa^lnwi** 
Mta r thm timmi mtVB aoose saa l l attafi^ta a t ragiQcialiam i» 
Asia* jTor immtxcm^ p»kiatft» joxhcd tXm mgioim&l a>qparatioh 
for Dewiii^eiit lu 1^$. At the »&me %im&t a i l th» maa^r 
eoiiiitri@s o£ ICD ecmtliiife.a Uieir partioipatiof. ^im Uie u«s* led 
mil i tary pacts stKsh m CBWm and SCATD* I S I96i Asaoeiation <3€ 
Soyth East Asian coun t r i^ (ASJ0 w&» optahlished^ c o i ^ i s i n g of 
fhailar^t l»hiIi{)peB@8 a»a nalafsiat ana during i9&6«€7« tM» %«8S 
#iilartcd to heco^ Association of soath East Asian isatiom 
8 
th® m a l r i s e of a secoua a t t^apt (oc-- g a o e r a t i ^ of 
rcgioi^lisss s tar ted by ths aarly s^^h t i a s * The t^iMi-'Of regional 
narrap mm col* l*tdV, LotKiots* I^Sfe)* p# 124» 
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cocq^c«ti(»i iiM pursuca hf icr«* inaixft Otndhl <3iiriii9 viaita to 
BttrtBa# Afgtmtaistan «cd ln3oneslft !» IS^di «ns the jo in t 
coeKnuoique i^s^steS af ter t ^ r v i s i t t& Zoaomesia eaXled £ar the 
"preiotioii of ceociomic eocqp@£ttticm betwcren nationi 0£ th t Aaiftn 
region* Such coos^ration wm Dccessary^ to furtbor OQWOlidAte 
jpeaee and 8tiil3ii2ity in the refiFion and to give ii@a»ii^ul c:%prm9$jsm 
t 0 economic and social progress**« ffOi» ttie la t« s ix t i e s 
a c t i v i t i e s of the Big PO'tmrB in th@ ZntSian cc^in region had 
ii^rcascd* Yh© unitea States s tar ted re ta i l ing ies t ies with 
S&uth £ast# }mr irast and kest Asian c%timtries acid# in response to 
these increased y*S* ac t iv i t i es in the Indian Oc^n region the 
Soviet jnion also eade trnv moves i and Sreshnew*s proposal for 
col lect ive s@cyrity %«s also inade a t this time* further atteii|>«s 
a t regionslliim got iispetus a t this tiiae bccatiie the process of 
decolonisation had significantly adwiK^d in A£ro-^ia« givi i^ 
ris© to s^ i^oe growth in the econociaic e^nsciouBi^ss o£ the Third 
H'orld* Besia^ the global cosipuisiocs* there were certain region 
nal factors <eonfiaeive for regional cooperation* part icular ly in 
Sot4th Asia* tJDder the Sisala Agreesisnt# eonclo^ad in July 1972# 
India and palcistan agreed not to resort to a r » in the i r h i la te ra l 
relations* India and Bai^ladesh also signed a treaty ^ Peace 
and Friendship in 1974 and the setae y ^ r India and Sr i Lanka 
Znstitats for Defence Studies and Analysis* mv Delhi* 
n&ym ang aevicw* July 196^* Sectitim on Indonesia* 
lU 
10 
resoXved theiir locg •tandiog Jjiaue o£ t^ie OMBervhip of ^clichativu« 
ZissQ@aiat«Iy prcAceaicQ thee® wxfv&t ««• the Atteiq^t by tlw Shah Q£ 
l i 
Iran to rcactiiriese ai»3 fttrengthen RCD 1^ cxten^ULng i t to Znaia*'« 
Sctween 1973 i«iid 197&« Xfi^ ia ftcsa pakistAii r^atorea the i r trade ana 
ciKormmioation relatic^^ ana the over a l l atoosphere het^eeo Urnm 
apr^earca to bt^ r c l a^ i s . The Asian Hiv^hyay project toe Zndia^^kiatan 
Af9haoiatan~ljraf3 sector f iiiaiiced by EC '^E* aiia South Aaiaii neeting 
on Ci^loyiBi.&t strategies a£>a regjU^aal travel ana i&c^ tjrista 
prospects in 1976 «ere a lso Isipcirtsnt events Ha this respect* 
Another sigtiiEicaiit eonai^cive £actor tOMSr^ rcgionaliSD i s South 
Asia was t t o eQCoaraQcmeiit shoim by i^estemi powers towards 
cooperative r^alatioM in south Asia* in ^ i i i»ry I97S the u«S« 
presiaent car ter and the i^ i t l sh priiao MiiOster C&llagimn visi ted 
Zi^ia« paiOati&n and Baosladesh* btiilo tal^^ngi o£ poace^asity and 
coqperati^sc iia the reQioii# they isade apeci£ic offers of eeoiiociic 
holp if South Asian countries could work out omltilatecal 
13 
coq;ierative projects* In Koveisber 1977» the foreign aiinisters oi 
10* s*D« Muni* *tachchativu Scttleetentt Befricndinj lieighbi^iring 
mgiw^'** Lcem .r.ic and Poli t ical ^ ^ k l v . 13 July 1974* 
n» yHg„ Um^ ffl, IVl^ <J*W m l h i j . S January 19«S» 
12. m^^ 2« ifebruary 197$. 
13 • {Ministry of External Mfairs* Govenaaent of India # Foreign 
Affairs* 
us 
Bftoglaaesh aoa Sri tJ&nim called £or ^it e«t«bIi«DiBi?fit of a 
tcgSkOzml JMiian Ct»8.jjri tiar^t* aod t^ tiey %«re of t te vUm tbat 
tiMi sreatcr ec^iioc:ic cooperation iu tiia South anc South East 
14 
Asian regloE ^ s^ in the iotcrcst o£ th@ entire region* Kiog 
Birendra o£ ^pai« xn ceoaa^r 1977* urged for cooperation among 
iS 
Asian countries such as 8spal« aiiia# Btmtan and BBingXadesh* 
I t isas also <§yrio.„ ti-ils period that India concluded the saiai 
Daa Agreamnt i^ith mkistan* f^rakka vat»r sharing agra@»ent 
»ith aangla<Si^ h« nct^  trade enc transit ^yraanent with Hspalt* and 
. , . ^ » t on « t t e r . ^ « U t e d to « . * . « . JolBt ^ t ^ with 
Bhtitan and £uri Zianlsa* 
fhe aeouth Asia as a region i s characterised by i t s Xodo* 
centric chacacter and a heirarchical potfer structurei and a l l 
other eountrii^ o£ this region have asore in cs^ ioKm tiith India 
than with each other* 1 ^ result of the Zndo-osntrie nattire 
of south Asia i s that no worthwhile step tonardi coaparati«ai 
and eollabc^ation can be taken in this region without India 
taking a central role in the schsfne* reside this# there are 
certain factors which invite the regional cooperation ;Ui South 
^4* , ^ f^^ffE| fislaiaabad) IQ l^ vesSaer 1977* 
IS* fhe Tiei^ of India (iiew se lh i ) . 
16* Z*t* i^^mi, *xr«dia's Genefecial eiiatcralisn in 8out^ 
Mim$ Infill gvffter^y^ Ceoenber 1$?9» pp* 17«>33« 
17* Ai^tar i!ajeed« "Indian Defence policy in Sou^ Asia**, 
tf^^n ^n}^m\ Pf f9U%l^t ^^^ 1$34# p« 7&* 
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PMim* Oeogrckplilc^Xly 6pedkiixg« South AsiA is aXnoet a ccmtJ#iioia« 
lanamse «ca there ere sirBll&r j^oaamm o£ n i s to r i a i l evftXuati!:^ 
caperietieea }y^  the countries of the regies* tbme countries have 
e l so tm^ vast 8ocio<^ultiar«l and ethnic laent i t iea mn6 prQxotnitJU» 
of roligion# race* langue^e ^ad coetuts^ ote* and for centuries 
together they havo preserved a i ^ propagated siniXar philosophical 
tradit ion* cultural values and norrai of l i f e . I t mm in the 
context of t]aese coiiiior. factor that president £ia &£ Eiangladesh 
had said in his pr<^»osalt 
*ttso countries o£ South miA aimre iBsny cooaiofi 
uttluQS th£t arc r^ ^ot&d in their social* ethnic* 
cultural and hist(»rical txaditiosis* perceptions 
about certain specific events or po l i t i ca l s i t u s * 
tion o£ the vob^ laay di£fer« but such differen* 
ces do not seeto to create a gulf het\«esn thsu that 
IS 
can not he li^ ridged*** 
Inside this* th&rm are certain lectors Oiich hinder tJhe development 
o£ r Ggionalisn in South jisia. Aiasny these ye my include the 
colonial legacies* prohlcni of national integration and 8Btion«» 
huilding * saldevelc^d ecmioraic structure* rcgiiae instahil i tf* 
potfcr d ispsr i t ies in the region and* finslly* the role of external 
18* S*t* FA^ "Regioral cooperation in South Mia*** }qp.cit^> p» 13* 
in 
fiowefv* At l^mst t i l l tiie Sitda ngiiMiiMBt* t^M* £ietxir» i)liider«tf 
^bfi growtli of tieftltfey r ^ i o o i l cooi^ftttioii Sn scmtn Asia* 
A ^ireist r^tilt Q£ tiie simUm »,9tm9mn% ci£ |9t2 i t tStm% €bs 
Ben t te te •yniswii in tJbe riefion i t sore cMpiet Atia 8tftbl«« tritli 
li^s«r pir^l«f« oi oationftJ^ ii«»tiity ana iBlsagsmtion* Further* ttbls 
rc^ulte^ in mmolvia/s tim 9trtiiiici»l laleaee of powers cr€®ta3 1^ 
eatte^Ml poweifS* isetMevfii India a i^ i«kl«t«si» fltia IIB»# aarXier^ 
ona of t ^ m&^Qs dia^srtiana ifi tiie fii^iOKAl poimr atructuriea* a 
Mtjco- aoiiree of confUet a&a an iii^diattst to rmglmml €»o|)«tmtioiiii 
Sieoa ^an» tim pmme gap i;<®tifean maia mm her seigSilioura is so 
Qr®at tliat attf i&tra«r@gio^i ooas^iict* over n^ioml iaau^ aaa 
with we0mm^- iiiitl«tif«# b^eom^ raa^ Btaaiit^  fhis^ i»t«raUy« 
i » ^ i t poaailiia £cr the iaaa o£ regiorial eooperation to talea ahiqpa 
JMi €»Be acivdiar amcimmi '*£or i990B» u&l©as there ara 
vary nasy gre«it &mm^ iaaaa^* Sot^ O^  Asia cae h& comiaaraiS to l« 
i t 
a sofia o£ pea«wi"« ai^ a wtmn peace prevail*« coo|»astttiem ia npre 
feaaibla* 
tlia iaaa o£ south Aaian RagiOBai <^operatioii took ahap© 
throi^h a ptopmml mm Isg praaiae&t UMm nalaaiii of miigi^aiah i s 
May i@30# iii mhieh ha called for & atjiipit neetins of the i^iaa»i 
of the aeven South Aaian cdimtriiM# to explore the poaaUailitiaa of 
1>. mfm wi3«ox, 1 ^ fifftfitact g| UMldtdftffli tuaahlogtoe nnUw*n 
l i e 
estftbliJibing a fmiewsrk fear rcoloml ceopftz«tlQii« 
That iBftoglftaesh peopmmX m» enaorsed by mpml» Sri IA&IQI* 
midivx^ and Etoutaa# but bo^ z&dla ftnfl pakiataii were retiesnt* xt 
was a tint i&liat m»» Zi^lra <3ai3ai}i had raeantly i^tumaa to ponar 
(in jacuary 3L980) and tier govanuBeot mantad a eloawr acrtttioy of 
the proposal %fhlch had bean diacoBsea with tiMi JTaota party*a 
govmmiaent* At this tiiaa* Xiidia*a relatiooi with Pakistan and 
Ban^latf^h witra not very eloaa* Mrs. Indira oandbi*a govarnwent 
^as apprataaneiiva tiMit tlie caigliboura my collectively try to isolata 
Znaia cm gl^ial issues and aay put prasauraa ee i t in order to 
isprova Useic iDargaining position via«a-via Xndia* 
1 ^ Initial r^erwtiPns of India tovardi the Baogladaali 
prqpoeal «#eni also bacausa of the ti^ astern support l«hind the «>««• 
praaidant Carter of the u^S* i c his stata of union Address* on 
29 January IS>ao» proposed a *coqperativa ragicnal saetirity ; 
31 
f ranework* • abi^niaw srasasst&i* Rational saciiri^ Adviser to the 
u*S« praaidant* ana fArren Christopbart ci^aty M^^tary of State* 
visited paUstan at this tine aod Made an offer of U*S« luras and 
other assistnnoa to help PaiOstan aeat the situation arisingr out 
22 
Of Soviet aetion in Afghanistan* Siaultaneously* Clark Clifford* 
20« Indian I'oraign Hinister Kursiiiia Rao's statetBent in parliament 
on 25 Mflireh 1981* fha t^^ ta^ M y^^ ^ 26 mrch 19SI* 
n* laigtCtaWffiti 9t gVH» W t o t t o (washioatoot tiarch l980}pp«3S^i. 
22* Ibid** p* 6$« 
119 
•ociiBsary of tte u«S. i>r«iide&t« visited loaitt aoA ftdyissd Zaai* 
to ''evolve a regiomi approtcdi with FttkiAtfto to tt» ftiodiiBeBtellir 
cbEUBged oitia&tiOB i^ich tlie lAiole r©gicifi aoM fftced* I t «•« in 
the eoRtext of these developaents that Sadie *• £oreiyn isiBister* 
mreiciis neOf esteed the a«s* to keep o£f the stretegic end security 
24 
aspects £rosi the regiooei cooperetioe nove* 
SeoBttiie o£ different eonsideretions* pekisten %«s also not 
very enthtisiiietic eboiiit the Bsngledeeh proposal* perhape« paiOBtan 
«;as usder thi» siiscoiieeptioo that the BaogladMh aove was prompted by 
India # to e»nere regional imrkct t(x Xadian prodtiets leadiog to the 
CQosolia&tiffli and further strengtheBiog of India's economic 
as 
dentnanee in the region. Tbus« Pakistan i«as apprehensive of losing 
i ts political inBtan;:e in the suiacoBtinent 1^ Joining this taove of 
regional eoo{ieration« without resolving its hil^teml issues yith 
India and as JQUBL ^^Bsrved* "The ai^ senoe of serious Mlataral 
conflicts aMS the existence of e sense of CORISOB political purpose 
are two essecttial starting points for an vmdertaking ais^d at 
regional cocfieration •••« If tho Sanylad^h idea i» anything other 
tliBB inforeel forisn £cr consoltation and if isoves ace to he oade 
to institiitiacaliae ant fcciAliee tim erraagemmt* i t is csertain to 
26 
rim into snays* • Ano i^cr Pakistani apprebensioe ati$ht have been 
39 • atWr^Wat 9C SWia B^USUP* («^hington, April 1980)« p, 62« 
24. TUB BillfiHItaB liWIi 3<^  AI^ U^ 1981« 
as* Neville ce Silva in oeviop milv ^^ pft 18 April 1981* 
36* ^ lyyp (Karachi ,^ 29 Kay 1980* 
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%tXtMk regwra to its credibility to euitivfttft mxtiiftlly profitable 
rol«tion« %iilti ttie south Uest lMii*« 
Zt «NU» aot possiblo for Xndi* «&d pslUUitaB both to rojei^t 
the {MTopoB*! outright* iait«ft^# they Kere iot oodifyifig i t to 
Accoano^te t^ heir policy requirematf* Thie wee doee in e nuaber 
o€ aeetinge* 8eiigleae«h \m» given the reej^cosibility o£ preperiog 
the tfre£t of e i.orkU^ peper to be aieceseed et the firet oeetiag 
of tiiti foreign eeeretariee* io 19iO» 
It nay be mmmme yp that the divergexioe of epproechee of 
aifferent South Asien cou8triee« in the context of r^iooel coQpe* 
ration* center around two aepeete* nanel;^  (^ the politicel level 
and ecope o£ c^Qperatioiir iUi ette«pte to introduce political 
etretegic orientation to the eaerging regionaliea* 
The South Apien Regional Oc»peratioii (SAR0 eee cetabliehed 
at New Delhi* on 2 Ai^aet 1983 in a aeetiog of tfao (orei^ ninieteca 
of BMigladaeh* Shotan* India* Mal^ ivee* !«pal* pelsietan and sri Lanka. 
The ^deration of ite eetablishaect givee the following objeetivee 
28 
Of the SAHCi 
(a) to proiKOte tim welfare <^  the people of fouth 
Mia end to iJisroiie their quality of l ifei 
27. ?*«• Dtnioie* fjig mlJH tftdftY* (Sydney 1983), p. 112» 
26» text of tim xedaratioo of the SARC* wiven ia Appendix* 
Al^tar mjeed* tn<mn Qggjin ggtt^^tel joa Ktglr9ail (New fielM* 1985V* 
%t% 
m to acx^laemts ceonomiU: groKrtli* soeial. progress &(aA 
<;taltiiral ^vmlojpmat in tli@ region and ti» provide 
ftil ixk&ivMmlM tim spprnttiMit-y to live i s aigaity 
e&a to reeliae their f ^ l potentieii 
( # to promote end eteeagtliwi collective eelC«veliaiice 
mmsma the couBtriee of south Aeiei 
( # to co&t»ril»tite to aatuel tru»t# uBdersteBaiiig end 
epi^ reclatiOD of oite another's pt^lmmi 
(e) to proiBote active eolli^&oretioii end imituel eselctwaoe 
in the ecoiKMilc# eocielf coltirel* technical and 
soientifie fieiaii 
(f) to atrengthen cooperation %.ith ottitr aevelopiaQ 
coiatrleei 
Cg) to strengthen cooperation aacing thevielves in 
intematicnal foruns on lentters of consoii int«r@sti 
and 
(h) to eoqp&etktm vith international ana regional 
organisatiQcs with siailar aiae aod purposes* 
an i;he institutional arrangements* certain c^omaittees tiere 
^tahlishea i<^ the it^plementatioB o£ the prograaRue* Ttmsm is a 
te<^inical conmitt^i iwing the iiechanisn of ^le folloifing for the 
i^^^^a^efc^*ww'ffeTii^^^ e^^^^^Ww^^ Tw^'^i^'^ei' epp^^NPi^ wi* ep^e^^we^ ^^ i^Pii^ 'W ^^^^pee^pif^w'^'^e^ i^ wei^ wp ^ I^^P *eiw^eiv ep^n^ ^PTwe^^wew'w^iP 4WHsa 
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Agencies* 
Ce) eontttct sn^ aogst r«eogiil*ed center* of •XO«11«IMM» 
in th@ rsgi^s* 
A€^G» Coeipitlsees eoaprisiiog tim couatrice eoooarfitta »r« 
to h& «®t US) f ^ ^ projeets iamlvim <B°I^ t^ ^^ ^ two «ouiitri«8 iMife 
&ot a l t ^)e eoumuries of tim r^ lon* 
A stftudiog axaititt»e« at tlw levtti of 7€r«i9ii Sfter«t&rli»« 
is ^)er^' ^ e • tite eoordituitiOG ana aoBitoriag of tM SARC ifitb tliB 
29 
folloi^ii^ term of refertoce &o& aeettog a% least onoa a ymri 
(a) approwl, of firojaota and progiraHiiBaa^  aaa t te 
ood&iiti^ of their fisafusliigi 
m d8tarBilJ8atlo& of inter«aaetoral prl^-it las 
<iitd ovarall a»ordiiiatiQCi ^ progiaiMit ^ Actioni 
<«} »c^llaatioa of regional and axtemal reioorotoi and 
(d) iaentification of mm araaa o£ eoqparatioo laaaed 
en apprq^iata atudiea • 
2»# 1!i69£t iQf the I3teiamticii of the §^M fivan in Appaiidljc* 
lUOt^r Mailed* |frtgk§^aBtf|t. 
,pty3pi^ l^ ||^ llff (»»w Calhif i»8^ 
l a i 
30 
{«) Except to tlie «ictMit otlii»ntls« «Qr«w8* tlit oast 
itendiiftxs« vorl«Mp0 ^ d traifiiiis and oVtme pt^gmwem, 
iibBtil }:>« aet lay their rMpttctiv* govwriMBeiitai atid Vim 
emm Qi car^^nlsiag senieKrs* wmelmhag» mtud tminiiiii 
itnd ottier ptogr^tmm tmy tm net by ttm hmt eouetirf 
or appc»rtioi}©d ftnong ptirticipeiits in p»qporti«3ii to 
til© f acilitjbes availed o€ or Ha&tmmd iron extemftl 
it»> Esccept to tim eict«iit otIiftnilJic m^xwrnA* t3m eost of 
.•ij£3«lstci»se £ot mipmem •hai l tm net lay tte receiving 
countries ana the cost of travel ana/or salary o£ the 
expertai My he paid Mm: hy the eeodii^ eotntr i^* or 
shared mmaeg par t ic le ting cotntriee or finaneed fro« 
extemai sourceei 
(«$ Otiisr coet»« iocltiaifi? the cost o£ fci^paratiaii of 
studio* ehaii he shared OR m ettitiftlly agreed hasiai 
{^ Xfi the csMie of iogtg tern |Hro|ects# the li^ei^mieai 
Coenittee cc9»e#r&ed shall estinate the eaite involved 
and shall sulsnit reeomneiiaBticais of i t to the Staadino 
30* iiSAAt, 
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cenaiittee on t l i * noailitlcs for mttiag tlMi 
The f i r s t f»t«%ia$ oC tlie s^imdlos COMBi.t%M #i t l » SMC* 
• f ta r the ^tslslltf^i^ot o£ t l» Xfttt^ wm heia at v t i U o f i U * iml» 
ei'vm* o» J^ aly 7*8* I9d4« ftila osffisitte* {3r«|«f«tf « draft supcrt 
vhieli MUi suis«itt0d to th# •aeiaiua laislaterlai MMttiOQ «liicli m» baSd 
on ^t>ly lo»ii« 1984 « t V i l l ing i l i * Revieniiio tlw iforltf aeo»attie 
•itiJfttloii e]i€i i ts itaplicatiomi for the Sooth tmimn ctowtiries* tha 
Comlttea expf^^sed great diaappoistsieot otrer tlie coistintiiaii iiqpaasa 
i& tlc»rth«€dath ^ialoeut aod viewed vith aerioua eamemm tha 
•igiiifioaBt era ica in {Bultllateral eaafMii^tiQiii ana thia cxsamlttea 
iiTfiaa the simc atat@a to aetivaly ptaratat prof^itala put fomara ^ 
the sow»th«f].oo ali^^iea SuMBit ana the yrot^ <^ 77 a t iiaricnii 
toewm* f ^ a Staaaiog Conraittae mgmA Sotith Asian aatiOQa to 
iimtrtKrt thelJT vafraaeetitivaa to aueh aaatiaga im m:iw*4 ana 
ii*K* Oeaaral Aaao^bly to eloeelsf eooraixiata tl»eir emmtm i^aitiofi* 
32 
fha »aaa for greater Sotith««oitth cooperation ^aa alao a» :^}haaiaea» 
I f an aaaaasiaant i t to ht waaof i t ap|>iar» that Sitm ia an 
exeroiaa »hieh is high on fsrofil® but low on auliatanca* na^ r ha tha 
&&in prdblen hohina tha coifflanmtiva outloolc on atdntantiiw aspaota 
of SJyic ia K^» lack m a polit ical i»ill on tha part of tha Soii^ 
Mian atates to s^o^ into tha araa <^  raal cooparativa aetiiritiaa* 
13S 
Hotvitl»tending aias»aritl«0 Ana MMiermaom im pf?reeptioOf 
a l*rye COWBOB intez^st 6e«m ts aietat« «h« tsove for evgiciMl 
ealiesl<» io South juiia« The oirc^ rriiSit^  objective is to «aeliorat« 
ttMi iisl£ftr« of tite p«ap2« in peace aoiS hartBOny* A etrdiiial Mam 
to thia ecd was to eacbew paat inhibitatlont and prajtitfici^ i aoa 
stveegtheik tbe COKSICSD raaoXva to cra i^ta a eliottta of trtitt and 
Qooa wllX» In fact* tlie Ojptioii to copparate is at iMich an aaiarciae 
in the praeUcal ecoconlc plane aa i t la an effort toward! cooCidenca 
buil<3iBg* i^ tiat la extraordiimry ia thit« iaapita of auaceptilaility 
and iraliieral:>ility o£ ^eaa cotoitriaa to axterftai praaauraa* tha 
iQ^ettia for ragiooai cooperation caaa fron vtithla tim regiOB* oot 
«tithoiit« It «iaa not an ii^ CMiition tiixt a oboica for aaaoclAtion 
volvelAtily arrived at* 
AD iiiportant ootivatiny factor taa that ragional cooperation 
let south Aojia ««• to be Imaad on mxtual iotereat« tnderatandiog 
and ainqpathsttic appraciation of the nationai aaplratiam of the 
cotntriea oj? the region* The attaaipt uaa to oreate an order laaaed 
on the princ^lea of co«6xiitenoe and amtual iMsaef it* 
there waa a i ^ an underatandlng in South Asia that leglooil 
eoq^ration liaa an evolutionary proo^ M in which any forward taove 
t^a to he at a deliberate and neaeured pace ao ae to liable the 
conaolidatiian of the ^mim of each atage before proceeding to ths 
next* opti»iiatically« there waa recognition that i t waa a flexible 
proc^e which would perait ext«ition of eoopecative ventoree in 
%u 
as mny ar«fts m wev« snitmlly mgt&me I^ HIB* 
TtMWi mmtm •ont <»f ttii uBderstimdiitgB ttwt Qovcmtd the 
evdlation o£ somh mUm eeQi&fML c&etmrmtism diarlns ttw last iialC 
decdde* fiM)«e tmaeirttai^ii^s led to « growing rtwitimticsii in ^w 
iiiiaei«iv@]ic^ea cotmtri«« that i t i* oniy ttiroagli «eemomie eoopcra-' 
tian emang tl»&iMieiv'ai «tiA eollftetimi self reliaoct ttiftt tbey ous 
hqpe to dehi«v« ectrnmAc eiamc^tioii* The esteMlshaftiit of 
smc ie the aetualizfttisii of BwM aspiratiqce for emucipftticici • 
the €Kidt^ Xmml ^ intra-cegionfti treda in Soisth Aaia 
is v«ry |)0oc* whic^ Is on an ave^^ge itom S to i34» l^iie io» ievei 
o^  i&tmmig&aml tirade has eeop© for ^pat^ioo i£ utiwaree «yeh at 
cooperation in expert |>rodtictioii and Mirtoti»g« aoneterr ai^ pavneiitt 
arraimeiBimt0# and pr@fer«ioiai tarrii aoraiigetBe»ts are ii»itlated» 
xt ifi> true that there i« a negative trade Isaiaeee Q£ South 
Asian neigta:><»jni in relaticii to India* Siit this can he solved if 
India goes £or big joint vent«r©s in the neiyhhottring coi»tries 
based iqpon the ahunddnee c€ raw aaterials in thit partieiilar 
eoiatry* and tM surpiiis product of stich ventore* sAy then be 
ifliported hy India* 
Indian Institute Q£ foreign trade* mm Delhi I98i» p* 87* 
34 • M«A« laiaiiqur Eehsan* **^ m0 trade Effects of a south Asian 
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1tmtf§ are proipects for South Atlan countriMi to profitftbly 
cooper*te im temesaii^ OAttirttX rtMourocs* Thio region tuw 
ebuodfeoce of hiaroiioifer end irrigatlott pet«ati«l fro« i ts Miter 
revoyrces* For ioetence* the hidro«poiier potectiel of liepel rivem 
aitxw it eoMidered to im warm thaa 60 thontend iiif* which ie 
approxiwtely eqtal to the coo^ hined imtelled oipeeity of Canedk* 
39 
th6 0*8• and Mt«i<»* 
Ei^loitatiaii of the reeourcee of eeeHbed by ZRdie« pekietan* 
Bangladesh* Sri tanloi and tmldivee offers another incentive for 
regional, cooperation* Throogh the Lan ^  the Sea conferences# 
advances have heen imde in preparing an international fravework 
for exploitation of sea«iwd resources* India has concluded bilate* 
ral agreeaent with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh for Joint scientific 
exploration of the sea«resoarees which has i:repared neosssary ground 
36 
work for initiating apeoifie scheaes* 
ror alleviating tim widespread poverty %diich is a connon 
characteristic of this area, there is a special for South Asian 
countries to develop effective use of science and tedmology. The 
experience gained by some countries of the region can be shared 
with greater advantage ttsaa technology borrowed from ths induitria* 
lised countries of the developed world* Such cooperation could 
35* H«p* aanskota "Nepali TOtiard Regional seononic cooperation 
in South Asia^i i ^ ^ ^ #W^.yffy.ir v^l* 2tl« 1981» p* 346* 
3^» gftf y ^ W Of ^ ^** ^ isseeaiber 1984* 
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expiorft i«]r» ttsd tmmm oi reduciny dftpciiaoiioi on £Gr«l$n toixtc^* 
by the dev«:Lcpmt (£ tlw local resoureos* Slailarly* *iii vimv 
€)£ tli@ id^portance of atvalopiiig tim rural sector in partieulAr« 
«xcl3ttfige of iaewi @B£ elmriiigt of experienoa in the a^era Q£ rtanU, 
iostitutioB iiuil^Eig coultf result io el^ii£ic«iit «4v«iiec tm %mll 
m» ««viiiva« tK>t^  in r^soutr^s «&d tine*** 
imotter field of regional eooperatioct for tim south Asian 
countries rttlatiHi to international Eoono i^e isegotlatiooa* and tl^ie 
f^ cmld pre««iit a comsm appcoaeti yitb respect to t ^ ^velopnent 
aidt trade (Si^ oeeeicsns et»« tl^ iis woold require adoption of a 
eoanan stand as a group at tti© nortii-aouth CEialogtie* m^:Tht>0 
ESCM>« in tlhi© vorld Mnk and other m foruss connected with 
39 
diffienent aspects of developiirnt c^speration* 
Finally^ regional cooperaticvi is also called for on politi* 
cal and strategic issii@«* It ia not fatsihle to ptarsue coqperation 
in soeio^ccmoiaic f ieldi irithout imttaal i^ilitical isidMrstending and 
harm%H»y in the reiion* Hutoal svipp^ srt ac^ ^derstanding aisongi 
the 90vemfnent8 c& thy si;ilx!aotin&nt ie alanst a prereqoisite for 
any imaningf ol multilateral Generative actien* South Asia* in fact 
constitute® a hoooQeneous strategic regicn in Many sigsaificant 
17. S.D. nuni, fi9ffl^<?f^3, g^>9P8r t^il« to g^ f^fi iyli.i op«cit*« p. U6. 
39• "iy» In^tm notm ilesHMrdii^  Area of cooperatioif # colotuho 
Meeting of the South Asiaov, 
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««ys# but Qi nm&ms' oi ArtificiftUsr csmtB6. imrtimv Mvm immt 
prosKMed w to hiB^r tl» iiattircl •mluitieii tc»Murd» csoQp9Jmti<»i* 
m iMt»r^mmmmm^l smppott m,f i»6mm gr«ftt8r hmrmmmf in the 
•«ir«t@gic |piee«p»etiv8« i ^ mmsmitg pmnmptilom in South mim* 
Itmpitm oi al l tim proipoetft «od {»ot«t&tlalltiA« ^ rofionftl 
eoopmemtliMt tti@ir@ «r« iiifiiim£«l)l« pffmilmm m&6 iqpedineet* tefor* 
this qaml ctto Ise ftcbieved* 1»is8« iaiwdiiieatet eto lae ett^genrised 
AS r«l*t«4S to Ci) teclmioftl or lKifr«<«triictir«l f«eto»i and 
Cii} £«ctori fesultiitg iwom tim i»itiir« a£ the £«9ioo*s poUtioil 
fliftott onitual ^ppr«iieo9ioii« in soutti MIA tmm oitmn bmn 
inflated and delilaerateXy played u¥>« politico«ttC0noiitle vested 
intareate iti tbia region iiavo tlwived oia a»^«Iiidiaa pilicic» 
and poatureii* Soutfa Mian fo^ e^mnanta have often foiaid i t 
a^Nantageom to project asaertive and divecient pestiarea towardi 
India i0 tXmir atratii^iea £or dooieatiG political aiaitenance and 
ai;|>pQrt a^tliaation* Such intra-regional diahamony haa tended 
the soiith Allan ooimtri^ to look towards outaida potiera for 
airport to @n0tire a favowahle regional halanee* The external 
p o « „ . « « » t « . U , « p l o i t . | ^ r ^ i o - l ^ . « « « i » to . , « . 
their otoi a^trategie intereatti* 
•0# W.S. ai|pai# |pf4ft*f Jg^^llY imv I»lhi ltS3) Oiaptar ?• 
41. Stanly bolport^ Jcxfflr ^ g9pgy9|^U« l i iWH f^fte* (OOP* mi» Htsck, 1982)« Chaptera 2 ft «• 
im 
on m note o£ •«ti9£iiQtieifit i t m^ iMi «oneli^ teA «iit% tlwirm 
i« a 0ro»l33!g rettiiaettioa In ttm uooth Mian eountrl^* «taat i t la 
OBly throusiti eoqperstioii saMX^  tlitai«|««« end c^ll^etiv* ••If* 
r«li«ii€« tiAt tbey ^n h^e t& mt^ew^ eemnomie •naneip^tioe* 
tfm e»tmMiBhmn% oe the aou«li Jk^ iftn li»9ia»il CoqptfUtion i» Hie 
•«»tisftii«iti«m» o£ 0t]eii ••p^ati@c» f#r •tAneipfttion* 
tim QQC» vhlGh •pp#ax« to ^ eom •trateglailly eooieioos* 
lifts mn explt^kt ©coiio l^e olijeetiir^* tbe iU.yAdii istelairatiQn v^ry 
clearly saia that tiift o3»iactiv@ o£ @CC v«» ta b e^omii *'a oeaaa 
for a€ihi@vii»g tim wmxiMam aiK^t of a»operati<ii int^cmtiao and 
linkage* in al l ai^ lieres* Xt in alao to play ^>ist siBiilar syati»ii 
in the eeoitiostric* finaneialt educational* cultural* social* nsdical* 
tranegtort* inforifiation* paaaport and nationality* travelling* 
42 
trade and euatos)* ahipping of cargo* legal and legislative effaira** 
It vmm in .^ oveaiser 19@0 that a uwmit neetiai held in Jordan 
propoeed a eettitie up of OCC lAiic^ liae finally eetabliehed on 
43 
2& my 1981. 
The oain itrnvmrnotk, o£ coordinating c^^eratioes for the GCC 
ooontriea foewaea tapcn the estahliahiatnt and aupport c^ joint 
projects to ha undertake in the fields ofi induitry* agrictiltire 
42» Oscree Ho. «<»l3t 16*l«19d2 jir^ A l j y i i Saudi Arabia 
ii«iroduoad in 'mm% Bifftr iwrgittYl msSSMl ytmUmtxm* 3wm 1»82* pp» 23«>4» 
43* 3M^ 
in 
ana cervical ming pul&Iic* ptl^Kktm or niicea EmuSa t o «el}J i^r« 
economic iiii:ttgrftticn# tHe intcgrotioB oC produetiQli «iu9 Joint 
devniof^ngnt OR eeoBontottiiy •ouna bMM • 
In riMlitatioo o£ tli* ^c»l» stipulAtftd in this ftgr««i»«iit» 
the oeniaejr cotaitries •tmilt 
*(i) coordinatft ttteir inaiastri*! a e t i v i t i ^ »na 
iSmmlop the policicti ana oiAna cai;>a]»l.e of 
iiehlsvinQ indue trial ^veiopaent ana diver-
»i£ie»tion o£ the s^rodiaetion tm9m in aai^ 
ii^ vntrjf on an intagrataa l»aiai 
( i i ) i4}i£y thair inai»traial i@9ia]jtticii ana ragu* 
lationa ana aiphaaiwi the oriantfttion ai t3m 
]Lool proataetiva aysta* in thtaa cont^iM 
ii;owarai the proviaioii a€ thair n9«6n 
( i i i ) iiiatrihttta the ieaoitrir mwm^ tiiaiaiaivaa aoear* 
<iing to the relative aavantagea and the aeonoade 
£caaibility* ana aneouraoa t i^ aatabliatwant 
44 
oi kmBie ana conplaisentary inauitriea"* 
44. Text of Oul£ eoc^aratioa Council *a EconoiBic Jigraaaanti 
caeraa Mo* Mt 13* 16«l*lt82 UMB A1 Qura# m^ Mmbim 
Seproaucsea in 'tjj^lf m t iUfg^Yf ftiTHMrm* itMhingtoii, 
^uae 19{I2# pp* 23«4« 
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file £ir«t stage of coop«rfti;iv« ftgrtttflMHit t)«tii««ii t3m 
Bin mBvto&r • to^s of tiic OulC eoa^ffttloo Oiuneii cftnt into •f£«et 
€m 3mm 1981 tiovering lc\r«stieeott p«trol®i»« the etoliticn oC 
etaiton antics* hsrwanisiof (^  iasoisli^ regtOatiens and tht «v«i3tisl 
formtion of « eoaB»» eurrttiey* 3% s^itiaii to th»«« provisioos* 
crsaticHi stfi|» bav* already lasan tak^ in n^ard to a nuater of 
ecaeooic aeti.viti«a co^raA 1^ thia agraanmit. Ti^ iooluaa 
afDong other t^ iUigat 
19 ttm eoardteati<ae o£ poaltioiw at Arab and 
llBtarcatioeal petroieyn fonaoa* 
2* tile mccbaaga of iiifomati<» on local petrolaiai 
4i 
Iirodtact mrkata* 
3* tbm eatabliahiBiist of the Oulf isv««tn«it 
oorp^atiOB iQt0 • 
4S* MiMLa East Ecoaomlc Swrvar l@ CNitolaar li Fet»MMrsr 1982, 
4§* Miadla East Econonic Survay* 26 April if 82 cypriia* |»» il« 
47* The eatabliahaii&t of the o«dlf iaviMtMitt eorporatioo (QIC) # 
capitaiU^a at $ 2*1 h« to handle Joint fioanelal ana 
eoonoKibe inveataent 2Q9( of iihich will be paid t# and the 
reet settled during a period not exceeding five years« neiRhers 
of the QOC • vUl ODo equal shares of $ 3S0 m* each in the 
new eoarporatioe and will have tim right to settle «ip to #& 
of the share to their oitisens* The <^Jeeti¥e of GZC 
ao^rdtng to iir« X£»rahi» iihd Al melm, the Mahraine niQister 
of Fin»»^# are to invest in eoanercial and indiatrial 
ventures both tdthin and outside the Qalf region (GZO has 
i ts hiMdfiuirters in Kmiait and Is exfwoted to start oi^ra* 
tion at ttie end of the fear* Middle East soenoaie Survey* 
X% KoveiBber 19^ Cyprus p» A*ll» 
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4« the A^ t^iOQ ^ c»il«etiire bftrg«iniiiQ poUleUm with 
&• flw mtmhiiatmrnt of t ^ c«Btr« for u»i€iea MBMUTM 
4t 
a«a •peelficetioiui* 
It Mty be Mia that in this •triving for r«giQii«l 
eooperfttifio yy^oa «^ f^ry %IM store « perceptioe of threet to 
inaiviauftl iregints rather thftn eamiitftSM of imified action, 
priaerily *3.l this tmi beostaie o£ amies tie effects of oil ueeith 
{ificluaing ftocis}. inequelities) the possihiiity of e papuler 
usiriMt ceusita 1^ the presemai of foreis^ worloirs (ineluaiDg 
Felestiaiens) sua repia aioaeirmisetitsci idiile reteiitiiiQ treaiticosl 
rules of he1mvo«ar* Beesuse of the presence of coDSiasrehle Shie* 
minorities in the Bmirates «i^ isk Ssuai Arehie* thmre twos the 
politicel tlareat frost the religious fervour of e Shis Xren. 
Besides there VBB the iavolveiaeiit of outsiae powers which wss 
incresaing eaa was cot trivia the cspehility of the local powers 
to control* 
AfnaiKS the «m»mm which ere eiQpeetea to hs ptit ioto effect 
in the near future are a review of eoisBiereial laws with a view to 
facilitating the cstahlishnsnt of joint private ana public 
48* Miaaie Sast Economic Susvey* 3 Jants»ry 1983* Cyprus* p. A-7* 
49* ifiaaie East Econonie Surveyf 8 Hopveniser 1983 Cyprus# p«A«6*lO« 
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eoapftnic* mnA the •Aop^on m • isiifiei ecencwie agFattMNat is to 
e«tal>lis)i an Integrated eeoiKMB&i: entity in Hftiieh tiMiva ia ff«a 
faovasieiit o£ capital gooda and oanpoiier aa nail aa joint coordina* 
timi in the planciBg and exeeittion e€ aeonoiBie and financiai SO 
poiieiM* 
Ml re^rdt the |Mr«areaa of QCC*a cooperation in the aplierv 
of eoonercial and of oil proieeta# i t baa achieved a great 6eal, 
partictidariy in the fielda of Joint projeetat flie lateat gulf 
goiremaent project ia tim Saudi-Bahraine eaiaia War i^83 i^iieh will 
provide a road link Isetnean the Zalandi and the Arabian peninaala. 
Although i t ia esaentially bilateral rather than pan«Arah« the 
cattfe nasr in indicative of the trend toward greater cooperation* 
It ahoiild have aoae heneiita for the QAE aa aell aa for Saudi 
Amhia and ;^ ilurain* BJT helping to unpen huge Saudi B«rket to 
Sahraini manufactured goodi* the caui« way will atti«ulate activity 
on the Zaljind helping to create the jcftia aeceaaary for continued 
SI 
political atahility* 
To bocet up the entire indue trial eet tq» of the region 
recently 6CC and OApEC eountriea agreed to proaote in Ku««it 
ceeeaber 2S,t6< 1983 f^ taltca on nattera of wutual intareat in 
SO* Middle seat sconosdo Survey* 7 Hareh 1983 Gfptvm, p*d« 
Si* Strategic cigeet See Art* Joint projecta hriag diversity 
to an oil a^ndant econoi^ y by S4taiund (Sullivan* (loatitute for Citfeaee Studiea and Analyses pub*«) 
Pew £)alhi« septenber 19^« p* 7S8« 
l i s 
thft Cleitf oi eottrgy ori«it«€t speelAliaei trmiKlii9# tlit exchsus* 
of miec^y r(Bl»t«a dBta ana •xptrt&s* ana informtiQii aetivitiea* 
Zt !£«• «9r«<»d t^ hold asctiti a««tlJKp foreigB «ii «roiuti.e3n o£ 
the various «sp«ctft of »\3S^ eoopaMtioii* Tiief« Is «l«o eocraiiiR-
tloe betntwci tlie iiatian*! oil eo^ paiii«fS in th« coMtittMW on 
iiiarltetifi9« ixc^Bgtt of infociMticjfi tHrougli the QCC liaaioo offiot 
in Lonaon* in traiiiifig aoa nafiiiii^* 
iRio i}a»i« ]r»Mi» tbit tlity t»im bama abla to «elii«v» ao 
rnxdi in ao Short « parioa i« the fealiag of nutyai trtatt Isettfaaii 
ttw neflflsan of niniatcrial coimittaa asa tha laek oC raaaotnant 
•vea wha» QEM of tha eoiatriaa put forvara a projaet ndiieh ia 
rajeetaa for aeoooi&ie raaaoa. Mor«orar« tt i» tha aaniffitt 
poliey <ari«Btatioii of aen^r govesniaeiita that thaaa projacta ahoida 
to^ eeonomic haaia in ordar to ai:abia than to aunriva a&a to forai 
a buttraaa for gui^ eoopa^ticifi in gasaraX rathar tima a Inaraan 
which haapers tim ^Sewmloi^mmt of eosparati<m' iMitMaaB i^m a»«bar 
eotntriaa* 
sa« OPEC iulietiii voluna l» Jantimrjr 1984» p* I Ktiwait* 
Sd» Vtm <3CC haa aat «^ a liaaion otflea in t^m&M mom aa tha 
9t>if infonnatiaft ana raaaarc^ caatra tshoaa taak ia to 
aiatribftta iafornaticn aldoiit m» <XC aaa to aat m a ^narai 
rapraaeatativa of tha osyaaiaatiQii la tlia tl*K* fHa <»atra« 
which aotm aot hava ^plaaatie atatis will alao arraaga for 
tha pyhiieatioea ana aiatrihutioa of heeklata ana proviat 
iaforaatien on eustoaa ra«iilatiai» to preapactiYa axportars, 
Niaaia Saat leoaoaic Smvmft 26 Smm i983« p, 1^ *7 C ^ w * 
lU 
As asm aitthssr tm» pointed otit« *Th» inititvtiesftlintioB 
o£ linics «n<9i]^  t!ie Arab Gulf dtAts* («»c2.t^ii9 2fiiq) iM tlie ferai 
o€ ttw *Ottl£ Co««p®f«Ucm Councils iiiiic^ to^ pUce earlsr in 
jL9@i# sBUjf aavttlop ftioag limtm mimllMt to AS£A^« «Mt»liiig ict«m«l 
tlireatff to im ae«it with by nnityftl «gs««e»nt and thota froia 
outside tli£3 region to be perceived aad bandied in a aiodlar «fas^ « 
Howevert ttiere i» an iisportant difference between soitth-Baat Aaia 
and tl^ Galf • nately tbat i t would prebabXy be extremeiy €i££ieiat 
in ^le Gui€ to give iapetaa to the demand that 'ali powers foreifim 
to the area should be kept out** Here so than any other sob* 
region in the Southern fiemisphere* the (3ulf will continue to be 
exposed to the contrastine Interests o£ gltiaal polities** 
S4* Dieter Brmun« *thm Indian Ocean liagion o€ Conflict or 
feaee zmmf p« 197* 
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ZoitiLeily ^m witharAtefti oi: the u r i t i a i i p&ma: frosi xmiM 
<&m not Qftfsct ttm •©curity 0I tli@ Xn^iae octiaii for wm^ yL^ars. 
teeaiis® trii:;ai» r^taimrd l i i r ^ i l j k ^ r y eosntrol ovor tlie Siaes ana 
tiM: rersian Oalf «rea* &iit it^ r tceat yrarft tim •«eyr i ty o i the 
locisn oeemi tia® liecatie a yri-at coiic«rf& £or Znf-ia dutt to a r ^ l s h 
%,'ithc^6ti,'«| ]lrom tt^e east o£ tlie Suss and tb« cosimqmim Super 
poi»«r8* »sviil ac t i v i t i es in the Sii£ia» ci^i^sii* How both S^B»@r 
po%«r8 • tir*it@a States &n€ Smfi^t. tioio» • «r<t esctti^ioy the i r 
naval ae t iv i t ies ixi tha Xfi^ia^ ocaan aii€ inaMBg iha ocaar. tm 
ar@a o£ con^i^etitit^e @»£ c^nlroctntloii* ^hich oatatal ly threatens 
the ®@earity ot th# l i t t o r a l stata®* 
TtlE^  atretsQf ot tha Super ro^eera q^ r i t ta both a t the 
in ter • 5^'cr Power laval tm6 at th© ^ ^ r pmmr * Thir€ ;.3ria 
l«v&l* There la a pi^al la l iam ij©ttst@n the strataglas o£ hoth 
the r i ^ r rsi.'cjra • ttm soviet strategy talisg ns^itli ' atfccsiva 
&m a rctal ist iDR to the le i t l a t i vea of tha uniteil etates* 
*rhrreforc>* u aciparate stu^y of US atrata^y i f i the XodiiHi ocaae 
U IICC@SS©7A' t3 atia@rataniS tha aoatoiay o£ S i i^ r lobars 
strato' j ies* 
In «.^t tl'« IcCian cc«af4 h«a t a ^ a iproBiin@aea ir< tha 
rn i l l t a r / strategy u£ tha ynited Statas froir ®iirly 19&C .^ Tht 
un has o^tli ODHveistiDiml ae^ p s r l ^ s a atratir^lc i»aolaar mi l i ta ry 
13» 
interest in the Xoai«n oceaa* Military objectives £or (3 
coovantional Icrces it^clu^ the eapatility to (1) protect US 
ccocuaDic interests in the Persian Oul£t Cii) ei^loy or threaten 
to use £orce in s\3^g^^ort o£ US £Spl08Kitic objectives In the 
Middle East* <lii.) secure the Xnciec Ccean air &a& Soa routes 
&l;aii:^t harasfflise£.t or letter diction* (iv) Intervene in suppcHrt o£ 
other objectives in the l ittoral etid* related to a l l ot these* 
(v) balance ^soviet Forces in tiya region and attain superiority 
in a cr i s i s . The \0 vital interests ineluae the preservation of 
t estem access to F«rsian Gul£ oil resoiirces* aiKl the n&intenance 
ot a local (|4»qpolitical balanos* Zn this %.'ey the Indian ocean 
region forms an inportant alceient In the us pol i t ics of intrusion 
and the concoinitant military preseiK:e as part of i t s global 
strategyi but i t i i also liicely to play a crucial role in space 
and strategic varfere* 
l?he GKiin ^ol^em trom the US point vie«! i s the US perc^tion 
about Soviet bases located on maritirac strategic choiGe«points« 
«hich is rc:,flir(ded by the tinited States as the raain oriytoator of 
any decisive threat to her interests* The reality of this 
perception tes been proved after the events of Afghanistan and 
Iran v^ hich hsid shifted the geopolitical balance adverss to the 
us interests» 
One effective techAique* \^hich %BB «|> l ied by the united 
States to 84!Ciire i t s interest irois i&>viet ttrsat is the Rapid 
Deploynent Dorce (RI )^ * vem originally evolved in 19ft8« 
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rar a staco^^^:^ lo t^cept lon aloioet oi a l l Sovlrt satc^llitcs* 
the y^ f»'!AT eitrotcuy v^ill rcKiuir« to '*je cloLal i c i%m ^proacu 
ent ^111 i^ed to . e l«ufx9i«d ic a iuilti«cixectional ftfulti-«Boae# 
coordinattfS inteyrated operation, to* %ihich the ZQdl«ii ocean 
region* acf part icularly ciego Qascia* ia ti&st aituat^C* 
^ot oiay the unitea States but the Soviet es^ten^ng 
ac t iv i t i ea an i^ intereata in tha Indian oeaan «ir« cxptainaa in 
tcraa o£ it.a ^iroving atpen£enc« on thr aaa route tt^oi^ih tha Xnaian 
ocean for iQov<2isent of yoo^ bett^een tha eaat an6 % e^8t coasta of 
the coantry. 'rhe Soviet naval daploynrnt in tha Znaian ocean 
a t a r t i e ir. l'j^7 if; tha ioris of a re ta l ia t ion to OS ^^- activit iea* 
Soviet intereata in the xncian oc^an are faat only pol i t ica l 
©nr ecorjumla iMt atrotegic too. Ttic <\'ploy»-i-t oi atrit©5,ic 
kf:apon caii lit mor^ eet^erou® e^.-aicat the Soviet union tteHOByainst 
the un, oi^  a€x:o jst ok the physical <^nf iyuration o£ tha Indian 
Ocean, Tc ncrutroliae these ivcapon aysten and to preaent a 
oisiilor threat to the i«est« Soviet control is neceaaary in the 
Xneian ocean.. That ia ««:,y# Soviet aea denial atrategy ahi:.tea to 
aea controX iitratcjy, 
titQ miiin nuTviOse o£ Soviet policy is to eecura a^sone 
oc SoviLt pern t r e t ion"« t:ro»^h tlM tuo ii^aaur@a vei^iona, nit^ely* 
tha G3(ploitatian of t i c re9i;:>nal inatiUsility nfur a ycctral 
propagcnce ag-inat thi^ i^aat* Uhc objective of Soviet s^licy in 
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tl% Thir^ i-iorld is i^t to interdict tl4i western n t r i t i ^ tra^e 
anf coi»:«rce Ixtt to streaythen i t s cav«l iotervcntioiilit 
capacity only to neutreiiiBe < esterr navvl poioer* fhe soviet 
t 'oirn elffid i»^ itota to mtke '. i^sterr o i l Si^piy cocditibnal to l^r 
Xt cnay be* com:^u^'€ that the purpose o€ Soviet {^llcy 
is m^ither tiD provoke a iiaclear lar i tself nor hope ox eay 
nuolcor a t t sc^ Lwasa thit ;est* t^ hurtit^j Soviet ictereste in 
t io se ercan# t^hcre Soviet diploeiiicy has developed e Stefce* 
Th&SG effleryifitj che.fy«s ir. military t€i:hnoio^y jive « 
conclusion* tl:at e Cailore of ^l0£^l arsw c^rtrol eiiforts* 
epecially t t e collapse o£ tbe hXm Treaty* covdti open the \>«y £or 
varijtus new erstaLilising iBilitary act ivi ty in the Intian ocean 
by loth Suftir po%^rs» The present re la t ive s t eb i l i t y i^ 
B\3pcr p&mer CDinmntional naval cleployntnt could ahriiptly chaise 
ill a cliiMttci ol: increasiisy tension at the gloLal an^. rryional levels 
The rc^iksnaJ. ai^. e^tr^'.^reyionai tactore create ^^ntinuii^ 
inctabi l i ty tihich could dra« the Hv^r lowers into a d i r^ : t 
confrontati:»n« 
The latt- ai areness oi, ^t^biac coutAei- ii ahout th i s £act« 
that any thircat t3 their security <feill f^t bti exwernal hut i t 
%*ill C3»c ijrotQ Eternal protlcsa as &MI s t i c unrest* salsota;;^ 
and ictrarcyional osntl icts* To counter t lds tlarftat they are 
usin:;> t i o eirthods panely the laassive eras ic^^'uctiun an^ att0K|>ts 
in 
to develop closer co«O|>er«ti0O p&rticttl«rly tn those areas 
vhleh affect their security* 
ths w&BQive arms induction taoans tlK3 permatieRt aepccdency 
o£ the Gul£ oc the Kest <Sue to their l i t t l e technical knoided^ end 
inability o£ proper use of highly sophisticatea ariw equipsicnt. 
The BUftin pur^se o£ arras sif^lier o^untriee was to 
secure an uninterrupted Ho^ o£ oil by establishing a viable 
reletionshlp at any cost* 
The another notable reason ot era» prol iteration in the 
Xnaian ocean is the direct lailitary presence of Great PO^&TB 
and their capabilities to {project such presence at short fiotU:e 
in tiuD region. 
Ttiere i s not a sinyle coantry in U)e Zndan ocea^ vhich 
has not 9igtm6 a military pact either of with the united States 
or «?ith the Soviet union In respect of security* ideology* 
political convenience* econcKKic pay off or e: pedieoce in other 
words £or the sake o£ national interest* 
Tr.is regional arc!» proliferation poses a limited threat 
to iioria pcftce end security but i^ hen i t linised up with Great 
Poter rivalry then i t is posed o seri:ms threat to the security 
an^ peace not only of t te region but to the vhole woria. 
i.hat is not clear is the party to be blwaed for the 
otilitarisBstion in the Indian ocean • extra regional powers^  or 
the l i ttoral i tse l f . Actually the extre rcyional potiers htow 
142 
f;ov® only tmhmu e€v«ntage o£ ttm local cot£li£tM aea rivalries* 
Itie ifjenreaec€ iBllitary ar.f atratef ic ectivitiea in tlie 
Jnt^cn ocecr- <£!»^ iBj tte siG i^ia fcull: at 19C)0ii« oJ^  both the Kts^ -r 
Poi'Cre b<ive biirtb iu> a hm. realisation ornxod ttm littisrel states 
9^ Utm tctian ccem^* %ihicli streB&m6 on the cuBoept o£ peace '^ r<^  
io the Z&U.ac ocean* 
Tfie tiirat C^tsulatioi} o^  the prc»«ieiseiite o£ the peace 
:^i^ ^ t!ie Xm''id{i ocrai) i^ as co picted in I'-JTQ at the ivon* 
Migrjea Sisiialt o£ L«Kaaka asa s^iiMeq<jmiiitl}f wcrtivittes et^itteti to 
prixsotii.y the ptoptm&l yithit^ tl^ iJBiit(^ 6 l^ticnui* 
tim ctificqpt c@o m iiri<Se<l into t%io tmir* 6iyi8ioi##otie 
related t& Chr> r€$i«»sal etatas i<S)c«e ^airi problem ie K^urity an€ 
€Co cr ic sisnj'ival* fhe eiKSOLc! divieioo ie th.t the regional 
fjecice i s tht iTlrst step to^ a^res t'm ylotoel p«a^» 
ThD ccKici^ of reace «^ ias is a c:5BA.4i»ti::ii of aiSIerent 
iceas* Thf <tstabli^ ^4m t^ ok i^ eace a:0ne ir> the Xn i^en ocean* 
without am^»l«te Imowleage is c»t ri^ht* The acceptai^e o£ the 
v;ithcra«>al »f oeternal pollers le^ ans the costinaation o£ regional 
prollees anc. aiC£e>renc%s» The c^ velopnriMt «ine security o£ 
regional oaialler anS weaker stat«i are ac|>end^ Bt on stronger 
> nd i>iQ^r states ol the area* Their ina«.ility in the solution 
o& tfjoir proiuleias tixo»yh neyotiatiocs mxt tiieir siilitary 
a-tituae CO pell tt^e^ to invite the |»reiieiice o£ the Seiner po^ issare* 
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respoctCulIy ra t lur tr^an haviiiig an ayraeatint «»ith «h^ bigger 
s ta tes 311 etitiii tcroa* thia lisvitistion iivoi tklrth t^ • 
aitus^tiofi in v.Mdi, the regi:;nail i^n^ers 9vi^i^sosrt ttm efituctfpt o£ 
rcac* »jDEO on tS^ OR© tiane end on tlie other co»St«ntriitc 
th@i»$@tve2! on ttie loiliu^^ Isaiia i^ %ihich cicoureyes o scrftol^lc! 
for (joalsatice in tr^ rciyioo* 
Tlie eaaj^ n focus £sr copj^rstioi^ snooy the asveloping cocsitrits 
hJts to i® on s!i?«sur@s for ®cc@l€rstliHi tt^eir aiivelo^fflgiit# 
cooper6tion« ;iro%iif% out o£ l«ri;er traae opportunities ^ne ac^ivtH 
Crofs tht Be«ai oi d&v®i:^»int planciiiiHI* are mutuslly coc^l^iotntar^ 
init tt:t 7.attrr «i3pect i s iilselF to talu? preseileRCc in acor.ociic 
rci^ti-riS eoc^ BQ t l ^ less <Sevei|s^6 oyunftrits* 
A process o£ i^JLstwricsl tsvalution* vast socio^culturia and 
ethnic ic«ntAtiai &tm proie:imities ol ri^i'ition« rftcs# l a i s ^ s ^ 
an<5 c stvss m etc# the fjrcssrvation ana ©rop®'-i«ticm of pbilcwo* 
pi:ic©i trsei t ion* culttarsl values ana nort&s oC l i fo of aat^b 
f>9isr> countrIrs invitos reyionsi eoQper«ti(^ ift ISotith Mis* 
But on tl4£ other hv i^^  there are soii« o l s t ^ i s s in th© %^ 
of regional coopsration. Hain oisitscles arc«ooloijjil legacies* 
protileBis o£ natiocsl int^wrsti^n ana nation baiiein^* 8iaXa0\.elosHf 
• eor. ^ "'ic e t r :cture« regime l^c^tabilit^* pomsx ^lisparities in the 
region cm. i:tnail^ the role o£ external ptnne-^* «ihich hither ttie 
rc^,ianal axspcration in South i^ia* 
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An ispHta&t T'otivatiog £ectar vms tlitt regionAl eopperft* 
t ^ o Ui South iMiia a^® to based on ositual interast* uRderatiuriCiUniQ 
ond eya|>&theti«3 arpc'eclatloii of tbe national a^lrat lo» c^  the 
countries oi tlie region* Oo««]tistence ana smtual benefit itfere tiae 
two eiiin princJ^les ot %nim attesqpt* 
Acottier attecapt of regional cooperation took shape in the 
fore o£ Gti^ f Coopieration Omncil (coc) on &^ my 19&4 • t^lch 
appeared to be foore strategically consciv^as tsm mn explicit 
ceonooic objective* 
the iocum upot^  the establishornt ana support of joint 
eCCorts to Lo unfertaken in t!^ firld oi indtistry, agrieitlture and 
sertrices usin ;^ ptildie* private or eiJied funds to achievs econsnic 
integration of i^ roc nation a&6 joint developa^nt on ccononically 
soui^ UiSQat are the main f ratsm o^ris. of coordinating operations 
for tho ooc aiuctries* '^  
fhe ojaLu r^ s^ponsiiale factors of their sueosssful and 
aaBi':a&le acliteveia@nts in so Bi^sirt pttvLC ore th^ ^ tmitual trust 
hetyeen the meinters of ministerial coir^itt^e and the lack of 
resontissnt even ^^ i^ n one ol the cotjmtries put for%>ar^  a project 
v^ hioh is rejected Cor econrm c^ reason. vto^eov&Ct i t is a 
3: nil est policy orientation o£ imwb&r yovermients th&t these 
projects siiouid have economic Las is in order to ca&tte tt^ ra to 
survive ana to forts a buttress for gulf c^soperation in general 
t4S 
rattier tlian a turatn »hich h»B|)er« the S^evvlqE^ nF^ i^  of Cdoparation 
bet«ean the {af3!tl»>rs couBtrl^* 
Tfie grot^ ifig realissatiot} «si3Cj the anrelapii^ crountries 
tli®t an on^nc^ati^n la poaaibXe otiX^ through the eoofionio 
es^i^-ation (m:^n^ tti&nmfil^mm and collactiw »mli reliance* Ttie 
eatabXiahmeist of smc and ccx; are the actual izatibo of auch 
aapiratlac for ^nancipatlon* 
CHINA 
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HmwiA;^ - I 
The f i r s t f I tu re acnote© area in Sq. I'M* &n€ the second 
potpuioti:;!] in tnill ioia} 
Ausitralia 7,607*000 » 14*42 
Burina 677«CX}0 • 32*91 
Xli6:»QD0ia l«9O4«O0O •>148.47 
Malaysia 330,CC0 •» 13,30 
siiHiiftpore 581 * 2.36 
Thall£f»S &14«Q0O « 46.14 
2» ^ufc^ A a ^ i 
Afgltatiistac 647#O0O * 1&.49 
Bsnglaaeah 144*000 «• 60.64 
Bhutan 47*000 • 1,27 
InCim 3,268*000 • fa4 
mtcivca 298 m Otis 
Jepal 141*000 • 13,71 
paKietac 892* Ooo • UA 
Srilar.l(a 66*QD0 -> 14*74 
14? 
Bahrein 623 
Irm lt6m,Q0O • I6«94 
Sreq 43&«00C . IS*?? 
t3©tar ll#0DO • 0 ,21 
mmtit l8,co& • 1,20 
omtn 212 ,0)0 • 0 ,06 
St&uCl Arabia 2,l&0«G0t> • e , l i 
Uiiifeea l i rab EEiirates S4,0C^ •• 0,7& 
EfVpt 1000,000 • 40 ,93 
i^ i i c ^ i a 1,222,000 • 30,42 
rjJiJOUtA 22,ODO • t , f l 
l©raal 21,CD0 • 3 , ? 8 
«l<^aeci @S,000 • 3 ,79 
Sor..alia 638,000 • 3,B4 
Su^m 2glG60QOO • 17,89 
lie^th tm&n 19£.,000 • 5 ,79 
South trnmsi 333,ooo • 1,04 
£»• 
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lo tBt e.fm 600^000 • o*79 
:eny« &G3«000 • 1£»*32 
i.cSDtho 30,000 • 1,31 
raio%>i 113,000 • 10*20 
MOs^arJjique 733,000 • X0,20 
^.aeibia 7&3#OCO « &»6& 
':%fa£iiac€ 17,000 • 0*&4 
Ssirth A f r i c a 1,221,000 * 2B.43 
tjer.<Sa 236,000 • 13,22 
6* MiM,.Hff^gyH,lffff i f f „i «^a^tiii JKIiU'ra,, gygant 
09t!Ssro8 2 , 1 7 1 , •* 0»33 
men'jQBC&e &87,C00 • 8»6l 
m \ a : i t i u a ?,04£« » 0 ,91 
Scycl te l les 278 - 0,Q6 
149 
introc yctiQC 
Tijc Cj?.rt©r i^li'inis-rcition tes prqpo»o6 the establislmmt 
oi a cprciol* rmick strifeo l^pia £fepioym.»i::t E t^jrce (tTF) oi i^ to 
110«C(j& tro«f5S. tor use i4t< fatarr cofJl icts Sc turtulejat r^^ksns 
etjch ^c the rrjrcien culf • The iKn; :.CF proposal ia cesi^nca t o 
uot^roCa tiif; United rtct^:s* csslrtiny rapid aqoloyat* at ca^L4l i t ic3 
over the f^  : t fiv© years, xts five-yccr cs t i t^ tcd procurcBM i^it 
e ^ t Is CP to $10 b i l l lorn 03l>4 million has been reqiusstcd ii: 
the i^ CI 'xc» ljua:.'et» 
The Mis-icistratioii propos. l8 will cotst* anae-r ifcreaaii.;^ 
ceruti^^y c^ Cou.rcss ^lii«»ra-es l a t onJy requested pr.jcurecsent 
itcJiB# twc also the larger qocstioo olf i.ti^tl^r ao H!^ itfill help 
t t e u.S» ichicve i^e Lorriyc policy objectives* 
prcpofK^nts of an rifj* con&ccc t ^ t «a imttt be &MG to move 
our i,ro^.c% @ca ant eijr imits to cista&t oreas r a p i ^ y act" v.ith 
oce-niate eup>plk:s; tJaat o\3r prestjnt capabtli t ios ar© l a t ©iifficieRt 
to cope i.*th ^-otcctiaX tlircat tj crucial o i l si^^-.licsi avit that 
tlic creation oZ a force will cferjoiBiretc tl»S« iiitorcat in tli© 
Tiolitica^ s t ab i l i ty of tlse Gulf# 
ISO 
Qritlca o2 the forc*^ qoKtent tSmt i t louia as o£ l i t t l e 
u0t ifi t!ef: rtfiPfe pereieu Gull o i l i that ifc louia b* e f'cstsMlitrisig 
£orcG itJ t t o Kicaie Cast ®tit DtKrh o£ t ^ tl-ir€ uaria, tliat i t 
t,.ouia ix v.j!Tf csstly tli^t i t coulc: le aUiSccj &s ©ti lf.tervrntioiiary 
£c»rcc« Inv-vlvir/^ tl;£2 U*S« ii!^  a coiitiniaDus s t r i f e oi l ios t i l i t ics 
crouat" thu i:,iorl^ .f or*t, tinet diploisatic &^C ccotatBic iuitiativc-s • 
rGthcar titac © rcc^rt fj DiHtary eC^rcfiturisa • represent the otASf 
policif vHiMih tisrill efiecti.w:li* protect U"»S. v i ta l interests iu 
t b B l^SG»®, 
tlilB pspcr Qcarrcscs f^Bi ospccto of tfec utf*, icclu^iry 
i t s hlct*»yii i t c ©triicttir©* cqaipQcfst erit" coctai i t s lad^sioiit cdLsK^  
v i th cotiDontM'f or* i t s Cio^biii t iesi an analysis c^ tf^ a t t i t aac 
oi" TbUC horlG CD«i3trirs» '^spLClally ir* th© rireioR culf tofe®r€ 
u.B, railitai'f preserve J er.C er. enQ'tysi* o£ Coc^reas* role 4r. 
scm'iii.j r.ry troo»© to cwit-iit* 
Ti'm KVT to rot ^ tmu i t ^a . Tte concept vias f i r s t initi«t©a» 
Cobatca# crx' t-ventuallv rr Jectec by Gsc^rcss uBiGrr tiK ^c^nsssn 
OM-iEiiatration 15 year® «iaO« ?.W*B ear l i tx tjeginr-iiiy can fcs© 
trt-cefi t© a ly&u teck;ic> l€ff Faauclatioc reo!ort# auEtti^ area by t*€n 
?iirvQ -^fi r>roCe.j©or i-ieiary Kissii^cr, ^l^ich l®t©r caam to t i c titten-
t ioo 01 rcCccse Socxetarv i'ici.ciD®ra« 
Cespit© t 'ar l / 0u|?r.<^t tor tiiF^  nrf coj^rsot la 1961. tlis 
program w®s cvoetyslly rejected for two ruacocs. Fir«t# i t i.as 
ISl 
thoitgttt timt thin C^rcc ^tml€. t: a fmreiyn policy l l aHi l i ty , 
ii3 that i t V13-16 project e lae^etiv© iiw^c of m&r$ximn teteiifcioi» 
eroun? th- tor ld . fecunC* co Si^iiator Rlch^rfi Ryosell £%'t» h3<S 
originall^f swrwsrti <: tlK ntrj coteai *..» th i s v l l l iocrcaoe 
t l ^ dc^ni&rrcc 3l •sur elli.es a l l ovtr t t e -..gria on tlie onited 
litotes to ©ferci;hteR =!Ut ecythin^^ t t e t t^ oc© vxo^ ftiiyi^i»r®. • •** 
In ©torti the- «»s. ccul^ Cini? i t s e l t invulv^a Iji em ©s^ess proce-
eiorj} of utmll vm& e l l over ts«* LOffl<5« 
rillitery csjuJp©-Bt rc-questcc fcar ttr.^  RCF in IL-fett i s siBiilof 
t o that reqoE28t€€ ii^ ttm ilf yl I33D bye-get. lis I96t# SOC prc^oscufi 
buUCiKi, a IlcQt o£ Gurgo plafrs tC-€»As) oi wemmi^m prop&cti&is 
tha t coj.ie e&rtf fm^e paylocca atJrt atli^i^r then: on tlie slsartt 
rouyh roo^-a^s 35; less <tev©lopea coyirtiries. Jl §le©t of 120 C-C-,as 
t.os o r i i j i j ' ^ l / placr-ec'i lmscvez» large cost ow*^ -ruBS# itifl®tJor 
iht.c t t e C'*£*f»s ifiaoility to tiefit eerly ©K|s©ctatiorJi (such as 
leiic"iis, oi: ni^tcra ruf5R©ysJ# forced ttm usiliter^ pl€um»r@ to 
rrCac© the isusicr to ^1# o£ ttUlch 76 arc s t i l l c^rattoijal* (Ttm 
C-&A i« pircecRtls? tincSeryoiir, a uiR« itotfif icatlowi progr@n«} 
j^<5po©itioii'^  & BUipBt tl'iesi calleifi rorwa^ -<5 lSiplo|fi a I©ul«* 
t i c a l ehi|>s ilTI^), i crc ©Iso rcq^istca 1& yerrs «QO» «S origiian 
ro<|iiest for r.l31«t millloia 1-or t lr eoc^struction ot four fftlS %!SM 
cut i:;ael« isx? lieif that in tl% 1960 l^Cet^o procurerdstit .^et» 
largely a»sc to Um €i%-mriamtitm& asfjcct.© of the pl«fi« l-!i»li coat® 
for e tallitcry escort fcor the 'etSM* alocg fe-ith oppotitiou to the 
1&2 
pro jec t tj t!iL" M-rciiatst ic?xic!0# l e e t o caticeaiatlon oC th© nr. 
::--r«r:c C r^^ .-js "sfcratcn.r.t Ccu:rcl :aul i^, i'<-1?.r/» ii n i?'tx cctG** 
I;''if)ii'..C tX3 *"plGi># t3ra*r, (IBC c2-rxGk:m @e tf* '^' as «r<?ns*x coJxcteC 
Lai.iwO ••# liar Ccjr^loysixt :i;f. cnplo/is rit.** ';i4C cr^l't litf^oC to 
> l a . irc» V .tP r,Lrvi; ct:3 a nlui.;.-iij h aff;iaaru,J.*s tJiic* tiarir.-j tSrco 
of. crtolOf .L^n Lspji-'ratlijcal li attjUsirtrrs. A cycis ian to ©ctlvetc 
tu,- ::-..' tD-vlf i cv ic r.t t'./ :rt:cji6Gntici It .vet.» f-ocive CDCS tl© 
ctiSL:in :>- CO r.i to •:i«- r i - t i s ra l r:ccarit^ Cbu:tsil# zlmn t o t t e 
prl^-ri^.;, ' to C4^-rect tJxs jyrcscnt li:t3k ,^ i c^ j raJ te t lo i i lx>t«eGC thR 
variiiris rl<3UXta oi. t t e i^rtxrC Foi'Cca t::<!t L.,Jt( «:oci3?'i55:(: tho KrF« 
l o r cc s ^i- ..lit V.^TIOUO i-'.atx:i.i.n o- tl&; f\r:r.aEu': t';;vt-rs« -;:r W*R£ 
rilsrLartx; r,;i« tin, IClst A i r u ^ i l i CivieioE® ol the /yrtf^  ©re lilx^lf 
ceu' . icctec ...cauao oi t h e i r *:i(::iLlc ©ct! i^iyhly 5©Dilc iKtore . 
It. aC€Ltiz.:i t::; t i x so L'orceo* tt»; t o t\^ur t\.riM3 c iv i s tons ore t o 
niwtScipGte ii; 'die? U{:i'» a'oii^ witii e lcsoLts o£ tl-e iavy ent tljc 
lii.v ;"t£ccc# *i£;ljitir.^ t ircc; Cer r i r "Siasii ro-rccs cr.?' scvtxel tcsctl^,;:! 
fi.^li'licr £:ix cl'-.-'iit «*c,s« 'A^K: ».r:it© to ijo uorC ^^ill cfep^^c^ :^ c 
tbi' CDitt^Ct^ucy Qt ixint eiic t!x" c?:rAJrtise n. e<4/6» 
1£J3 
: i ccoI y vir L*U1 lu r ti.v; rx^ pi-u;u.etci:;t IUXJS* tJfc T-J^t. sJiw p^s cm' 
the G. ci*-crai:t. lofcel i-ive-^i.-^r e^ct «J» c'ct:iiat€€ a t cLaut ; i c 
i j i l l i cn . ot:«er r c l s u e t:.4llt«:ry cqu-.prxcA t^iile cot omslusivelv 
••"•rif.c /r^*!iiZji'v.-o liri,at't? • rue '.i?."! oj ponitior-pf; m r r notcctic"'. 
^' jc or;-:iar t"^« Tit^ : -i-AJ^: ti!.S e's.-) !kwi iX*i'-Oti :"*oll«OiC 
" , cffiif.iiit|it'-&* ;-;,icn , i1* r l l a ; {^'i;ilc c^%:»r Jit t o be^  
; . t ( ciU" \Jif>Qctc€ untcr i t s '.,;.i.; nourr* 
for tUc r-A.'*. proi,Tc:r ir^ f i sca l ^ o x Uiil* ^174 oillAon Cor cocs-
t rac t£yo luct'iS ,.'jr t*.;-^  scc:;f:c# '^ CC.V ;,jiiI4oij .or ttie i i J t t i e l 
pryci:xccx:i::t; o: i,i.*lxjar.-t: t s i l i ^ . r / cr.ia^jBKiitt am*. CC»t tnilli,4B *»€»: 
i'.fT C: ;,• A iGUil oi. a4 a'-sV i^fis ait? to b- Lui l t ovtr the n ; : t iLi,\ro 
ycQffO a t ar. cstiuatt^c: cyst tji Cl«lJ bi l l ion^ t t e coct o£ «c-Lo.-rc; 
cqtaipci t:t ov^;r tlic r* ;:t Live y^  ^ -^c ^ sls:;^ c^.ptctc€ t o rcacli 
i&4 
COCt:.CCt.8 
.bSlt tiiwSe ®ii4ns %'-ll i;^  C uLt; Ixr CiipSwlc Ol. prcpar,itioi»i£^ 
aus ter i ty . '..• crahG.. de^ t ix* «r»t rcrjut;- r^^crctary oi. J'inj^c* 
rcccr-tly testtCi^:^ !> ^trc; tlm c^^ts%:vT r:u:.-cai„Xtt«c c^^ t^ it, '/-..ML 
Ly^t^Tii nrrv^;co C:x.TDii'tcc tlx.it t l / tcEte^ri plur^s to ?^aciitx* or 
charter - .".air oolf $tB al i l isfi • CCVCT: t,Tf^fiit4-rrd sliifss Scar 
uoe in tJx: lEiClosa cccai. t h i s jfear* l»:eortii:rj to fSr» Cleytor* 
ti'iio iG^cOf Uiica *..i11 Ix' camps'Ifict. Q1 tvD t o «oi3* f|r./tB Dbipa# 
ttec\X .j^rcs' IJC i.-itij oiiit t^v^i' n i.i eqj 11- s# It^^l rmf 4^,ter 
,'>L3ct ic ,u^t rxi* cut t c eiistrli: semra* D.'T*: 11-^hter cqtstrcris. 
paryiKil u t i l i t y o£ these k.pnsvL cnt&, 'jivec t!i© hljh cast 
jf t t e l'-"^ *!.. tii:t t»c; ii^m y <-r tlu® lc% totsre e l l 14 oC tiacrj 
arc Cully -rpcrction®! raise© scrAouo a^^'Stlor.o al^out the cost* 
i ; i l i U: < ::i^ Kc:a to Carry outoius ejat licaw ccfalpttiLi:^  iUe* ttm 
; . |>l m t e r a t t l e %'m.ls^ ovcx tetcrcsctixaKutaS eTiateoce®* Its Cstc* 
r.©D UciQ i*ot: t>;vcii:^ Kja e ^ c c i i l c aeciir. Cor t i , is airuraCt* 
1E.5 
erst': p'ci:c£ en la'-'to co ttoi C.Lf^  tD mta'lcr plQjica GL2.C t IcrX 
Q plru: c«x>at u£^-!i l^ tii,^ SiijC ^- tlic C-U* a;jle t'-> trosm-ort 
ar. ; : :-I r.^iit: j ^ t t l t ; * i^— ix^uJjliUi^ wtout Ot t,vr4i} over aE 
ufxet^atlcC rae^ i^ c ai i-^Uit to w#wt. tuiic:©. &t hdfj iM e^c jxtiortcC 
tlict 'iccretcir;, :jro-fi i-.-^ a Lecc c w i n c e d t'u-t tijf^  in t ra -^ j : a t rc 
cn::rDV'Lc dc '^elqrsrar11 u:. c feiJi^t t_ a^lOi- the C to use auet^ Tfc^  
Ql'-£iclf« t t a t a t t^roscfit onVg ISL C - 1 3 is . i^c tD use* 
tctirci'vef. cost: r* to ta l c l :^..u,7 aUlicsR ln^ b e n rcqyK;st«":C. 
Lor £*coc.a ch DH t lx c^ i n o^ **6r :.n r f ^l» 
tlic .: *v?:-«sr-rx C3ct ts t i fau^ u- Ua: CK l:svc fxi^stiMTc tlie 
txx:C -cr t , is ciiixrrlt Cor o Lisr^^r -j^. f- usnr^^ l-'iL-ot* f.tf. 
" H t -jl Vx.^'j tq'a^ti fit '.v-cu^s) In cra l l iiaiisL? •"© to: c per 
t ' 1' ^ -X »'-ru Lcit t3 JX: ac ;-J.ii.£ci.t ure ::;:i ai^cr. i i t . FeCai'i: 
t .n-if bcliC'Vc tliat tlJO tl0iK,*c n^icc-te, rr.'^rcrjcfits er* us^rcccncery 
Crelij o~ f.i"ttt'ry i .Kts i r cc ijxre rccae<£ ©rcas. Xt:4r€:# t i c felay 
4n l>rccarc:iCi:^ ticiD is tli-j;»Jit to »aa|3c;r OLT cfipabliit/ (ssr^, 
ffLrjcL±€^rii::^ C-SA cx; t ui*. r ruir ait <jcla-/9# su^^cst tliat 6cl©ys 
83ic,ht rj::tr.ti<:' L.G^nC £it«? ^ r re») l'iRally# r>ary ^L^I t l a t cl^ %j© 
r a t u r t:.c.K r i r c r e t t reprc'sci^ u L.:aro elf Iclent \Mf oi r.^ s^ t^ej 
'.iCG'irj eriuljjir:''Ut ".vzj t i a t txa iS . 
nr. ; larch 27, ttr* ifcune mi. ' t f^csv-ccs CacrittiBe vatec" 
12-1/ to rcjr«:t tiJC rcrucntc^e l^^c^ itar t l ^ C . 
ILL 
:is" ul, l;sr G ca'a':u-ri ( l i t i t l iC *''U:ticu icc^v. iia.-*6 T'n!.,^ .^Ti Lt 
t;-- prwvi.. c en *i:-- Cic^o rcpii . tc::lu„iTi^-Lt j:^p.'., i ' l t ; / ^r. t..:r It-fim: 
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Total 4Ca*0 Q%y»4 
1&7 
ii©latc6 Dili ta r y oq: ipm ;.t# tfMcb o^z: w d^ an 'T--' but c?scj 
IX \3DtC i» t-Vx» <2K:rciCG# %'ill pli^j a ra le ir. tiac -5rci€tnj c€ 
TlK} C;c;:ti4oitiica: 0£ £6 LC;«K ACvtilSCcC 'S^ sDf^  r Ai re -aCt t o 
pr^viCc if:--'il,I:t rc£vjclllr^., i:nC o l i o . Icr^x oi rcra^t to cress 
Intf rca:tif::i3t-::l ^lst.;ir-c3 y«tho-r. t J r c< re" ,'.cz- n . - ru t r iHScs* 
'^st4^t„c^ COJt! O30v«7 oilUoo to crstruE^t cin of tfeicc 
pluncs U 9^ Icn; rcc::icotcfl iti FSf w l^. Viic t;it^l c t^ t o£ tijc 
pra^rae mill acproacj; oi»3 iiiliism* 
Tl» C»5a o'-r-jc circraCt to uoCcrcoii:^ %7Xc^ r-t«fi.i::icatiuD 
to l( Si'j^ thcr. tJic litoC c- cacu plUiisc Crom 7* ICC licu:i'S tc-» ti^ ax' t l ^c 
i:nt*:.2auC Costs 017B»0 r l lUcr . Ix:ii l^ci: i?cqucdtct^ t:^ 
attCli^ aSC-Lfii. in FVul. i:©Cii.ic2tlcti ©1 tfic- cc t i rc f leet lo 
cfticratca a t Qlvi oillioQ* 
UtJc C-141 cargo airxaraft io Loitrj *^0trctc'lr.ti* t o usable 
rach sS tho £71 ..4raKa*.t tu cafry 3L prr c^nt r.:jrc ccr^^* cnC to 
CBOlsic ttit^ plciEo tu rc-l'i3^'l, io ^liyCit. 
i:st^ciaiti:a coott io wr^l, 34 c-i4ic ^iii ijc "s rctcirc*'* 
<.t Q ccst or C*t«6 tiii?,liaa. ^otal ca ; t Cor rcsRirm i^io' t ^ f leet 
im 
1tiirt^^"0iE C3truc;rcial Mrcrai ' t ¥ i l l be eaapt: C as i^art 
ol the Civil Hcsrrvts Air Fleet IC iiS^ s t-:i3 r*-*^ ^ '^" '.mk^s 
of. cm: rrjcm;y# aiK" ac ''» t teE fc) iccrccac t?K. eoouiit of larye 
caryo tlr?y cac carry* 
rstitrotc^l Coots Ff 6i# Brmm pham Q ore t o L-c adapted o t 
c ccct ©^  70»9 luii'isai* Use to te l cast ':Qt tM» rsrOjra© i® 
catlckitcfi a t 'J4C© iEi!,lloii. 
Ligl^ Lest mrijO sa i 3 (S'*<s) cay ix L-ou^ht or If^asc^* 
iJBtiimwe Costi OeU) Ciilltc^ purclj£:tt: jiriGc i9 c3tiriatGd» 
i^t4caa;^'a caets t^sc LSti!iatt?0 mtSO cmt t a r tbccergo 
: t:^ .p» i s T^SO C3ilii3Di ttiL tadSwrs are c^tir^tcC 3 t $12 @iiliao 
mme Use c^^nt tl^co ycar8» 
F.^^rt:issitisD of Eiiir a:«4V ATET^ ^ r£:lic'jptx^rn lias tecc 
re*iu: otc£ CUP iij.tr®-tl-x ^tre e l r l i i t Cii' c^ryo . nC |x:rGcsEiftel» 
tStim'tcd emu ;l£l»B laiiiiu} IJQS tsecc r^'.ic«tca £car 
^ 8 1 • 
1L9 
littcarol acf. LXctx;cicKr' Ct^tcs t£ ttio Xrxics: c:-c:*iii t o fresf rvc 
tl-oir i,cC:ixiift^rxx;# coyrrcl^cty cm txrr i tur i®! ints-^rC.ty# a::t: 
t«, roccvc t;.-c"ir po l i t i ca l , cca.a ic eji. ect^lal }r:raMci-© v-Rfcr 
JceCa GL' cu.'wC! or cov. rccx i:t of :.;4Sna"4b£* C CQaRtrit:u# U^Z6 eit 
respect ciiO iiSA-Xcii ocean as e s^icj ol ;i'r.ce i.ru't; s.lMtc;;: i„reat 
tl .at cx\l.5. ^cs' Ut Coversi.c^ ot t t e litoitixi ritru r^ 5.S5 ot t lxsc 
ntotci; frca tux; CKarc c»>pel,lir.y -KC i^octjctivc tasl; ^f cccsr-osCc 
cn^ uccie" '- ccaaotru-tia: -oC co 16 Iiar'Uitx iKv^lvc the© ir. t t e 
r iwi l r l i r. oZ poi« r clcxs In a ssmLvx prcjut ic iai tD Cifijr liiic-** 
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C^nce«K.€ a t rccctit ccvclo;paB-^nt8 tL-.t portLi.tl the cKtecsicr* 
ol ^ le c.!.-cx; -.-Qi o ir.fei* tlic lt:C-ar. (xcrar. crra# t!i rcbi' f^oein., .: 
ncr4~i:a Ui-c-G ti) tlr^ ciiintci ^ ixic «« ouch caii a-titcD In tiio a r e a . 
Ccc^isiC d? tlv.t tlie ..staLllcij-.^xt ct' - sex c c„ praco in t l » 
CuDvicic C £urtSx.r t..w.t tl^ K- tiStaLlifjiaxist tt; a mono si 
jsc*QCo ^:J a:i (s&ccsivc i^ca^rupi:i,c**I area li: ,310 rt\,iijr; c.-'UiC l^we 
liltSi Li4L pur^-oeci: QrX pr inc ip les €;» tlK. Cii;;rtcr of tJtm iiLtfiC I ^ .ti^xs • 
I* r.clcinlj t'Lci-irca t^i^t t : ^ icc'iQL (;e@dE# %.At!iin 
tlic cx;^ c^LL I'icji-sr cuJ«iCLnt tSxrreto# i s htrel>/ c'-is^ysatcr: 1';^ e l l 
tirx- o" o i :^o oC tx:fcicoi 
2 . Calls upon tl^^ .rc^^t rot^rrs* in c~ni:u!:':.-i.ty %.ith tl^is 
E<-clfc!r<-t;i.-n* l;j cr.t£\v «t;to isr.cCit.4tc c::r^(.itatlcr.s y tt: tiic 
i i t t t J r a l r tJ t i rs of, t ix Infiar. (cosn t-itli o view tos 
Q) L'^lltii.^ tix; t-ortirrr c sca l a t i t t . wSf (-sparffli:: '^! 01 
t*:cir u i l i QT'g rrcijcncc iu cl'c Xc^rioc tcrai;? 
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e;sixucticr. uifi acy t*:i:^i:;otatiu- o:: ..rcctt l.-afeci" tdHitsr^' 
ZUd^ai. r.cc:*.r.# t!:e jxi.'CQit:i:t r/iriirQ of: t:^-' .':rcurtt.; C-^tscii cut" 
.^^cGtivc cccurit 'j tltii-wt n i iLury o l l iu ixa; oni; ntr. t:^ tJx-.-Diii^  
£r.tcin:stiux!. eceurity tix:;a:,L i-ajivski:.! c^'£. '^tiT co^rxx ratio:> 
to cctcr Into c-rsului t i^i^ t:ith c vict; to vix^  itnrrjlcEKOtatic^ ©-
tiiio rvc7jrj'C.lii'Jii niiC eucl^ ecticii cc ray U^  rr:ct:n or^ -' t:; eisoctx) 
t;;:3t« 
a) •..3:.t5lii|;sj cxt" i^iilitarv eifft*ref:t cav r.ct use 
t:.r Sct~^ ct3 cc::aD L^r aci/ tiara-1 or usr: d 
CarcQ a-^o^::at t^ '^  ncnr^rei'i,iit^# Lrrri t ir i&I 
cf; t ;x CS^rtcr of: t l^ wuit 6 ::ati.a::3j 
14 nuujcct to vl^ - i.c3?ci.X»r:'^  en6 t'~; t t t : ccna* 
cir£ t:riticiL-lc3 of it;t: n:atiLcs.:al l^it:. tlx; ri.^Lt 
t - «rtc ciEt" uiic:A;t?Lc use f-w ti^: s::3i:s L"^  tiic 
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c) ili,ixqpriatc errcsiycsJDiits arc s[;s^ Ce t^ yivc 
c£i:cct to Qr-v ittcrtiotlctial a.^ reeuX.-£it tikit 
of tile iB^lao ci^ao es a scax^  oi; p ^ c e ; 
4« ri:.;,ii;£-3U3 ts^ ii. Cecrct^ry-^Gria.xQ''- tc; rc::crt to tiK; 
Gcocrcl (RSGc^ Julj e t the t«eiitj'-sevcx*tb scssicaa cc ti*: pf;o^rcsy 
tiiat has Irreii IX^QD witi* rcw^ird to ttx: ir-r.lrtxiitatiSQ OH tlafes 
Docltircticaif 
l>. r ciCT. t 3 i::c.luLC t* :^ itL^:^ ci:t:itlct3 •*incl.,r^ticn 
Cetaoros. » C jiai# CSx:C# Ci;*;*^ ,* coioruiia* CQi;i;:j# uCCU: :iico# 
Cyprus, r;jSFpt# i.IoiilvaCJPf i::3uat--riGl GuinLS# ..ti^icjsla, 6i^nQ# 
l'rnyi-^'0 timer neiJ«u»14c# Kuwait# "JGCSS, lC*Mi:tMi, TJLL^ 'a* f52,loysia# 
!ial4# i-saitQ. i^xxi'itci-^^t .juiK^co» ;csrocco# ;<cpaJ.# i.icrajus (Ictc 
©<;;«7isee ti:c: »':c-cretari£it i t tuC intend C tw elataic)» Liberia* 
rai:iotQii» fc^crejajf {r^tar* ilQ^^i.io.* OacCl <^ai.;i£i, sa:^lia» SuCan* 
j;t^isiiai:£# ::uraen# i:yr4a# vajO» Trii:it:ea czic Tcai^ ;jo# *4'u:j.siE# 
u^scaa, Liiitc'C Re:mj3.ic cC Ticsiiffiiiiai arujusy* 'iTcoai', ¥Uj«sIcviQ» 
t ^ObiQ 
263 
#ii3st^ t^ i,f^r.a i^^iutitM* Ai®tral;^# nuetria. DDljji«m# Eslvlat 
arcmil# i;u2.v* '^ia# -/clcaryssia* Citaca* CRCtriil Africaw HfepubliCt 
Chile* Oit&f v.^civjslmak^^ap tBl:j4x:j, rL:.2ar;-# r!:s!:r^ s:;lc«iK» 
RCt)uil4c# vi^i0 Ficlt.ii6# irrac^* c-3rGccc# c^- t ' s a le , Laiti# 
nccCareo, I uWij^ r'/* Xrcls -^iX, ::sx:Goi, itiuly* Ii;cr/ C:xist* J« riiioi* 
aafrSia tit-
«^i3Q,f:p,fc6„ Miajila* laiffsic, Bar::«iei!S» Kc^ s%.'2jKi# ::cuac2rt CSIJ^SI, 
cocl^iQ Tiotx-r afviKc^ t k Gj.crctdrtat i t to( ij:ticnd-C to vote 
rarctruay* nii^rra FTOJX *^ riiiLr<2 larab Er^trctca* 
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tlic pccplts a'f south AsiG ace tfe-: ccc€! to accoicxetc t l ^ l r 
C;*Evicct56 tJ5:-t rcuiot^l <»-.peratic3D in n.utli ^ i a i s 
^^i»l'ic4o*# Cesiral>Io cnil tX2CC3i:Qr-_ L.m' tlxit i t tr i l l lK:lp 
prOLOte tl'T' ;.rlS*-:cc arfi ^qprow; tin. t-oaiity cT: li£c t^ tho 
Caav^RCcC Ct^tlr-r t i n t Irxjreacca cs;-|x:ffQtioo# ccaatects exc 
oncfen'^ cxS c£2aa.„ the co-^tric9 oL Ox rcc,it^ ^ i H contriLitto to 
tl5c prcKsotiSfi at ilriciitsahip, adti^f cnc uut'-rsUiDCJ^Cj atxm-j U^ t r 
ccsjurituticB to iJBfec to tIsL' prorjoti.-© a: collcct/.v© eGli'-^eliaixci 
jiot4:i.t:,^  t t e t rcyicsKl cocp:rution sh. alC L - tiisvC aa mi(l 
in turn C'-r.tril^isu; to Dut«JO» triEJt* untcrouvncUCu ^f^C s^c^ctl^ t i c 
feppffccietic^ o:!' t l ^ ccitiorai esnitv^ticsrai ©1 Uap ccRaitrics cKg Use 
rcgiasijf 
r:if:i*lul yfi ^KJ it::cler"tiaD cm Coli '^tivo Scll-rcli4»i:c» at^atx'j 
nssD-oliyii' c JtE^ f: ctfc-r (k^vclc^it:^ cotnttk^B ce^cptcO lit tt::; Gevcr,tli 
t:c®*3liyi:c<3 !JiKanit iioid r.t r^ jt-, DDIM t*Mcli callcti uf^ mi e l l cccctrlcs 
lOb 
rcrir.i:>i*u: n cue its oup-.-^ ot't OL 0ub»r;.^iaE^l ^^^^i!M^i a«?. tetcF* 
rcvjior^? coop: r c t i u ; a5!:a.j noi-eliu^'.^ onC ctfecr fi-velOf^tec; 
ti> csihc Joitit f d a r t s fior i:^ ror!©tiii„ o.^ clj co:^^rctioci 
r"", ir r:j::'j :>.G;:\; J,: tliD e j lL ctivc ccsc^lw t^ l* tfceir JOWCSTTt r.fcs 
^ollo; isij dbjcctivcs, pri:,c4plcs# i c s t i t a t io , a l iinf. LiK::iic4Gl 
1# -ilx; oLScx-tivcs C3£ 8 ufcb Asict; iioLiooQi Coqpcraticu 
QltClX 1308 
a) tij protirjtc ^r ; VCII^LT) O£ tlit' pcc^ l^GS of noath 
t£:,Cj2i: VDL' to ii:fir&vt; t l ^ l r quality o£ l i f c i 
t:3 t^; ccccilaratc c:trwi.icx.d.c trt^^J* sc«li®l rrOuTciso occ 
Ciilt-vTOl CGvelcpssttt ^ tiK; rcclua ac€ to provife 
iiZl tetli7iCac5lr> tiK: og^^irtunit^ t o l ive te <3iw»ity 
cn<i t - Kiolice tlic'^ ir t't.li p;,tci:tiali 
c) tzt fzo- -^zo acr strcRati^rti collective ecif-srelietu:^ 
^ t© c2BtriLut€ to lautaal. t i r^ t* ui( crntaBifitra ae^ 
ice 
QC. JLo^fscc it. '4ic ecu:© ic» scx;iGl# eulttsrol* 
fe.c;:iiOla,ical ace ucicntil 'io iiclao* 
cu:jQtrir3i 
&::t'^rr.^.ticDal «onics tas CLittcrc 'J2 C^ MKI^ OD interest* 
ppircti;lcs U. stim.i?ei(jG oiuaiity* terp^ti-riai ii:Ut>riiti# polS,tJt^l'. 
ln€ct%.ti€cr^o.'t t:a:i»toter^eircs:co ic ;x;tcixal o.>£aie© ct' ut ter :;tatcQ 
E* OtC'Ii CJX3pcrat4i-n G : ^ ! ! i;ct fjc e eu.',stittito Cm: L,ilotcraI 
16? 
a) C:.'jx.rn-i.tLiti:jD si t ' c ysf-i.tlcA air. t^D naopr 
?• ?/iKj aniS'Lcri3tiip aC fljn Tr€*r.irjil cssasidtt i,s s t a l l rc ta tc 
ti-o s?.ere. 
lOJ 
Q) :':.::tLv:ji (XI ixafs a'. i:at*.u:s2 vccii:-ica! Ayc-ocicsi 
fc5 : ••:x:tii;„t3 •^^, v.-\x,vtn. U. sr^uci-.-ic l-ii^iCa* 
CO consLCcTcC fecrd^r.?^ ctz {.mirchlc i.or t!5C ^ t i c m l use o£ 
©• Is: t ir a::;c ciS proJ:xts invoiviro cssi^ t i aa t&ts couetrlcs 
^ut ncz. ell Ui; cooatricn «:. tsjc PU^IOQ, Acti;43 ca&.ittccs 
rcCor< SKxt 
fci t'ctx:iT::^jtlati o^ : lcitcr-9cct;srol pricsri';iic:j cist 
i69 
€) i€i:ntiCiC2itlai% c^ cci; areas oS cc^scxatlac isaecfi 
I I* ^te r!tas'--Xj COi-^ lttG© she I?- raect es c^ten os i s CmstrcC 
t;lic© crjcencc^y, to tl^- FsrciQi: rtljaistcrs £cr fecir^ioisn on 
policy t/aiCeliixtJ. £:i:tii ic rcs|^-ct u:; tht' G|:;:ir©val og rojcct®/ 
Cieuccir.j. also ctaccSiCtj GaK.4,ttLu e.£ill provi o nocQSBory 
13* ix:c4ci'jrs ot alX Ijvalc sricll «JD t^lxn cr* ztrj ixais of 
uaar.ifity. 
X4# Dilotcrol CBu cx:tenti:xffl iosura o l a i l IJD excluiScfi 
Croa tir^ colli: :^atIa-S» 
!&• Lecli Arcl:uical c a a i t t c c oiaall cwf^ s rccanLccastiics fear 
gUi£cXiJ2CS8 
17^  
cr^»t or tr^ivcl ci:C outoi^tccoo tor porticiijutits 
iii ctTiBGrot t.-^^festor; in- traii^-iRj cmC other 
pr!sc r^ct:£ics# ©Isili ic r e t Ijy their rcspectivo 
toi/croPt:fitD iiue tti;: CUJUS ol" u:(ii^t:^iuj Bcvsixmrs 
t-^T^2i:x,to CR' tr:iic:ir.^ BDC otiicr r^c^raciiKS cay 
ko {it}t L^ t to li20t c£ir coimtzy cr c^s.trotiocc^ 
cL-:x,'^  l.iartlcipiit;LS *ci prcpartiai to tir; f ac i l i t i e s 
ovEiilc<l a£ c^ i.lr-j.iicc:Cl ^rci. cisitcrccl ccurccsf 
U3 ; r:a2::t tv Ur: o:ta3t c^Jrrr«ae c*jrcci?,# the 
c;.3t s£ oulaisteiic© lor espcrta cl^ii}! Ix net 
L|' t l r rccclvi::^ cwsECrlcc anil t te cost cf txawsl 
af£C/'<^ calGry -JQ ttx; cK7:«rts tsay Lc p&iC »or t?^ 
ti^' ©ccCUij countries* ur oi-jarciS KIK^U perU.c4patiny 
cmx^tricD or fiiKiincEr **cOw CKtcnal euiarcosi? 
€d otiicff ct3Dto# ii'-clufir^, t:i^ ccDt oC pTcparatii^. of 
a) Sn t :^ cere c£ lorr. tcr.; projects* t t e tcc^4lical 
Gcrr.lttec corrcett^f otel? cntd^ct© tJir ciXSCD InvaivfC 
n::^ ' sUnil r-jLusit r€COr--XBafLitiQC:o oL i t to the OtGiiCif:^ ^ 
camsitteo €» tl«3 fio ciiitico tar Gi:eti»s <^^ cost©. 
! ? • SD tiv cuso ;^ ttrojccts LTX. f^o^rarrKJi Cor viiich swfficici:t 
fiirjacicl rcsctrc-es ccti Cw-t Lo LoLiliscfi uitliiii UK; reyicai# 
rccw*irQo LBir U: !xc to oztcst&l ascictaBCo £roa QpprJi^iat© 
sources* i.j.tt^ the Gpijroval ol: th_ f?t£mtli:.;j Ccxamittce* 
in 
'mnt^ 9^ 9m 99mmUm 99m^Va upm^^u mm^^n% 
tural anicsal &nC Ic^tsitriaX proCiK;ts« as «k«i| as &ctural reaourc^ A 
products c^  a itatioiioi origin* &m ttm ©xpfrtaticxi oC aaoe to 
otticr MDsdCier Oxastxiaa* 
2t All agricttlturait aciaai* iiiaatrial* anf. oatyral reaourcos 
products ^ a oatiQcal origin are to te treatea ao oatiOBal proCi^ts* 
I* Ail egriciJitural* afiiexii# icCuatriel e&a natural resources 
prcruets are ©sKru^ tea item cmtom duties onC ct&rgij <3£ similar 
e££cet« 
2* Ttie eb'^gas cdileetea oc the oatiocel yooas sbaii cot be 
C0BSi^ rc<*: cs such (i«e» €yties) ii- t^y aro cs»lleG^a as ^mseeQ^o* 
sturcgc* transportation* shippi&3 or anXotiflnr; €utias coi^idarea 
as special services* 
i« Xn Gr«:€r iosp iciCustrial prodc&ts to acquire tte qualit:^ Q£ 
national ori0io# the value aaasa resultis^ ir&m tl^ir producticas 
in these <i«e«# fleeter} countries sh^ i^ia not tm less than 40 gcr^nt 
Q£ tr^ir fi&Bl value* a£ter production has l^ ten coii|»leted| also* 
the percentage of oirncrship oT the nationals o^  the i^^ tjer Countries 
in tXm industrial i:acility coanulacti^in^ these procucts mmt not 
ix) less tha£i SI percent* 
in 
2« Cech ci3fais}€itv' eligible Hat ossotsptlaa utit^r this ^greetoont 
ofcoui^ te e.ccos^ Qr4(?a Ir/ a certifier to c2 crigiD ap-^ovca by tise 
corpetetit gs>wcn3E«?ot authority* 
1« ThD r^-'Ster Couctrics shall cnft^evour to 8@t a miniimiiB 
usiCiod cu9t-© tarrif to fee ©pplioe to t!x* gooCa tari^iimtlr^ 
froc) tb!) o3ii««Bfc-i!ifi3cr countries. 
2* 7i^ pffotctctica o^  the oatianal prot^jotii £rom tlic ccxspetiti^® 
Cor^ iQC products) ohouia £ic c^^ o£ the oiDjectivc^ of the uiii£icatiafi 
Ql' custom t&riCCs* 
3* fhe unified custooB tariffs s t^ l l Ise aprlied gradually 
%;itiiAD Cive years teos ei&i^ iog o& tliis iigrceiaecit anC gr&&ml 
mietougotmRts ts* &cc:s^XiBh thi& ohouia he agreed u:;oo ^ .^thio ooe 
year ir(X3 tho ©aid dato* 
MiUSlft & 
1* Suli^ icct to paragraph 2 o£ Article 2* the matser countries 
slmll proviCo a l l facili t ies Cor tlie pas&a^e of the gcods o£ ai^ 
other r^ s^oiiser countries l:y tram i t acc shall esecopt these gooas 
£rmo ©11 (3ittic.>3 mrt€ taxes t regartllless a. tho mture o£ these gooai* 
!• passage is prohibited iia trensit) to Looili prohibited 
ictarnelly te the territory ul the i^ iiabar Couutries other then 
in accord^ce wiUi i t s rcyularations* '£hc cuetctiB authcrities of 
the r^ !cattcr countries shall cxchantje l isi^ cC such Lanned yoods* 
in 
1« Hie roulj r countri^t «r^ l l cjorc:ir4itc tticir trtCe poUcieo 
in oret2jr t c pircsvito rqusl. circisistcncri. . u Qtmiltlmm t^t tiii.it 
®) C:;3r£4r®te the i ^ J i c l e s eof rr-gul-t iora of I'-^port ace 
b5 CiisrClr^te pol ic ies I'or Erarei.tlci: a. c stx^;tcti4c c®:aK>tity 
c) Ceaaciu:^ © Joict cccsjor-c ar^cjesints i c those ereas mmt 
fiavo^riible to t t e coGJEts© teccf-its Q£ t!^ acister Countries* 
d> Create c co?.l€Ct4v© ^gotAat te j Lastco to rcinfcrce the i r 
licyotiatieu pmktltm witlJ Ccarci^ partlcjis «i th respect t o 
tfcc itjpoptaticij ofe tiseir ia®ic oocai ac, tl»e esEportatlcai 
of tlwiir pr4^:ry products* 
! • Tte m mtmr Cotaitrico egre© to insplcwtntitsg rrtiulatious t o 
provide for UK^ trcatireet ^ natioDsla of aoy ess© KcaKbap Country 
ae i^ti(a:@lfi o£ ttieae (other) cataatriea i»ithwut discrimiimtioii oS 
prcfcrcciKs In tht: £ollOi.icg ereast 
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Z* ntztit o2 CTjcerohip* inheritance enC cpiJOiKtiis^ct oZ 
3 . FWCQCSK:: Of iw-plcascKtatica of cCQTJXda act ivi ty* 
4 . lYLCttou o£ trassCer o- capital* 
1* Tlip £->:itto2r Co«itric-3 sljall ecc^^^ac-o the i r priviste sector 
to carry out jcitit projects that join the ecoj.oiBic ict^rosts (Ji 
cinticoaie ii: o i l areas* 
1* Tho r£ca%r cotmtrios shal l y ^ k £cc tliu rcali^^tiOD dS 
ecK»r€Llnatiac^ mzc tho hocis^Qeity o£ t l ^ i r a^velapsect plac® ic 
orCer t^ ochie-s^ ece©Oi.iic icfc-yratio© acacj thooselt^s* 
1» i<^ r m t e r Cotmtric-s shal l trork to\-ere3 eoorairAtiOQ o£ 
th©ir paXicicC' io tfe© cM^ l iii^uatry acd Gil i t s oslcvatiit ftfiascs sach 
OS ©tninQt rofir;ifig# Kirkcting# 7aeu-actur4t:iy# ijri.ci;,3# cxploitiisg* 
natural ess ci'^ i^jgraairig t t e oourc^i o£ cmergy* 
2. l?lic? frdaaier Ostrntriai 8lm?.l i«3rk t a ; a r ^ ^evel:»tiig JoiDt 
o i l T>olicic9 -ant' tfitJltg jois^t paeiti-DS to. era t i ^ outsi te 
ena in ictcrnQtionsl mC epDcl©lico6 orr^r-ij^tiom* 
Vtb 
I • AI3 rculL'»2,tiik.. Lj tilt; ^onl-? .it.iv>al:2t::f' in ttilr, a jrf*ci:'cxti# 
padiicies csC isrjns capable o'; ©ctiicvic^- liit'iuBtriai 
las© 4c each couetry as ec ictc^rat; 6 Issla* 
2* 32i-:^  t lnir ifzCiistrial l.t;^isMe4sr. ar.n re tu l ' t i e r s as^ 
ci.^!:3si:^ t^ io ariettatiOQ oS t'm local proCisctiwe 
sfsttca io tht-se C3tii«tri€£ toi-.-ar^  t te ppovisioo c^  tJ-^ir 
3 . r.ioeeil;ate the &ii£u3trv Gn:asy stessi^lvijs accardiiiy t s 
tijc relative atiwact*.ii,..3 ^txc 6:K» ccsncalc icasAfciJlit^# 
oaCi ciscoiffoijo ti» Gstabllsttnrnt ^ teoic m^ 
o&iplGmintiAef itidisB tries • 
CcuGtriea cij^ll civo npecicl cttectiao t3 t±ic catsfclisJirent oii^ : 
suprciTt 05 Jcdtit i^ojccts to te oncertater. ID t te f i e i o c€ ii:i2iaitry 
eorlculturc cn :^ servicers uaiisy pul:lic# j^lvate cr mixea fuc^B to 
ecliiove cco:.acjlc integratic«i» t to ictcgrotioc of pr^uctioa aisC 
joint aovclqpcrnt OD ecoiicsaiailis^ GO.JH; l.asc«« 
in 
i* i%)c ^oforr Coimtrie© stmli eo^vcrete in c^valiaatiog the 
earp&B of: Joiiit iscor.oaic cooperaticG Cor the pmpme o£ acquirino 
a souxa Cdun^'itioo I:a8c6 caa tl^ ic support entl proiK>tiOQ G£ re9Garcli# 
mppiue antl t:ecnnoioaiC'al sciences* en^ acSiimrii^ tlxs familiarity 
v'ith lirportrC teclmoloi:if ID e IBF that is in fenaocy « 1 ^ tho 
ccea C32 tha pcfjlon* i t s progress ecfi aetmloptaect o&icctlves. 
1* The f&m.rr Coaotrlco atmil «crk to«ara praparicy the systeBB* 
arrdngctxcts # m^C cotsiSltlcxQS o£ tranBtcr ct teclmolo^y and aclccticy 
the r»at ouiteJslc tcclmol«^lcs cr lao^fylir; thes so ea to natch 
tho v a r i e s t^aa^ of csich country* The mc^ter Co^OBtrles elmll« 
^VjQncvcr pmBlblet coeicli^© jolct Goireest-Rta witth fcareltx govcrooscts* 
sc lea t i i lG cua ctmateei&l leat i tut lci '^ iot the purpose of aehlovlcy 
thcoc gtsila* 
t. cht.icalf emii crw4.'>js cocs-ci.t<a'ci <2 uralkit^ pi Caracas .^ ti a l l lc\^Xs 
eD<S piki3ciA0 ai:42 t;^ra<3e tht) educational progravsQ co a l l levels 
t o cBtaM^li € caDKcctiOBbcttsecn cexxsatlaa GR<3 tf^clmoloyy en€i the 
dovclc^aicntal nect"s io fseotKr Coimtries* 
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I . ^ r :::::<-..r ccu:;ii,*:L,n vl^^ll cJt.-Jlica cS';£r4Jii:«U.u^ «ai',;ii5i( 
czeti ot!x r li. U L ureas cC lalxsiar ant" tlse <!csiGii cC imi.£ie6 
ouC truQcs U: Vv.:fict3 scctos^ uiU. e vkn; to ovoidlti» l^riagul 
Gocrpetititan caLr^i c®ch tMicr anC rcal iei ir , th© qptirois L&ii«*€it I'lroc 
tl30 ©vailab^-e huEiac resources. 
%• Tl'^c mmi'jer ii^%mttiQS siiail t rea t Um kSMm (£ trcuE^port 
ijL iJdsecrrj. ITS !,ar G^^«*^ ptrtaiuiiiii %Q tia: fatiiasale oL tSm r&ci«ir 
coiiotarirs cix" t l i : t mss t^iffsjrij Ciclr torritiirieK os' t t e t avu 
<:^tijsca iior asy oi; catisb ot tJ:«sSf7 caitntriais as t toy trer.t tlJe 
r-©tior*cls# iccslufilatj a l l Oatit:© GDC ta^es* Kiyaraicss of 'Llse aatuaro 
oi ss»ou3* cc^ c^ciueicg local t«:ami,»art» 
! • ftoe rtc-iSJxr 03«»tri£:s simll CKsqpcccte in t t e errs® <£, l£'j5d 
aca sea tirscsf^art ac^ in tiio £icl<?. of cammtkGatlomt cmc stmll 
i-or& tc-^rd tho ccssr^mtiar. cc;" tlMs establlshiaeRt ^ infresfrac-
ture projcctt' sixh u© porti# Qirt:^^ts# uetrr 0t£ti:3is# pt^.'cr* (^ .KC 
roaC 4D Q vajf t!i:t aeliii-vcs tix: Joint eccK.uiaic c^velojiracct acd 
tSio clcso cjanncctiai but^c© tte: eccaioffiic ac t iv i t ies* 
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of a v i a t i o n ec€ ^iir t raospor t pc^ ic ics acon'j eaci) ot}^]r« oca i^graae 
the ^tvsm 0S Jo is t e f f o r t om ^ liCCereiit leve ls* 
! • i : ^ Hetst^ er Countries s t m l l a I l o » ttie vi^-sels* ships ana 
J-oats eotj t l i c i r l € » ^ psr ta ln ieg t o any oT tlic-s© eoimtrioi Creo 
t£9e a: tl ie ^iivi^e&t f o e i l i t i c s i c t t i c l r seaports« ac^ s h a l l lurcat 
acd <9iv« t l^iB tt^ itf^  saffle p r iv i leges giveis t o t h e i r i m t i o m l 
equiva lent i l i c t t u r I^ KJC* arcJiarii-'u 1 1 ti io t a r t s or tjassicy by the 
porttJf t : : i * : ioc lu tes tho dut ies* yuidPic© act: ama^iarin^ services * 
otcvedsaricg, rx-iistcisatJ^Cf rc t ja i r . s t c r * ^ of goc i ^ , cxv: other 
8 toiler Gcrvia:s» 
I * i^ho m:M£:r Covrnti-ich shB l l a t r iv ia tc»i>ar€3 Uu. t»:;i:.i^itlQi:> 
of lEm:5txx,Sit tctl&ti C rc-gulatic4i@ act: latea juu or<6icr t o succee^l i^i 
^ s i g s i f i c o c2$n:tSD iovestinDot f ^ l i c y cies^^ e t dbasi&slit^ t l ^ i r 
IOCSQI ccst. £crei{|Q iBvest^seot i c a ;ay t l ^ t serves t l ^ i r i c t c r cs t s 
en^ t h o i r psqpl^:?! e::poctBtiQn8 o* f^vclc^sBscnt aufl p ra j ress* 
! • 'itsG r-et'ljer Countries s h a l l ca:g"<2ir.aLc U ie i r farclgc; | : ;cl icico 
i c tl:r. GTcaa o: csjtc»€icy in tsr isat iocal cnC r cy ioca l ^ v c l c p s s c t 
assistcocc aiC* 
in 
msnet&rf 086 ^mi. i^^licles aiaa alkali i4aare«sc t^ % eoop^ratiOB 
acD :^^  tlieir cr.00£tary a^e&cies and tha curirci^ to coe^ieisetit 
tl3e CKpeeteS cem;:::3aic Icteyration en:4ivi t l i ^e oountjries* 
! • Llicn irr lci!3CBtiDg th4fi AQrcetaect ac€l <^ci^liry QD t l ^ 
r©le<7attt CKmsiarcs* t&D di££erecc@ ^t%®eiJ tt^ levelB Q£ 
^vcloim:-ctei p i r c r i t l r s sl-^ll !« taKem ict^ csRssiacratien* ^f 
mt^iacr Co^mtry nay bei tespararily cxecpt©€i Cc^ cs opplylog 
cer ta in a: t^is iXl^ re<2ii»nt*8 pro'^isioa i c ccscs «;l)er6 teiaporarf 
i o ^ I co&ditia:8 require i t (©%a?pt uniScr e t ^ i ^ a t c d circisiaetacces} 
Tliia CHc o^ticn « i i l be tor a limi^c€ period acf Ibif i^^cisicm ci: 
the suprcfflD CoiBKsll a*: the Cuil C^KJtcratic© couccil* 
i« Ko CKsuBtry stmii giv© any ppivilc-jca to a uaii-iiiccaacr 
country c a t s i ^ the privileges atipuSatea l»y this Agr^ eojDOt* 
I* ^ l i s ni^recfncot bceixms et£eetiv® £our mctiths £r^^ tt)@ 
approY^I. ( '^ UTG Bupretm Ct^iccii ttiereto* 
leo 
1* The ptoviaXotm of thla MJir^ iQemt stoll tm givett j^iority 
in ary cooflici;; with tim lo^ l iat» asa r«9Q3AUoiis oC ttw 
1« itie provislocs horeii^  shall mi^lece a l l oioilar provlsiona 
set £07th iD tte bilateral agr^^ncstB • 
* •«» •««« 
(^f r. Dccf^ ee r:9* H*13« ie«i*iya'^ tm A1 oura* Sat^i AraMa 
ifeproaiacc^ in • Kit file Eact executive aeports* 
tei 
^^^ 1^^ w^^ ^nmt^ wf^ flw^ BP^ w^' ^^^^ ^^^ 4 ^ ^ •^••^ 
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St}@ politics of i^e^ioeiaiiam m tue Tliira irorld** 
ilfit«?rm^9nil, ggggRliffltoi vol* si, ^ . i 
Winter 1977# pp» £0*ieS* 
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